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Abstract 
This dissertation reports a series of studies on social influences in decision making with wide-
ranging marketing implications in areas such as gamification initiatives, participative pricing 
mechanisms, and charity fundraising strategies. The body of this work comprises of three in-
depth, stand-alone studies. The first study, “Contagion of the Competitive Spirit: The Influence 
of a Competition on Non-Competitors”, investigates the influence of a competition on non-
competitors who do not participate in it but are aware of it. In a series of experimental studies, 
the study shows that the mere awareness of a competition can affect a non-competitor’s 
performance in similar tasks. These experiments provide confirmatory and process evidence 
for this contagion effect, showing that it is driven by heightened social comparison motivation 
due to mere awareness of the competition. In addition, the study finds evidence that the reward 
level for the competitors could moderate the contagion effect on the non-competitors.  
The second study, “The Negative Effects of Precommitment on Reciprocal Behaviour: 
Evidence from a Series of Voluntary Payment Experiments”, examines the effects of 
precommitment on reciprocal behaviour towards a forthcoming benefit. Through a series of 
experiments in several countries, the study shows that precommitment often weakens 
reciprocal behaviour. In two field experiments, a laboratory and an online experiment, the study 
finds consistent evidence that voluntary payment amounts decrease for individuals who are 
asked to precommit their payment.  The results from a final online trust-game experiment 
support the posited mental-accounting mechanism for the effect. 
The third study, “Hold-Up Induced by Demand for Fairness: Theory and Experimental 
Evidence”, explores the domain of hold-up and fairness concerns. While recent research 
suggests that fairness concerns could mitigate hold-up problems, this study proposes a starkly 
opposite possibility: that fairness concerns can also induce hold-up problems and thus 
significant inefficiencies. The study reports theoretical analysis and experimental evidence of 
hold-up in scenarios in which it will not occur if agents are purely self-interested, but could 
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This dissertation is comprised of an introductory chapter, three empirical research 
chapters and a concluding chapter.  
Chapter 2, “Contagion of the Competitive Spirit: The Influence of a Competition on 
Non-Competitors”, is co-authored with Dr. Markus Kunter and Dr. Vincent Mak (who are the 
second and third authors, respectively). A version of the paper has been published in the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. (115), 
no. 11. An earlier version of the paper has been presented at the INFORMS Marketing Science 
Conference 2018, Society for Judgment and Decision Making Conference 2017, Cass Business 
School Marketing Research Day 2017, London Business School European PhD Workshop 
2017 in addition to the seminars at the Cambridge Judge Business School. 
Chapter 3, “The Negative Effects of Precommitment on Reciprocal Behaviour: 
Evidence from a Series of Voluntary Payment Experiments” is co-authored with Dr. Vincent 
Mak and Professor Elie Ofek (who are the second and third authors, respectively). An earlier 
version of the paper has been presented at the INFORMS Marketing Science Conference 2018 
in addition to the seminars at the Cambridge Judge Business School. 
Chapter 4, “Hold-Up Induced by Demand for Fairness: Theory and Experimental 
Evidence”, is co-authored with Dr. Dominique Lauga and Dr. Vincent Mak (who are the second 
and third authors, respectively). An earlier version of the paper has been presented at the 
INFORMS Marketing Science Conference 2016 in addition to the seminars at the Cambridge 
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Social influence lies at the heart of understanding human behaviour and decision 
making. It has been central to the study of social psychology and fundamental to the research 
in consumer behaviour (Kirmani & Ferraro, 2016; Harkins & Williams, 2017). The study of 
social influences is not new. Research on both normative and informational social influences 
dates back several decades (Sherif, 1935; Asch, 1951, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1954). Over 
the years, some topics have formed the core of social influence research such as compliance 
(e.g., Freedman & Fraser, 1966), conformity (e.g., Asch 1951), and obedience (e.g., Milgram, 
1963). In marketing (and consumer behaviour, in particular), we see this manifested as 
exploration of the effect of influences such as social norms, social comparison and social 
contagion (see Kirmani & Ferraro, 2016, for a recent review of the literature).  
In this dissertation, I use the term social influence more broadly – to include themes of 
social interactions and social (other-regarding) preferences. I define social influence as – the 
process in which an individual’s attitude or behaviour is impacted by the observed (or 
perceived) attitude or behaviour of others. This definition distinguishes itself from the 
traditional characterization of social influence by including both the observation and the 
perception of other’s action or cognitions, as a cause to the effect on oneself. This dissertation 
adds to the investigation of social influence by exploring the previously unexplored areas with 
novel research questions. Chapter 2 investigates the influence of a competition on non-
competitors. Chapter 3 examines the effects of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour 
towards a forthcoming benefit. Finally, Chapter 4 explores how fairness concerns can also 
induce hold-up problems.  
As stated above, the body of this work comprises of three in-depth, stand-alone studies. 
The first study (Chapter 2) shows how mere awareness of competition can heighten comparison 
concerns and influence individuals who are not competing. In addition, the chapter shows 
intriguing effects of monetary reward on this influence. Our second study (Chapter 3) 
investigates the effect of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour. In particular, the study 
hypothesizes and finds concrete evidence for a weakening effect of precommitment on 
reciprocal behaviour. The third study (Chapter 4) explores the effect of fairness concerns on 





Following a series of peer-reviewed feedback, the work remains in progress with opportunities 
for extension and improvement. 
Central to the three studies in this dissertation are their counter-intuitive yet robust 
findings. The individual studies not only contribute to the relevant literature but also provide 
opportunities for extension and future research. Equally important, the studies provide 
actionable evidence-based managerial insights. Finally, Chapter 5 of this dissertation provides 
headline findings and further discusses the managerial and research relevance of the three 
studies. The rest of this introduction provides a general context that motivates the three papers 
and highlights its findings. 
 
1.1. Contagion of the Competitive Spirit:  
The Influence of a Competition on Non Competitors 
In the field of marketing, competition is a common occurrence among firms and 
individuals attempting to close a deal, secure a contract, or win a reward. With the recent rise 
in gamification strategies (Seaborn & Fels, 2015), competition is frequently induced as a tool 
for motivation in incentivising the salesperson, designing platforms or engaging customers. 
However, such initiatives rarely stimulate full participation – in the competition – from its 
target population. In fact, it is typical that the competing individuals are far outnumbered by 
people who are aware of the competition but do not participate in it. Given the importance of 
these non-competitors, understanding the intricacies of their behaviour is crucial to a firm’s 
revenue, employee motivation, customer engagement and, ultimately, its success. 
In Chapter 2, we investigate the influence of a competition on non-competitors. In 
particular, we raise the question: what impact might the competition have among non-
competitors, who do not engage in competition but are aware of it? In investigating this 
contagion effect of competition, we dive into an important yet unexplored area of human 
behaviour. In our theoretical development, we surmise that awareness of competition can 
induce, in non-competitors, a perception of rivalry among competitors. This, in turn, makes 
social comparison more salient, among non-competitors, and heightens the social comparison 






The study uses a series of experiments, in the field and online, to show how the mere 
awareness of a competition can have an intriguing effect on the behaviour of non-competitors. 
First, we report on a large field experiment (Study 1 – Section 2.3) conducted at a German zoo 
with a Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing scheme. Customers at the zoo, during the period 
of the experiment, could pay any amount they wanted for the entrance. In the treatment, run 
among a subset of the customers, a participant had the option to take part in competition. Our 
results show that customers who did not participate in the competition, but were aware of it, 
paid more than customers who were not aware of the competition – establishing the presence 
of the contagion effect. 
This field experiment is followed by three online experiments conducted over 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). These experiments investigate the research question in 
a more controlled setting. Our second experiment (Study 2A – Section 2.4) exogenously assigns 
participants into competition role and demonstrates the contagion effect in a real effort context, 
which is highly different from the monetary context of the field experiment. Our third 
experiment (Study 2B – Section 2.5) provides evidence that awareness of competition is 
necessary for the contagion effect and eliminates alternative mechanisms for the observed 
effect. Finally, our fourth experiment (Study 3 – Section 2.6) provides process evidence for the 
mechanism put forth. Study 3 also demonstrates how the influence of competition on non-
competition changes with the reward levels for the competition. 
In conclusion, Chapter 2 provides evidence that competition could indeed have an effect 
on non-competitors and this influence could change in an intriguing way according to the 
characteristics of the competition. 
 
1.2. The Negative Effects of Precommitment on Reciprocal Behaviour: 
Evidence from a Series of Voluntary Payment Experiments 
Many aspects of social life revolve around people receiving and reciprocating benefits. 
Oftentimes, there is little uncertainty about the benefits to be received, and it might seem 
unimportant as to whether the beneficiary is asked to precommit his/her reciprocal behaviour 
beforehand. Chapter 3 examines the effects of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour towards 
a forthcoming benefit. The research focuses on a baseline scenario with little or no uncertainty 





should make little difference. Through a series of experiments in several countries that involve 
voluntary payments, we show that, in fact, precommitment often weakens reciprocal behaviour. 
 We theorize a general mechanism based on the concept of mental accounting. We then 
test our hypothesis using a series of experiments. Our field experiment uses PWYW pricing 
scheme for tickets for familiar beverages at a restaurant (Study 1 – Section 3.4). We find that 
payment amounts decreases when consumers are asked to precommit their payment. The field 
experiment is followed by a laboratory experiment (Study 2 – Section 3.5) where, in a 
controlled setting, participants could pay any amount they wanted for an Amazon voucher. The 
laboratory experiment provides consistent evidence of precommitment weakening reciprocal 
behaviour. In our fourth experiment (Study 3 – Section 3.6), similar effects are observed even 
when participants are able to precommit their payment contingent on the outcome of a lottery. 
Our fifth and final experiment (Study 4 – Section 3.7) provided process evidence for the posited 
mechanism using an online trust game. 
 Altogether, Chapter 3 theorizes and provides consistent evidence that precommitment 
can weaken reciprocal behaviour. In doing so, this research investigates a previously 
unexplored relationship between precommitment and reciprocal behaviour. Furthermore, this 
paper makes contributions towards literature on charitable fundraising, adds to the growing 
research on PWYW, and provides actionable managerial insights. The research suggests that, 
for example, a non-profit should offer souvenir gifts to donors before asking for donations; the 
management of a well-known museum should solicit donations at exit; and a business running 
a pay-what-you-want campaign on familiar products should ask customers for payments after 
the customers obtain these products.  
 
1.3. Hold-Up Induced by Demand for Fairness:  
Theory and Experimental Evidence 
Humans are often wary of committing to relationships, from matrimonial bond to 
supply chain cooperation and alliances in various domains of the society. Commitment 
involves making a relationship-specific investment (by means of sinking resources or foregoing 
outside opportunities) with an aim to improve the value of the relationship. However, a 
common dilemma for the potential investor is whether the relationship partner would 
expropriate all or most of the gains resulting from the investment, leaving the investor with no 





the relationship, thus thwarting opportunities to improve the value of the relationship. This, in 
essence, is the hold-up problem, which could result in significant inefficiencies. 
Hold-ups are a prevalent concern when ex ante contracts are incomplete and ex post 
negotiations are not preventable (e.g., Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1983; Grossman & Hart, 1986; 
Hart & Moore, 1990). Recent research has shown that fairness concerns could mitigate hold-
up problem (e.g., von Siemens, 2009; Dufwenberg et al., 2013, among others. See Section 4.1 
for more). In Chapter 4, we propose a starkly opposite possibility: that fairness concerns can 
also induce hold-up problems. In this research, we present and analyse a model showing that, 
even when hold-up does not occur with self-interested agents, it could occur under inequity 
aversion. We then report a laboratory experiment that provides empirical evidence for the hold-
up induced by demand for fairness.  
Our results demonstrate how reciprocating tendencies trace insufficiently backwards 
over a path of actions, and therefore cannot remedy hold-up induced by perceived distributional 
fairness demand. The intended audience of this chapter are researchers in behavioural and 
experimental economics alongside marketers interested in channel relationships. The study is 
a work in progress and the extensions suggested in Section 4.5 and Chapter 5 showcases key 
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2. Contagion of the Competitive Spirit:  
The Influence of a Competition on Non Competitors 
 
Abstract 
We report a series of experimental studies that investigate the influence of a competition on 
non-competitors who do not participate in it but are aware of it. Our work is highly relevant 
across many domains of social life where competitions are prevalent, as it is typical in a 
competition that the competitors are far outnumbered by these non-competitors. In our field 
experiment involving pay-what-you-want entrance at a German zoo (N = 22,886), customers 
who were aware of a competition over entrance payments, but did not participate in it, paid 
more than customers who were unaware of the competition. Further experiments provide 
confirmatory and process evidence for this contagion effect, showing that it is driven by 
heightened social comparison motivation due to mere awareness of the competition. Moreover, 
we find evidence that the reward level for the competitors could moderate the contagion effect 
on the non-competitors. Even if an individual does not participate in a competition, their 
behaviour can still be influenced by it; and this influence can change with the characteristics 
of the competition in an intriguing way. 
 








From workplace to classrooms, from social media to sports fields, competitions are 
ever-present in social life. The recent rise in gamification strategies (Seaborn & Fels, 2015) in 
areas such as education, crowdsourcing, and marketing, further popularizes attempts to 
motivate people by engaging them in competitions. However, such initiatives may not always 
induce full or majority participation among the target population: it is typical in a competition 
that the competing individuals are far outnumbered by people who do not participate in it 
despite being aware of it. Consider a fundraising event organizer who charges attendees on a 
pay-what-you-want basis for entry to the event, and in addition advertises a voluntary 
competition with rewards for the top donors. If the competition has a participation fee or 
requests personal contact information for participation, many attendees may not enter into it. 
What impact might the competition still have on the entrance payments of these non-competing 
attendees?  
Alternatively, consider a business organization in which two senior partners vie for the 
role of the managing partner. It is pertinent for the firm’s board of directors to promote the 
senior partner with the better performance. It might then be natural to expect that the two senior 
partners, when told they are in consideration for the promotion, would respond competitively 
with improved effort and performance at work. Would the other staff, who are aware of the 
competition but are not participating in it themselves, be influenced by this competition in their 
own office work?  
A third example comes from the fact that, in innovative market places, competition is 
often encouraged and winners are rewarded by public bodies. If these incentives are targeted 
at only a few leading players, what influence could they have on the rest of the industry?  
In these cases, as in other similar circumstances, could the competition have any power 
in influencing the non-competitors? Could simply making people aware of an ongoing 
competition produce a contagion effect on their behaviour? If yes, the design and public 
communications of competitions should factor in influences on non-competitors too. These 
questions highly warrant investigations and are the central objectives of the present article, in 







2.2. Theoretical Development 
Note that, throughout this article, we define competitors as individuals who are 
performing a task with the knowledge that the best-performing individual(s) among themselves 
will receive rewards; the rewards can be symbolic (e.g., recognition by the organizer) or 
material (e.g., cash). In the context of a specific competition, non-competitors could broadly 
mean anyone who is not a competitor; here, we use the term as a shorthand to particularly refer 
to individuals who are aware of the ongoing competition and are performing an identical or 
similar task as the competitors, but without the competition rewards as incentives. Non-
competitors in this sense abound in many scenarios, as in the examples above. 
Lastly, the term contagion as used here should be distinguished from its use in the 
context of social contagion or social influence (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Erb & Bohner, 
2007; Gump & Kulik, 1997; Hatfield et al., 1993, Mossaid et al., 2017). Social contagion is 
largely about how people might be affected by observations of the expressions or behaviour of 
others. Here, the term “contagion” refers specifically to any behavioural impact of the mere 
awareness of an ongoing competition on non-competitors’ task performance, without any 
information about the actual behaviour of the competitors. The designs of our studies do not 
involve communicating information about competitors’ performance – or behaviour in general 
– to the non-competitors. The non-competitors in our studies are only informed that there is a 
competition; in other words, they are merely aware of the competition. Yet we still obtain 
supporting evidence for the contagion effect. 
There has been substantial research on the behaviour of competitors, from works in the 
early and mid-20th century (e.g., Whittemore, 1925; Deutsch, 1949) to numerous studies in 
recent decades in psychology, economics, and management (Malhotra, 2010; Garcia et al., 
2013; Dechenaux et al., 2015). These studies have largely focused on competitors’ behaviour 
and how it is motivated by social comparison – the human tendency to self-evaluate by 
comparing oneself with others (Festinger, 1954). For example, Garcia et al. (2013) proposed a 
general model in which various situational and individual factors could influence social 
comparison concerns, which could in turn influence competitive behaviour. But the model was 
proposed for individuals who are directly engaged in competitions; this and other related 
models have rarely, if ever, touched on the influence of a competition on non-competitors. 
Here, in a departure from the theorizing in previous literature, we surmise that the 





competitors, if only in a vicarious form: “sensing the heat of the game” despite not participating 
in it. Perceptions of rivalry can be understood as the consciousness that the competitors would 
strive towards overtaking each other’s competition performance, in order to achieve the goal 
of winning the competition (Malhotra, 2010). A major driver of such competitive activities is 
social comparison. Perceptions of rivalry might then also induce in non-competitors a 
heightened social comparison motivation, such as by making social comparison more salient 
(see the General Discussion for further details). The result is increased effort and improved 
performance among non-competitors, and hence the contagion effect.  
In the following sections, we report a series of experimental studies that establish 
positive evidence for the contagion, as well as process evidence in the support of our theoretical 
development.  
Study 1 is a large-scale field experiment conducted at a German Zoo. The study 
involved a pay-what-you-want (PWYW) payment structure where customers in the treatment 
condition, apart from deciding on how much to pay, could also self-select into competing for a 
reward based on the amount they paid. The results of the study provide evidence for existence 
of the aforementioned contagion effect in a monetary payment context.  
Study 2A and 2B investigates the research question in a more controlled experimental 
setting. Study 2A, conducted over Mechanical Turk, exogenously assigns participants the 
competition role and demonstrates the contagion effect in the real-effort context, highly 
different from the monetary context of Study 1. Study 2B, with a design similar to Study 2A, 
provides evidence that awareness of a competition is necessary for the contagion effect and 
eliminates alternative mechanisms to the observed effect.  
Finally, Study 3 introduces a variation in competition reward across conditions to 
demonstrate how the non-competitors’ performance changes with reward for competition. 
Furthermore, the study introduces measures to elucidate the process; thereby, providing process 
evidence to the mechanism put forth. The moderation effect of competition reward further 
provides evidence to the existence of contagion effect. Altogether, the four studies put forth a 
case for existence of the contagion effect of competition on non-competitors, provides evidence 
of the effect and the process in monetary and real-effort context, eliminates competing 
mechanisms, and displays a moderation effect of competition reward on the contagion effect. 






2.3. Study 1: Contagion in Monetary Payment 
Study 1 was a large-scale field experiment that provided evidence for the existence of 
the posited contagion effect in a monetary payment context. The experiment involved pay-
what-you-want (PWYW) entrance at a German zoo. Under PWYW pricing, all customers face 
the decision of how much to pay (which can be zero or any positive amount) for the target 
product (good or service). PWYW can be a tool by which we can study how people’s economic 
decisions can be affected by behavioural factors, whether situational or individual (e.g., Gneezy 
et al., 2010, 2012; Kunter, 2015; Mak et al., 2015). Study 1 leverages this possibility by 
superimposing a customer competition over PWYW pricing. Our setup could demonstrate how 
customers who were aware of the competition, but opted to not participate in it, might still be 
influenced by the very existence of that competition, as manifested in those customers’ 
monetary payment under PWYW.  
We also examine the robustness of our hypothesized contagion effect across 
competitions with different framing and reward structures – which can be subsumed under the 
situational factor of incentive structures in models of competitive behaviour such as Garcia et 
al. (2013). It is plausible that, if the contagion effect exists at all, it might be significant only 
when the competition is very explicitly worded as it is communicated to the non-competitors; 
or that the reward structure needs to give the impression of intense competition, such as having 
only one prize for the very best performer. The design of the field experiment sought to address 
these possible boundary conditions. 
2.3.1. Materials and Methods 
The field experiment took place at a zoo in a major German city from mid-December 
2013 to early January 2014, when PWYW entrance was offered to all customers. Prior to the 
experiment, ethical clearance was obtained from the second author’s institution at that time; 
the experiment was exempt from informed consent at the institution. Four treatment conditions, 
each a competition over entrance payments, took place simultaneously during part of this 
period; the remainder of the PWYW period constituted the control condition for comparison. 
Every customer in the treatment conditions was randomly assigned to one condition and did 
not know about the existence of the other conditions. The treatment conditions differ according 
to whether the competition is presented as a reward scheme in neutral wordings, or explicitly 
presented as a contest among customers; and, whether there are one or seven prizes (see Section 





be equivalent to one annual family pass to the zoo (worth 145 Euros) plus 400-Euros worth of 
Amazon Gift Cards. 
In every treatment condition, the customer was given a short, one-page questionnaire 
at the entrance to the zoo (see Section 2.10 – Appendix A). The questionnaire began with 
information about the relevant competition. The customer was then requested to state whether 
he/she would like to participate in the competition; if the customer opted to be a competitor, 
he/she would need to provide contact details in the questionnaire. Regardless of the reply to 
the question about participation in the competition, the customer then needed to write down 
how much he/she would like to pay for their entrance to the zoo. If the customer was 
accompanying one or more children, he/she would also need to state the additional price(s) 
paid for them.  In the control condition, the questionnaire did not mention any competition, but 
began directly with the request to state payments for entrance. In all conditions, the customer 
was also asked to state whether he/she was visiting the zoo for the first time during the period 
of the experiment, as well as their gender. After completing the questionnaire, the customer 
took it to the admission counter, and paid the stated amounts on the questionnaire. Note that 
the non-competing customers in the treatment conditions were not informed about the 
payments of competing customers. Moreover, the winners of the competitions were only 
announced after the PWYW period was over. 
2.3.2. Results 
We analyse the payment data of customers who stated they were visiting the zoo for 
the first time during the period of the experiment and focus on the price the customer decided 
to pay for his/her own entry. As such, we screen out questionnaire respondents who, as noted 
by the zoo staff at the entrance, were not adults, and thus were relatively likely to have not 
made independent payment decisions; these respondents made up 3.14% of the pre-screening 
payment observations. The final dataset consists of a total of 22,886 payment observations 
from 12,076 (52.77%) self-reported females and 10,212 (44.62%) self-reported males; the 
remaining 598 or 3.61% payment observations have missing data on gender.  
Of the analysed payment observations, 13,056 (57.05%) were from the control 
condition and 9,830 (42.95%) were from the treatment conditions. Among the latter, 1,652 
were from customers who opted to participate in the competition, yielding a participation rate 
of 16.81%. The remaining 8,178 observations were from non-competing customers who were 





– Insert Table 1 around here – 
The major findings are summarized in Table 1. As shown in the table, in the control 
condition, the mean PWYW payment at the entrance was 5.42 Euros, which was predictably 
lower than the regular adult admission fee of 14 Euros. But the fact that the mean payment was 
non-negligibly positive, as opposed to zero (as standard economic reasoning might predict), is 
consistent with previous empirical findings that people often make a positive payment under 
PWYW. In addition, the mean payment under the control condition was lower than the mean 
PWYW payment among competing customers in every treatment condition, which averaged 
to an overall mean of 6.34 Euros (s.d. = 3.84 Euros, 95% CI: [6.15,6.52]) across conditions, a 
16.97% increase from the control which was statistically significant (t(14,706)=12.17,P<0.01, 
Cohen’s d = 0.28). Participation in a competition over PWYW payments with prizes did lead 
to higher payments, as would be expected from both psychological and economic perspectives.  
What is most surprising, but in agreement with a contagion effect of competitions on 
non-competitors, is that the mean payment of non-competing customers in every treatment 
conditions is significantly higher than the control condition mean. The overall mean payment 
of non-competing customers was 5.76 Euros (s.d. = 2.99 Euros, 95% CI: [5.69, 5.82]), which 
was 0.34 Euros higher than the mean payment in the control condition, representing a 6.27% 
increase; this is significantly higher than in the control condition with t(21,232) =8.43, P<0.01, 
Cohen’s d = 0.12. As noted in Table 1, the same conclusions hold for pairwise t-tests comparing 
each treatment condition with the control condition.  
A 2 (framing) × 2 (number of prizes) between-subjects ANOVA on non-competitors’ 
payments in the treatment conditions does not yield any significant main or interaction effects 
(P > 0.25 for the main effects; P = 0.11 for the interaction), suggesting that the contagion in 
our field experiment had been robust across the treatment conditions: neither an explicit contest 
framing or a reward structure with a single prize, was needed for the contagion. 
Lastly, it is useful to confirm that the payments of competitors were generally higher 
than those of non-competitors: aggregate comparison yields t(9,828) =6.86, P < 0.01, Cohen’s 
d =0.17, and the same conclusions hold for pairwise t-tests for each treatment condition (P < 
0.01 in all comparisons). Note that the effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.17 is in fact comparable 
with the contagion effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.12 reported earlier. In other words, the effect 





straightforwardly expected) was comparable with the contagion effect that raised non-
competitors’ payments over control customers. 
2.3.3. Discussion 
Study 1 provided field experimental evidence for the contagion effect. If a customer 
had opted out of a payment competition, his/her PWYW payment was effectively made in a 
similar economic context as a customer in the control condition. Yet the awareness that some 
other customers might be competing over their payments raised the non-competing customer’s 
own PWYW payment. The contagion effect we observe could hardly be attributed to social 
influence in the form of observing others, but could be attributed to the very awareness of an 
ongoing competition among other individuals.  
On the surface, our results are subject to several potential confounding factors that are 
peculiar to this field setting. One potential confounding factor is that the non-competitors might 
have felt guilty and obliged to pay more because they had turned down the zoo’s invitation to 
participate in the competition. But note that the customers could pay whatever they liked 
whether they were competitors or not. In turning down the option to participate in the 
competition, the non-competitors had not shut themselves off from paying any amount to the 
zoo, nor had they compromised any moral obligations.   
Another potential confounding factor is that customers in the treatment conditions could 
have perceived the competition as a new means to raise funds, and by implication, that the zoo 
might be in dire need of revenues. Therefore, it could be argued, non-competitors would be 
motivated to pay more than they would have done without being aware of the competition. 
However, from our observations in the field, the zoo had a public image to the local population 
(who made up a large majority of its customers) of being very well funded. We find no evidence 
that the PWYW initiative or the competitions were perceived as fundraising exercises. 
A third confounding factor can be put forward based on self-selection. The policy of 
the zoo dictated that customers who entered the zoo on the days of the competitions must be 
entitled to compete. That is, any non-competitor observations could only be from customers 
who voluntarily opted out of their assigned competition. The field experiment is in fact 
empirically useful in this sense, as many competitions in real life involve voluntary 
participation. Nevertheless, the policy also implies potential self-selection issues, as customers 





contagion effect when participation in competition is exogenously assigned. We address these 
issues in Study 2A. 
 
2.4. Study 2A: Contagion in the Performance of a Real Effort Task 
The objective of Study 2A is to provide confirmatory evidence for the existence of the 
contagion effect in a more controlled experimental setting. We conducted Study 2A on the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Instead of monetary payment, participants in Study 2A 
are asked to perform a well-defined real effort task conducted through a computer interface. 
Our primary purpose is to observe whether non-competing participants’ performance scores in 
a task change (resulting in a within-subjects difference) once they are informed that some other 
participants are competing over the same task. Our second purpose is to demonstrate the 
contagion effect in a highly different context from Study 1’s monetary payment. In the design 
of this study, we assign competition participation exogenously and randomly to study 
participants, and therefore the self-selection confounding factor in the setting of Study 1 is not 
applicable.  
2.4.1. Materials and Methods 
We conducted Study 2A in an Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) environment 
following commonly accepted standards of practice (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). After 
excluding participants based on attention checks and honesty checks, the observations of 557 
participants are included in the study (out of an initial number of 720 participants), including 
352 (63.20%) females and 205 (36.80%) males. Most (434, or 77.92%) of the participants were 
aged between 25 and 54. Prior to the experiment, ethical clearance was obtained from the first 
author’s institution. Informed consent was obtained from all participants at the beginning of 
the study using an online form. 
The experimental task (see Section 2.11 – Appendix B) is an adaptation from Gill & 
Prowse (2012) using the Qualtrics interface. In the task, the participant is presented with 60 
identical sliders on the computer screen; each slider is positioned at 0 on a scale with markings 
that range from 0 to 100. The task is to move, by dragging or clicking the computer mouse, as 
many of these sliders as possible from the starting position at 0 to exactly 50, the mid-point of 





The design consists of six rounds of the task. The participant’s performance score in 
the round is the number of sliders (out of 60) that he/she has positioned at the mid-point of the 
scale at the end of the round. The first four rounds are identical for all participants; but in round 
5-6, participants in the treatment conditions are informed that they have been randomly 
assigned into a 50-person group, half of which are further randomly assigned to be competitors 
for a cash reward (manipulated at two levels across conditions) while the other half are assigned 
to be non-competitors. 
The experimental design consists of one control condition and eight treatment 
conditions across which competition context, competition role, and competition reward are 
manipulated. In all conditions, participants are informed at the start that they would be paid a 
fixed participation fee of $0.5. They are also informed that the study consists of two sections, 
namely Section A to be followed by Section B.  
Formally, the treatment conditions form a 2(competition context: no competition versus 
competition) × 2(competition role: competitor versus non-competitor) × 2(competition reward: 
$0.5 versus $10) mixed design, where competition context is a within-subjects factor while 
competition role and competition reward are between-subjects factors. Section A, the first four 
rounds (round 1-4) of the slider task, being identically setup as in the control condition, form 
the “no competition” manipulation in terms of the within-subjects factor of competition 
context. Section B, the final two rounds (round 5-6), form the “competition” manipulation of 
the competition context factor. 
Section A is identical in all conditions, and consists of four rounds of the slider task. 
Participants in all conditions are fully informed about the tasks in Section B at the beginning 
of Section B, but not before. In the control condition, Section B consists of two more rounds 
of the slider task with no additional incentives. In the treatment conditions, the two sections 
are the within-subjects competition context manipulations of the experiment: at the beginning 
of Section B, every participant is informed that he/she is randomly matched with 49 other 
participants to form a 50-person group; they are then informed that half of their group are 
assigned to compete over their total performance scores. Within the same group, the competing 
participant with the highest total performance score among competing participants would be 
the winner and could receive a monetary reward; ties would be settled by a coin toss. The 
remaining half of the participants are fully informed about the competition, but are assigned to 





subjects manipulation of competition role. Lastly, to examine the robustness of our 
hypothesized contagion effect, we vary the competition cash reward level between $0.5 (low) 
and $10 (high) across treatment conditions. These form the between-subjects manipulation of 
competition reward. 
2.4.2. Results & Discussion 
Our focus is to establish evidence for contagion along the within-subjects dimension of 
competition context. That is, we look for support for our premise that non-competing 
participants in the treatment conditions, who were informed about an ongoing competition 
among other participants in round 5 and round 6 of the same session, would yield a different 
performance score in those rounds, compared with previous rounds without such awareness. In 
order to eliminate confounding factors related to learning and/or satiation – which would have 
existed without any competitions – we also seek to demonstrate that performance scores would 
not change in the same way in the control condition. 
– Insert Table 2 around here – 
For our data analysis, we divide the six rounds into three blocks of two rounds each. 
We then calculate, for the control condition and then for each role in each treatment condition, 
descriptive statistics of the performance scores. The results are summarized in Table 2. As is 
apparent from the table, there is a learning effect over the first four rounds in all conditions and 
with both roles in the treatment conditions. But there is a plateauing in the control condition 
from block 2 (round 3-4) to block 3 (round 5-6), so that there is no significant difference in 
performance scores over those two blocks.  
By contrast, performance scores increase significantly among non-competitors, once 
they are informed about the competition, at both reward levels in the treatment conditions (P = 
0.01). Unlike the competitors, non-competitors have no incentives to perform differently in 
round 5-6, when they know about an ongoing competition that does not involve them. Thus, 
we have obtained evidence for the contagion effect in the treatment conditions across both 
reward levels. Lastly, as might be expected, performance scores increase significantly between 
blocks 2 and 3 among competitors in every treatment condition.  
Since all participants went through the same four initial rounds in the experiment, 
potential between-subjects effects in round 5-6 might have been diminished by the identical 
initial experience. But pairwise t-test comparisons still reveal significant differences in 





treatment conditions, with marginally significant difference for the remaining treatment 
condition (see Table 2). Moreover, all pairwise t-test comparisons of mean performance scores 
in block 3 among the treatment conditions yield P > 0.1. Lastly, between-subjects differences 
in any of the first two blocks between the control and any treatment condition are all non-
significant (P > 0.1 in all relevant t-tests). These results, wherever pertaining to non-
competitors, lend further support to the contagion effect.   
 
2.5. Study 2B: The Necessity of the Awareness of a Competition;  
Eliminating Alternative Mechanisms 
The previously observed contagion is subject to explanations via three alternative 
mechanisms that do not require the awareness of a competition. One alternative mechanism is 
that the non-competitors might have been conscious of being assigned into one half of a group 
with the other half being the competitors. This group assignment might have increased social 
comparison motivations among the non-competitors leading to improved performance 
(Bornstein & Erev, 1994; Lount & Phillips, 2007). While the group assignment is part of the 
implementation of the experimental conditions, its potential effect is not necessitated, in 
principle, by the awareness of a competition, but by more general group dynamics. Another 
alternative mechanism is that the presence of an additional incentive among competitors might 
have created a vicarious motivating effect on non-competitors. A third alternative mechanism 
can be proposed based on an anchoring effect mechanism: the awareness of a competition 
might have induced the non-competitors in our studies to hypothesize that the performance 
levels of the competitor would be higher than had there been no competition at all; the 
hypothesized performance levels could have in turn induced an anchoring effect (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) that caused the non-competitors to perform better. While this alternative 
mechanism is driven by the awareness of a competition, it is not necessitated, in principle, by 
that awareness, but by the anchoring effect that follows it. 
To address these concerns, the objective of Study 2B is to provide evidence that the 
awareness of a competition is necessary for the contagion effect in the two previous studies. 
For this purpose, Study 2B has an experimental design that closely follows that of Study 2A 
and employed the same slider task as in Study 2A except that there is no competition. The 





the scheme was entered into a lottery draw to win a cash reward if his/her performance scores 
reached a threshold.  
2.5.1. Materials and Methods 
We conducted Study 2B over MTurk following the same standards of practice as in 
Study 2A. After excluding participants based on attention checks and honesty checks, the 
observations of 328 participants are included in the study (out of an initial number of 400 
participants), including 196 (59.76%) females and 132 (40.24%) males. Most (248, or 75.61%) 
of the participants were aged between 25 and 54. Prior to the experiment, ethical clearance was 
obtained from the first author’s institution. Informed consent was obtained from all participants 
at the beginning of the study using an online form. 
Formally, Study 2B has a 2(incentive scheme context: no incentive scheme versus 
presence of incentive scheme) × 2(incentive scheme participation role: participant in scheme 
versus non-participant in scheme) × 2(incentive scheme reward: $0.5 versus $10) mixed 
design, where incentive scheme context is a within-subjects factor while incentive scheme 
participation role and incentive scheme reward are between-subjects factors.  
Study 2B closely follows the six-round slider task design of the treatment conditions in 
Study 2A. But, instead of a competition and a random assignment of roles into competitors and 
non-competitors in round 5-6 (Section B), there is an incentive scheme in that section without 
any competitive elements, and a random assignment of roles into participants and non-
participants of that scheme. The incentive scheme is such that, if a participant of the scheme 
achieves a total performance score of 100 (5/6 of the maximum possible score of 120) or more 
over round 5-6, he/she will be entered into a lottery in which one entrant will be randomly 
chosen to earn a pre-specified cash reward; all entrants into the lottery have an equal chance of 
winning the reward. Across conditions the cash reward is manipulated at $0.5 and $10, as with 
the reward levels in Study 2A. We choose the threshold of 100 for the incentive scheme 
because, across the conditions in Study 2A, 100 is approximately the upper quartile among the 
total performance scores in round 5-6. As in the treatment conditions in Study 2A, study 
participants in Study 2B are informed at the start of Section B that they are randomly assigned 
to a 50-person group, half of whom are further randomly assigned to be participants of the 
incentive scheme. 
Similar to Study 2A, participation roles are randomly assigned within each 50-person 





assigned to be non-participants. Furthermore, note that an additional incentive is present among 
the participants of the scheme; and non-participants of the scheme might hypothesize that the 
participants of the scheme would perform better than had there been no incentive scheme, 
which could then induce an anchoring effect. We therefore maintain the group assignment, the 
presence of an additional incentive, and the possibility of an induced anchoring effect among 
non-participants; the only change is that there is no competition. If we observe no contagion 
effect in Study 2B, we would obtain evidence that the contagion effect in previous studies is 
necessitated by the awareness of a competition, and none of the alternative mechanisms 
proposed earlier could account for it. 
2.5.2. Results and Discussion 
We use a similar data analysis approach as in Study 2A by dividing the six rounds into 
three blocks of two rounds each, and focus on the presence or absence of within-subjects 
effects. That is, we examine the difference in performance in final two rounds for subjects, who 
are informed of an ongoing incentive scheme but are not participating in it, compared with their 
performance in previous rounds without such awareness.  
– Insert Table 3 around here – 
The block-by-block descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 3. There is a learning 
effect over the first four rounds in all but one of the conditions. Once the incentive scheme is 
introduced in block 3 (round 5-6), there was – as noted in Table 3 – a statistically significant 
improvement in performance among participants in the scheme, when the reward is sufficiently 
high at $10. But otherwise, there is no significant improvement in performance, in particular 
among non-participants of the scheme (P > 0.25 in all within-subjects t-test comparisons 
between block 2 and block 3), unlike among the non-competitors in Study 2A; in fact, non-
participants of the scheme perform slightly worse on average upon learning about the scheme 
and their non-participating role. In addition, we find no significant differences between any 
condition in Study 2B and the control condition in Study 2A (P > 0.5 in all pairwise t-test 
comparisons). To sum up, despite maintaining similar group assignment design and reward 
levels as in Study 2A, the incentive scheme in Study 2B does not lead to any significant 
contagion effect. Study 2B thus provides support for the fact that the contagion effect in Study 






2.6. Study 3: Further Process Evidence;  
Contagion Moderated by Competition Reward 
Study 3 has two major objectives. First, it aims to provide more direct process evidence 
for the contagion effect. The process measurements would have been highly prone to demand 
effect in Study 2A, because participants in the treatment conditions in that study would have 
experienced a change of role from round 4 to round 5. In the present study, the competition 
roles were assigned from the beginning of the study, thereby minimizing demand effect 
concerns.  
The second objective of Study 3 is to demonstrate how non-competitors’ performance 
could change as the competition reward increases across conditions. Since the non-competitors 
are not competing for the reward, any moderating effect of the reward level provides additional 
support for a contagion effect. In relation, we introduce a no-monetary-reward competition 
condition in the design. This serves as a clear low-end boundary of reward level; it is also 
motivated by findings from previous research (Heyman & Ariely, 2004) that symbolic social 
incentives, in addition to monetary incentives, could play a significant role in motivating task 
performance. 
The process evidence objective of this study is intertwined with the objective to 
demonstrate a moderating effect of the competition reward on contagion. We propose that, as 
the reward increases, non-competitors have heightened perceptions of rivalry among the 
competitors, which result in heightened social comparison motivation and more positive 
contagion. But we also conjecture that, if the reward level is sufficiently high compared with 
what the non-competing participants are receiving from the task, it can possibly induce an 
additional, counteracting reference effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). That is, the non-
competitors compare their task payment with what a competitor could earn from the 
experiment, and perceive their task payment as substantially low in comparison; this perception 
can have a general negative impact on the monetary and social comparison motivational drivers 
of performance. At sufficiently high reward levels, it can possibly lead to a negative moderating 
effect as reward further increases.   
Recall that, in Study 2A, reward level did not seem to moderate contagion in round 5-
6, as non-competitors’ performance scores in round 5-6 did not differ across reward levels with 
statistical significance. But, as pointed out before, Study 2A was not primarily designed to 





rounds in the experiment, potential between-subjects effects in round 5-6 might have been 
diminished. This calls for a different design that is more conducive to detecting between-
subjects effects.  
2.6.1. Materials and Methods 
We conducted Study 3 over MTurk following the same standards of practice as in Study 
2A. After excluding participants based on attention checks and honesty checks, the 
observations of 657 participants are included in the study (out of an initial number of 805 
participants), including 356 (54.19%) females and 301 (45.81%) males. Most (491, or 74.73%) 
of the participants were aged between 25 and 54. Prior to the experiment, ethical clearance was 
obtained from the first author’s institution. Informed consent was obtained from all participants 
at the beginning of the study using an online form. 
Formally, the treatment conditions follow a 3(competition reward: $0 versus $0.5 
versus $10) × 2(competition role: competitor versus non-competitor) between-subjects design. 
The lottery control conditions have a 2(lottery reward: $0.5 versus $10) × 2(lottery 
participation role: lottery participant versus non-lottery-participant) between-subjects design.  
Every participant completed four rounds of the slider task for a participation fee of $0.5. 
In the competition treatment conditions, participants at every level of competition reward ($0 
versus $0.5 versus $10) are informed that approximately one-third of them are assigned to be 
competitors. In the lottery control conditions, participants at every level of lottery reward ($0.5 
versus $10) are informed that approximately one-third of them are assigned to be lottery 
participants. 
Study 3 consists of four rounds of the same task as in Study 2A, but without any initial 
no-competition rounds. That is, from round 1 onwards, the participant is either a competitor or 
non-competitor, and the competition is based on the total performance score over all four 
rounds. The reward of the competition is manipulated at three levels across conditions. These 
include a $0-reward level, which is motivated by (Heyman & Ariely, 2004) as explained above. 
The other two reward levels are $0.5 and $10. They are, respectively, commensurate with and 
much higher than the typical earnings from an MTurk task with a similar duration (around 10 
minutes) as the study (Bohannon, 2016). Moreover, the high reward level of $10 is designed 
to be much higher than the payment to non-competitors (a participation fee of $0.5), so as to 
facilitate the demotivating reference effect discussed earlier. Approximately one-third (as 





contrast to our posited effects and process evidence, we also conducted a number of lottery 
control conditions. The design of those conditions closely follows the positive cash reward 
conditions among the competition conditions, except that, where there would be a competition, 
in its place is a lottery in which every lottery participant had an equal probability to receive the 
reward in addition to the participation fee. 
In all conditions, we administer three self-report questions to all participants at the end 
of the experiment. These questions are: “How hard did you try?” (a measure of effort), “To 
what extent were you motivated by the payment you could receive?” (a measure of monetary 
motivation) and “To what extent were you motivated by a wish to score higher than other 
participants?” (a measure of social comparison motivation). Every question is to be answered 
over a seven-point response scale. 
 
2.6.2. Results 
– Insert Table 4 around here – 
Table 4 lists the mean total performance score in each condition; see also the top panels 
of Fig. 1. As is apparent in Table 4, we managed to achieve, in two of the competitions and 
two of the lotteries, a proportion of 25%-36% participants to be competitors/lottery 
participants. For the competition with $10 reward, due to unforeseeable exhaustion of the 
MTurk subject pool at the time of execution, we ended up assigning proportionally too many 
participants to be competitors. Nevertheless, the participants were informed before the tasks 
(as in other conditions) that approximately one-third of them would be competing, and at no 
point during the experiment could they have inferred otherwise.  
We first analyse how non-competitors’ performance in the competition conditions 
changes according to the reward level, and find an inverted-U pattern that is consistent with 
our conjectured moderation effects of the reward level on contagion: when the reward is low 
(reward = $0.5), the performance of non-competitors is higher than when the reward is nil 
(reward = $0; t(169)=2.37, P =0.019), as well as when the reward is high (reward = $10; 
t(170)=2.33, P =0.021). Also, competitors’ performance scores across reward levels has a U-
shaped pattern that is consistent with previous research such as (Festinger, 1954).  
 





Furthermore, competitors’ performance scores are higher than those of non-competitors 
when the reward level was nil (reward = $0; t(134) =3.26, P < 0.01) or when the reward level 
was high (reward = $10; t(185) =3.10, P < 0.01). Both are in predictable directions; the first 
effect is especially consistent with the possibility that, even without a cash incentive, 
participating in a competition can still lead to higher performance because of social incentives 
of the kind observed in (Heyman & Ariely, 2004) and other studies. The pattern of competitors’ 
performance scores across reward levels also has a consistent U-shaped dependence although 
without significant statistical evidence (P = 0.066 and P = 0.19 when comparing competitors’ 
scores at reward=$0.5 with reward=$0 and reward=$10, respectively). 
However, performance scores do not differ significantly by participation role when the 
reward is positive but low (reward = $0.5, P > 0.25). This is consistent with a contagion effect 
on non-competitors to the extent that non-competitors’ performance can approach that of 
competitors. Another possibility is that the low but positive reward level has an adverse effect 
on competitors as in (Heyman & Ariely, 2004): as the monetary incentive increases from no 
cash reward to $0.5, the competitors’ focus might have switched from the social to the 
monetary aspect of the competition; but the reward level is so low that the competitors did not 
work too hard for it.  
Meanwhile, in the lottery control conditions, the lottery itself does not create 
differences in scores by participation role or reward level. A 2(lottery reward) × 2(lottery 
participation role) between-subjects ANOVA does not yield any significant main effects or 
interaction (P > 0.25 in all cases). Consistent with similar results from Study 2B, there is no 
contagion effect in the lottery control conditions. 
Process Evidence  
We find that the total performance score is positively correlated with self-reported 
effort in both the lottery (r = 0.30, P < 0.01) and the competition (r = 0.43, P < 0.01) conditions. 
Moreover, self-reported effort is positively correlated with both self-reported monetary and 
social comparison motivations in both the lottery and the competition conditions, with r > 0.2 
and P < 0.01 in all four correlations.  
Further analysis on the self-report measures reveals that, when the reward level 
increases from nil ($0) to low ($0.5), non-competitors’ effort increases significantly (t(169) 
=2.75, P <0.01), while their social comparison motivation increases marginally (t(169) =1.71, 





effort decreases significantly (t(170) =-2.59, P = 0.011) and so does their social comparison 
motivation (t(170) =-2.09, P = 0.039). It thus appears that the non-competitors’ social 
comparison motivation changes with the reward level of the competition. These changes follow 
a similar pattern as their effort as well as performance scores.  
We also find that competitors’ monetary motivation increases significantly (t(89) 
=3.72, P < 0.01) when the reward level increases from nil ($0) to low ($0.5). All other related 
pairwise t-test comparisons over changes in reward levels, including in the lottery control 
conditions, yield non-significant effects at P > 0.15.  
It thus seems that competitors across different reward level manipulations do not 
perceive themselves to have exerted different effort (indeed their performance scores do not 
differ significantly by reward level), but their monetary motivation increases when the reward 
level increases from $0 to $0.5, signifying a change in focus from the social to the monetary 
aspect of the competition. However, there are no corresponding changes in the lottery control 
conditions, despite the similar reward levels. This lends further supporting evidence that the 
contagion effect is necessitated by the awareness of a competition. 
2.6.3. Discussion 
 Study 3 provided additional evidence for the contagion effect of competitions on non-
competitions. As the competition reward level changed across the treatment conditions, the 
changes in performance scores of non-competitors demonstrated how they were under the 
influence of a task context that, in a strict sense, should not matter to them at all. Consistent 
patterns of changes occurred in parallel with self-reported effort and social comparison 
motivation. Those changes were not linear with the reward level, but followed an inverted-U 
pattern that could be explained as a moderation of the reference effect of the competition 
reward on the contagion effect.  
We have also obtained process evidence demonstrate a moderating effect of the 
competition reward on contagion. The moderation effect of the competition reward, which we 
understand as a reference effect, can also be seen as a form of social comparison factor, over 
and above the increase in salience of comparison concerns due to the mere awareness of an 
ongoing competition. Further supporting evidence comes from the fact that there were no major 
effects in the data among the lottery control conditions. That is, knowing that some other people 





individual; it is important to know that those other people are competing, in order for the effect 
to kick in. 
 
2.7. General Discussion 
 Competition is prevalent in social life, but typically, the competing individuals are far 
outnumbered by people who are not competing but are aware of the competition. The influence 
of competitions on the behaviour of these non-competing population thus highly warrants 
investigations. However, to our knowledge, there has been rarely, if any, research on how 
competitions could have an influence on non-competitors’ performance in similar tasks. 
In investigating the influence of a competition on non-competitors, the present research 
dives into important but underexplored domains of a major area of human behaviour. We 
provide evidence that the awareness of a competition leads to heightened social comparison 
motivation among the non-competitors, resulting in the contagion effect.  
We conjecture that the detailed psychological mechanisms behind this phenomenon 
could consist of two stages. In the first stage, the mere awareness of a competition induces in 
non-competitors perceptions of rivalry among competitors, even if only in a vicarious form. 
The second stage possibly consists of two types of psychological effects. One is the activation 
of mental representations – such as imageries or ideas – related to competition. This then leads 
to a heightened social comparison motivation as the result of a priming effect. The priming 
effect can make non-competitors act as if they were competitors, and can produce significant 
behavioural influence; see Strack and Schwarz (2016) and the studies discussed therein. 
Meanwhile, non-competitors’ perceptions of rivalry could also lead to a vicarious form of 
competitive arousal. As defined in Malhotra (2010) and Ku et al., (2005), competitive arousal 
is an emotional state that can arise during competitive interaction; it is highly irrational and 
does not require economic interests, or actual participation in a competition, to be effective. 
Thus, it is plausible that a competition can induce competitive arousal even for non-
competitors, which then heightens the non-competitors’ social comparison motivation.  
In sum, the awareness of an ongoing competition can induce perceptions of rivalry 
among the non-competitors, which might then lead to possible priming effect and vicarious 





motivation. The heightened social comparison motivation then results in the contagion effect. 
These possible intermediate processes merit future research.  
The contagion effect we investigate has general relevance in many social domains in 
the real world. Attempts to motivate people by competitions, as often seen in gamification 
strategies, might involve only a limited number of competitors. Yet, competitions can influence 
competitors as well as a potentially much larger number of non-competing individuals who are 
aware of them. It is therefore important to consider these non-competitors when designing 
competitions. For instance, as we have shown, higher rewards might motivate competitors 
more, but can also become demotivating to non-competitors.  
Non-competitors could be important to a fundraising event, a company’s revenue or 
labour force, a team’s strength or weakness, or a classroom’s prosperity or decline. Just because 
an individual does not take part in a competition does not mean they are unaffected by the 
social comparison dynamics created by it. Our work provides evidence that there could indeed 
be an influence, and moreover, the influence could change in an intriguing way according to 
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2.9. Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1. Main Results from Study 1: Mean Payments at Entrance (in Euros) 
 Frame: Contest 
Control 
 Competing customers Non-competing customers 
1 prize 
6.14 (3.37) [5.85,6.44]** 
N = 489 
5.68 (2.75) [5.56,5.80]** 
 N = 2,025 
5.42 (2.76) [5.37,5.47] 
N = 13,056 
7 prizes 
6.52 (4.01) [6.14,6.89]** 
 N = 440 
5.76 (3.06) [5.62,5.89]** 
 N = 1,978 
 Frame: Neutral 
 Competing customers Non-competing customers 
1 prize 
6.36 (4.42) [5.94,6.78]** 
 N = 426 
5.86 (3.04) [5.73,5.99]** 
 N = 2,101 
7 prizes 
6.37 (3.41) [5.98,6.76]** 
 N = 297 
5.72 (3.09) [5.59,5.86]** 
 N = 2,074 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals (CIs) in square brackets. 
The asterisks indicate significant differences between the mean of the corresponding 





Table 2. Main Results from Study 2A: Mean Performance Scores in Two-round Blocks 
 
Condition N Round 1-2 Round 3-4 Round 5-6 
Control 83 34.06 (10.87) [31.67,36.43] 37.56 (12.92) [34.74,40.38]** 38.28 (13.37) [35.36,41.20] 
Treatment:     
Competition role Competition reward     
Non-competitor 
$0.5 110 35.78 (10.57) [33.78,37.78] 39.82 (10.37) [37.86,41.78]** 42.03 (11.17) [39.92,44.14]**b 
$10 111 34.93 (11.31) [32.80,37.06] 38.84 (12.14) [36.56,41.13]** 41.41 (12.16) [39.13,43.70]**c 
Competitor 
$0.5 124 35.13 (11.87) [33.02,37.24] 38.53 (11.97) [36.40,40.66]** 41.88 (11.75) [39.79,43.97]**b 
$10 129 35.33 (11.22) [33.37,37.28] 38.20 (12.08) [36.09,40.30]** 42.73 (11.31) [40.76,44.70]**a 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals (CIs) in square brackets. The asterisks indicate significant differences 
between the mean of the current block and the previous block within the same condition/role according to paired t-tests  
(* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01). a,b,c Entry is significantly or marginally significantly different from the corresponding mean in the control condition 






Table 3. Main Results from Study 2B: Mean Performance Scores In Two-round Blocks 
 





    
Non-participant 
$0.5 77 35.06 (12.94) [32.12,38.00] 38.77 (14.01) [35.59,41.95]** 37.10 (17.08) [33.23,40.98] 
$10 77 35.55 (12.70) [32.66,38.43] 37.07 (15.53) [33.55,40.60] 36.82 (17.40) [32.87,40.77] 
Participant 
$0.5 86 35.14 (12.34) [32.49,37.78] 37.40 (14.81) [34.22,40.57]* 38.27 (15.91) [34.86,41.68] 
$10 88 32.90 (12.75) [30.20,35.61] 36.36 (13.67) [33.46,39.25]** 38.59 (14.53) [35.51,41.66]* 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals (CIs) in square brackets. The asterisks indicate significant differences 
between the mean of the current block and the previous block within the same condition/role according to paired t-tests  






Table 4. Main Results from Study 3: Mean Total Performance Scores 
 
  Reward 








N = 88 
143.55 (47.94) a,b 
[133.09,154.02] 
N = 83 
124.26 (59.39)** 
b [111.75,136.77] 




N = 48 
136.60 (54.34) 
[119.88,153.33] 
N = 43 
148.29 (48.38)** 
[138.99,157.58] 








N = 76 
136.03 (56.10) 
[122.65,149.41] 






N = 31 
138.32 (44.18) 
[122.12,154.53] 
N = 31 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals (CIs) in square brackets. 
The asterisks indicate significant differences between the means of competitors and non-
competitors in the same column according to t-tests (both at P < 0.01). The superscripts “a” 
and “b” indicate significant differences in means across different reward levels according to 






Figure 1. Means of major dependent variables in Study 4 by cash reward level condition ($0, 
$0.5, $10) and plotted with 10% error bars. Thick and dotted lines refer to the competition 
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2.10 Appendix A: 
Presentation of Competition Information in Study 1 
In the neutral frame/1 prize condition, the customer was presented with the following 
tabulated information at the outset (edited and translated from German): 
Receive a Gift Card 
If your payment is, among all participating 
customers’ payments … … you will receive … 
… highest … 
an annual family pass to the zoo (145€)  and a 400€ 
Amazon Gift Card 
 
In the contest frame/1 prize condition, the customer was instead presented with the following 
information: 
Customer Competition  
If your payment is, among all participating 
customers’ payments … … you will receive the … 
… highest … 
Winner prize: an annual family pass to the zoo (145€)  
and a 400€ Amazon Gift Card 
 
In the contest frame/7 prize condition, the customer was presented with the following 
information: 
Customer Competition  
If your payment is, among all participating 
customers’ payments … … you will receive the … 
… highest … 
Winner prize: an annual family pass to the zoo (145€) 
and a 135€ Amazon Gift Card 
…second highest… 2nd prize: a 90€ Amazon Gift Card 
…third highest… 3rd prize: a 60€ Amazon Gift Card 
…fourth highest… 4th prize: a 40€ Amazon Gift Card 
…fifth, sixth, or seventh highest… 5th prize: each a 25€ Amazon Gift Card 
 
The information presented to customers in the neutral frame/7prize condition can be inferred 





2.11. Appendix B: 
Sample Real Effort Task in Study 2A, 2B and Study 3 
 
The experiments in the two studies were conducted using an adaptation of the Qualtrics 
survey interface. The following is a sample of the task interface for the $10-reward/non-
competitor treatment condition in Study 3. It presents the main decision tasks as seen by 
subjects on their computer screens. The highlighted passages in yellow are as appeared in the 
experimental interface to ensure participants took note of key information. On the other hand, 
any text in square brackets [ ] are notes on the procedures for the purpose of this document, 
and is not part of the experimental interface. 
Instructions 
Please read the following very carefully. 
 
Please do not communicate with other participants for the entire duration of this study. 
 
Overview 
This study consists of 4 rounds. In each round, you will undertake an identical task within a 
time limit of 1 minute 15 seconds. 
 
Every participant will receive $0.5 for his/her participation in the 4 rounds.   
 
In addition, we have randomly assigned approximately one-third of the participants to 
compete against each other in this study. The participant with the highest performance score 
among the competing participants will be the winner. The winner will be announced among 
the competing participants after the study is over. The winner will receive an additional 





You have been assigned to be a non-competitor in this study. As such, you will not be 
competing with other similarly assigned participants for the additional $10 reward. 
 
[page break] 
Task description  
This study consists of 4 rounds. In each round you will undertake an identical task within a 
time limit of 1 minute 15 seconds. The task will consist of a screen with 60 sliders. Each 
slider is initially positioned at 0 and can be moved as far as 100. You can use the mouse in 
any way you like to move each slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many 
times as you wish.    
  
When moved, each slider will show a number indicating its current position. Your task is to 





alternatively click at the middle of the slider bar.  Your performance score in the study will 




You will see your performance score at the end of the study. You have been provided a 
results form, which is on your desk. Once you have received your performance score, please 
write this score down on the results form along with your name and email address. Please 
leave this form on your desk. 
  
If you have further questions, please raise your hand and wait until the study coordinator 
comes over to you. 
 
Do not ask any question aloud! 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
  




Round 1 of 4 
There are 60 sliders in each round. 
 
Your task is to move each slider to 50. You may drag the slider from its initial position to 
reach 50 or alternatively click at the middle of the slider bar. 
 
You have a time limit of 1 minute 15 seconds for this round. At any point during the 1 minute 
15 seconds, you can scroll to the bottom and click a button to skip to the next round 
immediately. Please note that your performance score in the study will be the total number of 
sliders positioned at exactly 50 over all 4 rounds. 
  
Please be aware that the 1 minute 15 seconds timer begins when you click the button. 
 
[page break] 
Round 1 of 4 
  
As stated earlier, you can use the mouse in any way you like to move each slider. You 






This round ends when the 1 minute 15 seconds time limit is over, or when you click the 
button at the bottom to skip to the next round. Your performance score in this round 
will be the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 when it ends. 
 





3. The Negative Effects of  
Precommitment on Reciprocal Behaviour:  
Evidence from a Series of Voluntary Payment Experiments 
 
Abstract 
We examine the effects of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour towards a 
forthcoming benefit. We focus on reciprocal behaviour in the form of voluntary payment— a 
sensitive measure of reciprocity as well as a common occurrence in practice. We also focus on 
baseline scenarios with minimal or no uncertainty regarding the value and delivery of the 
forthcoming benefit, so that, intuitively, precommitment should make little difference. Through 
a series of experiments in several countries, we show that, contrary to intuition, precommitment 
often weakens reciprocal behaviour in those cases. In a field experiment in which consumers 
could pay what they wanted for familiar beverages, payment amounts decreased when 
consumers were asked to precommit payment at the time of order as opposed to after 
consumption. In two follow-up laboratory and online experiments, similar effects were 
observed when the benefit received was an Amazon voucher or experimental currency. A final 
online trust game experiment showed that framing reciprocal exchanges as gains rather than 
losses can mitigate the precommitment effect, and offered evidence in support of our posited 
mental-accounting mechanism.   
 
Keywords: precommitment; voluntary payment; reciprocal behavior; framing; pay-what-you-






Many aspects of social life revolve around people receiving and reciprocating benefits. 
Reciprocal exchanges happen among individuals, businesses, charitable organizations, and 
public institutions.  At an interpersonal level, people often provide favours to each other with 
reciprocation in kind (e.g., Clark 1984; Zhang and Epley 2009). At the level of organizations, 
non-profits often solicit donations in return for a gift to the donor (or participation in an event), 
a practice that couches a fundraising request as a reciprocal exchange (see e.g., Holmes, Miller, 
and Lerner 2002; Chao 2017). In a similar spirit, museums often solicit donations from visitors 
who plan to view the exhibits with appeals that call for reciprocity. In addition, in recent years, 
a variety of businesses have run pay-what-you-want (PWYW) campaigns, during which 
customers could pay whatever they wanted in return for some products or services (e.g., 
Gneezy et al. 2010, 2012; Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009; Schmidt, Spann, and Zeithammer 
2015; Mak et al. 2015; see also Spann et al. 2018, Section 3.3). 
Reciprocal voluntary payment is a sensitive, incentivized manifestation of reciprocal 
behaviour; it is discretionary by definition, at a direct cost to the paying individual, and can 
typically take any value over a range of amounts. The present research focuses on this form of 
reciprocity, and is motivated by the observation that, in many practical scenarios, people are 
asked to precommit their reciprocal voluntary payment prior to receiving the benefit. In 
particular, in scenarios with minimal or no uncertainty regarding the value and delivery of the 
forthcoming benefit, it seems intuitive that precommitment should make little difference. For 
example, non-profits often ask donors to precommit donations before receiving a souvenir gift 
that the donors have been well informed about. Museums, including ones with well-known 
exhibits, often install prominent donation boxes at their entrances, which seek reciprocal 
voluntary payments from visitors before their visits. Lastly, a retailer running a PWYW 
campaign on familiar low-ticket items might ask customers to precommit payment before 
consumption, e.g., putting payment into a box before helping themselves to a bottle of water 
or a can of branded soft drink.  
Our primary research questions are: if people are certain about the benefit they are 
going to get and when they are going to get it, does it matter whether they are asked to commit 
to their reciprocal behaviour before or after receiving the benefit? And if it does, why? These 
questions seem to have received little attention by the organizations/firms involved. Through a 
series of experiments in several countries, we show that, in fact, precommitment (compared 





is minimal or no uncertainty regarding the value and delivery (format and timing) of the 
forthcoming benefit. We also find process evidence for the effect based on a posited mental-
accounting mechanism.  
Our research makes a number of substantive contributions to related previous studies 
(see also the Literature Review section). Firstly, our research contributes towards studies on 
prosocial behaviour by our novel investigations into a moderating factor in reciprocity, namely 
precommitment. Concurrently, we make a substantive contribution towards behavioural 
studies on precommitment by expanding the domain of those studies into reciprocal behaviour. 
Lastly, with our focus on reciprocal voluntary payment, we contribute towards the literature on 
charitable fundraising as well as the burgeoning recent research on PWYW. Managerially, our 
findings shed important light on the optimal timing of voluntary payment solicitation in 
donation appeals and PWYW transactions. Moreover, we show that framing the reciprocal 
payment as incurring less gain from the forthcoming benefit (vs. incurring a loss) can mitigate 
the weakening effect of precommitment – a result that provides additional practical guidance 
to firms. 
3.2. Theoretical Development 
3.2.1. Reciprocal Behaviour in the Form of Voluntary Payment 
In the present research, we view reciprocal voluntary payment as an exchange 
behaviour, namely a payment from one party to another upon receiving a benefit from the other 
party. We first make a basic quid pro quo assumption that there is a positive relationship 
between perceived benefit and reciprocal behaviour. This assumption is consistent with 
previous studies that also focus on reciprocity as a type of exchange behaviour, such as Clark 
(1984), Clark, Mills, and Corcoran (1989), Flynn (2003), and Zhang and Epley (2009). The 
assumption is also consistent with various motivational factors that have been suggested to 
account for reciprocity, such as self-image concerns (Gneezy et al. 2012) and guilt aversion 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 1994).  
The decision contexts in the aforementioned real-life examples that motivate our 
research, as well as the decision contexts in our experimental studies, are all reciprocal 
exchange relationships between the decision maker and a stranger or a business. These are 
especially subject to “record keeping” (Clark 1984) of benefits received and reciprocated, in 
the fashion of “maintaining an overall sense of equity and fairness within a relationship” 





assume that reciprocal voluntary payment will increase with an increase in the received benefit 
as perceived by the reciprocating individual, in order to maintain the perceived sense of equity. 
This assumption underlies the following theoretical development. 
3.2.2. The Mental Accounting Mechanism 
Taking cue from the notion of “record keeping” in reciprocal exchange relationships, 
we posit a general mechanism for our research that is derived from mental accounting (Thaler 
1985). Mental accounting is a concept on how people encode and categorize benefits and 
expenditures. Here, we propose that, before receiving a benefit, the recipient has not fully 
assimilated the benefit into his/her mental account for reciprocity. This leads to him/her having 
a weak appreciation of the prospective benefit (i.e., perceiving the benefit as relatively low). 
As a result, the recipient is less amenable to precommitting on a reciprocal decision that would 
draw down his/her currently “low-balance” account. By contrast, after receiving the benefit, 
the recipient has fully assimilated the benefit into his/her mental account. The recipient now 
has a stronger appreciation of the benefit than in the precommitment scenario (i.e., perceives 
the benefit as relatively high). As a result, he/she is willing to reciprocate to a larger extent by 
drawing down a comparatively “high-balance” account. Thus, receiving a benefit can change 
an individual’s reciprocating behaviour towards that very same benefit. As a result, 
precommitment (compared with the case without it) can lead to comparatively lower 
motivation to reciprocate.  
Following this line of reasoning, we hypothesize that precommitment can weaken 
reciprocal behaviour. Our hypothesis can be written as: 
 
H1: RVPBefore < RVPAfter, 
 
where RVPBefore is the precommitted reciprocal voluntary payment before receiving the benefit, 
and RVPAfter is the reciprocal voluntary payment that is decided upon after receiving the 
benefit. 
 The weakening effect encapsulated by H1 can be viewed as a baseline effect. The 
theoretical reasoning behind it is valid even when there is minimal or no uncertainty regarding 
the value and delivery (timing and format) of a forthcoming benefit, so that, intuitively, 
precommitment should make little difference. Nevertheless, we can expect this effect to be 
even more prominent if the benefit involves an experience good with immediate consumption 





after it is received, as Egbert, Greiff, and Xhangolli (2015) conjectured. However, our 
theoretical mechanism is applicable beyond experience good benefits, as we show in Study 2 
to 4.  
The effect could also be especially prominent if the benefit consists of goods that induce 
a significant sense of ownership and endowment. However, we demonstrate the presence of 
the posited effect even in cases where the benefit itself was a simple medium of exchange 
(Amazon voucher in Study 2 and experimental currency in Study 3 and 4) with no or very weak 
expected endowment effects (Morewedge and Giblin 2015, p. 340). 
Lastly, it should be noted that our hypothesized effect is not driven by standard 
properties of intertemporal preferences, such as time discounting. In our theoretical 
development, we intentionally focus on settings without any significant time lapse between the 
following three key events: the precommitment decision, the delivery of the benefit, and the 
actual reciprocal behaviour. Our objective is to observe how precommitment can make a 
“mere” difference in behaviour even over such shorter timespans. Correspondingly, in our 
experimental settings, the time lapse between the three was typically small. In the 
precommitment conditions of our field experiment in a restaurant (Study 1), there was perhaps 
typically one hour between precommitment and the actual reciprocal behaviour, with the 
delivery of benefit (consumption of beverages) happening gradually in between. In the other 
studies, the events were all separated by a matter of minutes or even seconds. As such, time 
discounting could hardly account for the observed effects.  
To sum up, we propose a very general mental-accounting mechanism that implies 
negative effects of precommitment in reciprocal behaviour in a wide range of contexts. As 
such, our posited effect can be viewed as a fundamental characteristic of reciprocal behaviour.  
 
3.3. Related Literature 
 Several streams of literature are related to our research. In this section, we highlight 
how our work can be viewed in the contexts of these previous studies, and differentiated from 
some of their results. In particular, we discuss previous studies on precommitment as well as 
mental accounting that are relevant to our proposed mechanism. 
3.3.1. Reciprocal Behaviour as Prosocial Behaviour 
Reciprocal behaviour forms a major category of prosocial behaviour (Penner et al. 
2005), with which an individual benefits another party under no legal obligations. As part of 





behaviour should be distinguished from another major domain of prosocial behaviour that is 
based on unconditional altruism or helping behaviour. Research on the latter domain of 
prosocial behaviour includes studies on related psychological and social-image issues (e.g., 
Berman et al. 2015; Cavanaugh, Bettman and Luce 2015; Allen, Eilert, and Peloza 2018; 
Kouchaki and Jami 2018), marketing strategy and economic issues (e.g., Dubé, Luo and Fang 
2017; Frey and Meier 2004; Galak, Small and Stephen 2011; White and Peloza 2009), and 
external moderating factors (e.g., Guinote et al. 2015; House et al. 2013). 
The present work focuses on positive reciprocal behaviour in return for a behaviour that 
benefits the recipient. Positive give-and-take has been described as a building block of social 
exchanges and a significant driver of social life (see, e.g., Zhang and Epley 2009). 
Correspondingly, previous research has examined reciprocal behaviour at multiple levels of 
social interactions, ranging from everyday life such as the workplace (e.g., McNeely and 
Meglino 1994; Halbesleben and Wheeler 2011) to diplomatic relations at an international level 
(Bhagwati, Dinopoulos, and Wong 1992).  
3.3.2. Precommitment and Time Inconsistencies in Preferences 
 Precommitment as a self-control strategy has attracted voluminous behavioural 
research in the past (see, e.g., Ariely and Wertenbroch 2003, and the literature discussed 
therein), because of its importance in resolving time inconsistencies in preferences (e.g., 
Loewenstein 1996). Of closer relevant to the present work is recent research on precommitment 
as a strategy to elicit altruistic charitable donations (Andreoni and Serra-Garcia 2016; Breman 
2011; Meyvis, Bennett, and Oppenheimer 2011). In all of these studies, a general picture is that 
precommitment encourages performances of “good deeds” or positive behaviour, which can 
range from working hard on course assignment to charitable giving. In other words, without 
precommitment, people are less inclined to later allocate time and effort voluntarily for “good 
deeds”.  
On the surface, this picture greatly differs from our general findings that 
precommitment often weakens positive reciprocal behaviour. However, in previous research, 
between a precommitted decision and the same decision made at a later time, there is typically 
no significant intervening events that can change the individual’s motivation. By contrast, the 
present research examines cases where an intervening event – the receiving of a benefit – can 





previous section, the intervening event is such that precommitment can result in comparatively 
lower motivation to reciprocate.     
It is also worthwhile to note another stream of previous studies which found that 
reciprocity decays over time (e.g., Chuan, Kessler and Milkman 2018; Flynn 2003). That is, 
reciprocity is at a peak immediately after the cause of the reciprocity (the receiving of benefit) 
happens. The timescales in these studies are typically over days or weeks after the cause of the 
reciprocity happens. In comparison, our theoretical development and experimental setups 
intentionally focus on the periods that are immediately before or after receiving the benefit.  
Lastly, we note that precommitment in reciprocal behaviour (in the sense described in 
this research) has only been rarely studied. To our knowledge, the pretest survey of Kim, 
Kaufmann, and Stegemann (2014) and the field study of Kukla-Gryz and Zagórska (2018) are 
the only examples so far. Both works focus exclusively on PWYW for experience goods, and 
contexts in which there is typically substantial uncertainty in the experienced utilities before 
consumption; both report findings consistent with our proposed weakening effect. In addition, 
the results in Kim et al. (2014) are survey based, and therefore call for more robust evidence. 
Kukla-Gryz and Zagórska (2018) allowed for actual payment to be made with a two-day time 
lapse before the delivery of the benefit in the precommitment condition. Hence time 
discounting and uncertainty, in terms of whether the participant would eventually attend the 
show, could be involved as significant confounding factors of the result. Note also that, in the 
“Before” condition of both studies, the participants’ decisions entailed simultaneous 
precommitment and payment. This methodological feature made any observed effect regarding 
precommitment potentially confounded with the act of payment. 
Our series of studies establish our proposed effect and process with designs that serve 
to eliminate confounds. Our focus on baseline, general effects, with certainty in the value and 
delivery of the benefit even at the precommitment stage, effectively complements the previous 
findings, and substantively expands their domain of investigation into many real-life instances 
of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour without uncertainties. Regarding the potential 
confound of precommitment with the act of payment in previous studies, our field experiment 
(Study 1) as well as online experiments (Study 3 and 4) decoupled precommitment and 
payment in their “Before” conditions (see also the Discussion section for Study 1). Our 





evidence for our theoretical development, and to systematically investigate factors such as risk 
(Study 3) and framing (Study 4). 
3.3.3. Mental Accounting and Time Inconsistencies 
 A stream of mental accounting research, such as Prelec and Loewenstein (1998), 
suggests that consumers in standard economic transactions are more willing to pay beforehand 
for a forthcoming consumption (such as a holiday package), compared with paying after the 
consumption. The general picture is that the “pain of paying” for a forthcoming consumption 
is partially mitigated by the prospective enjoyment from the consumption, while past 
enjoyment is typically decoupled from the “pain of paying” in the “after” scenario, leaving the 
“pain of paying” especially intense in the latter scenario.  
On the surface, this picture differs from our findings that people tend to reciprocate less 
if they precommit to some reciprocal behaviour or payment towards a forthcoming benefit. 
However, as discussed before, reciprocal behaviour is a type of prosocial behaviour with a very 
different nature from paying in a standard economic transaction. Reciprocal behaviour is a 
voluntary, discretionary act that is closely tied in with the benefit received; it follows a “record 
keeping” principle of give-and-take that is based on equity and fairness concerns (Clark 1984; 
Zhang and Epley 2009). Meanwhile, standard economic transactions are based on externally 
imposed legal obligations. Hence, especially in comparison with payment under standard 
economic transactions, reciprocal voluntary payment is more closely connected with thoughts 
about the received benefit. That is, the decoupling between previous consumption and “pain of 
paying” in the “after” scenarios of previous research does not happen in our case. Meanwhile, 
our “before” scenarios see the individual making a precommitment on reciprocal behaviour 
based on a weaker, prospective appreciation of the forthcoming benefit. Hence it is 
understandable that we should see an opposite direction of effect from those previous mental-
accounting studies. Seen in this light, our research can be viewed as an extension of mental 
accounting research on time inconsistencies in payments to the context of reciprocal voluntary 
payments. 
In the following sections, we report four experimental studies that were conducted to 
test our hypotheses and posited mechanism. In every study, our design allowed for examination 
of baseline scenarios with minimal or no uncertainty regarding the value and delivery of the 
forthcoming benefit. First, we report a field experiment in which consumers could pay any 





amounts decreased when consumers were asked to precommit payment before consumption. 
In two follow-up laboratory (Study 2) and online (Study 3) experiments, similar effects were 
observed even when the benefit received was an Amazon voucher or experimental currency, 
while the reciprocal voluntary payments were directed towards an experimenter and an 
anonymously matched seller participant, respectively. Study 3 moreover provided an extension 
result on risky benefits as well as preliminary process evidence for our theoretical development. 
Finally, Study 4, an online trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995) experiment, showed 
that a gain framing can mitigate our observed negative effects of precommitment. The study 
also offered evidence in support of our posited mental-accounting mechanism for the effect. 
We conclude with a discussion of our contributions, the managerial implications of our 
findings, and possible future research directions. 
 
3.4. Study 1: Restaurant Field Experiment 
Study 1 was a field experiment with a PWYW scheme for non-alcoholic beverages at 
a restaurant. It was designed to provide preliminary evidence for our major posited effect (H1) 
in a real-world setting. Non-alcoholic beverages included bottled and pre-packaged beverages 
of highly familiar brands with low uncertainty to customers. Accordingly, we focus our data 
analysis on those beverages, and find that the negative effects of precommitment persist (the 
restaurant also served house-brewed beverages that we demarcated as unfamiliar beverages in 
our analysis; see Appendix A). In addition, we introduce manipulations in Study 1 that 
explicitly presented or withheld reference prices (see, e.g., Jang and Chu 2012), to check the 
robustness of our posited effect.  
3.4.1. Method 
The field experiment had a 2 (“Before” [precommitment] vs. “After” [no 
precommitment]) × 2 (reference prices: presented vs. withheld) between-subjects design as 
applied to PWYW for non-alcoholic beverages. It was conducted over 16 days at a Chinese 
restaurant in a mixed-demographic, mid-income neighbourhood in Kathmandu, Nepal. Prior to 
the experiment, ethical clearance was obtained from the first author’s institution (the same 
applies to the other studies in this research). The experiment was exempt from informed 
consent at that institution.  
During the period of the experiment, customers could choose to pay any amount they 





with fixed prices as was usual at the restaurant. The PWYW scheme for non-alcoholic 
beverages was not advertised over social media or outside the venue. Once inside the 
restaurant, however, customers received ample information about the PWYW scheme on the 
menu, from a dedicated table stand, and from the waiter at the time of order. The information 
provided by the waiter, and the relevant procedure that the waiter had to follow, were scripted 
and rehearsed before the field experiment took place. 
The precommitment manipulation in the “Before” conditions was operationalized as 
requiring each table of customers to state, on an order sheet at the time of the order, their 
choices of non-alcoholic beverages and the amounts they would like to pay for each of them. 
The payments would be made according to the order sheet when the bill was requested after 
the meal. Customers in the precommitment conditions were made fully aware at the time of 
order that they would be obliged to pay the amounts stated (no customer violations of this 
obligation were observed).  
In the “After” conditions with no precommitment, an order sheet was also presented to 
each table of customers at the time of order. However, the customers were only required to 
state on the sheet their choices of non-alcoholic beverages, without the amounts they would 
like to pay for them. When customers requested the bill after the meal, they were asked to state, 
in a copy of the order sheet that listed the non-alcoholic beverages they had ordered, the 
amounts they would like to pay for each of the beverages in the list. These amounts were added 
to the total bill and the payment was made. 
The reference price manipulation was operationalized by using a menu for non-
alcoholic beverages with prices shown (in the reference prices presented conditions) or hidden 
(in the reference prices withheld conditions).  
For logistical reasons, on any single day over the course of the experiment, only one of 
the four conditions took place. Nevertheless, the dates for the different conditions were 
arranged to interleave with each other to achieve better experimental control. Moreover, from 
our scheduling and field observations, the number of weekends and the duration of the meals 
(approximately one hour on average) were not significantly different across conditions. 
In all conditions, customers were also required to state whether they had already 
participated in the field experiment (i.e., the PWYW scheme for non-alcoholic beverages at the 
restaurant); the research assistants also made a note, upon cross-checking with the 





the field experiment on a previous occasion. To achieve conservative experimental control, any 
table with customers that stated they had (or were observed to have) previously participated in 
the field experiment were removed from the main analysed data. 
Lastly, at each table in the experiment, at the end of the meal and after payment, we 
administered a short satisfaction survey with two questions: “How satisfied are you with the 
drinks you ordered today?” and “How satisfied are you from your overall experience at the 
restaurant today?” each with a five-point response scale (1: Very unsatisfied – 5: Very 
satisfied). As we shall report in the following Discussion section, the results of this survey for 
the “After” conditions are used to help us address a possible confounding factor. 
3.4.2. Results 
The restaurant served a total of 937 customers at 404 tables over the period of the 
experiment. These included telephone and take-away orders, which are screened out from the 
dataset because of the very different customer experience from the main customers. Further 
data cleaning removes customers who participated in the field experiment before and customers 
who for other reasons (e.g., they were friends and relatives of the management) did not 
participate in the experiment. Next, in accordance with our major research objective, we focus 
on analysing orders of bottled and pre-packaged branded beverages with which the customers 
were expected to be highly familiar at the point of order, so that there was little uncertainty 
even before consumption. The final dataset, which includes only orders of these beverages 
involved 419 customers at 161 tables, comprises 76 tables in the “Before” conditions (of which 
44 were presented with reference prices) and 85 tables in the “After” conditions (of which 48 
were presented with reference prices). Within this dataset, the overall mean actual value (based 
on menu prices) of familiar non-alcoholic beverages ordered per table was 151.21 Rupees (SD 
= 111.06 Rupees) (1 Nepalese Rupee ≈ US$0.01). A 2 (“Before” [precommitment] vs. “After” 
[no precommitment]) × 2 (reference prices: presented vs. withheld) between-subjects ANOVA 
for this variable does not present any significant effects (p > 0.4 for all effects). Note that this 
analysis, as with subsequent analysis for this study, uses table as the unit of observation, since 
customers made orders on a per table basis.  
The mean PWYW payment for familiar beverages per table was 109.91 Rupees (SD = 
80.18 Rupees) across all conditions. A table’s PWYW payment would be expected to be highly 
dependent on the actual value ordered; this is also consistent with the basic quid pro quo 





with Study 3 (see the discussion around H3B and H3C). In fact, for familiar beverages, the 
correlation coefficients between the two are consistently significant and positive in all four 
conditions, with an overall r = 0.79 (p < 0.01). Therefore, in order to test our hypothesized 
effect of precommitment (H1), we perform regression analysis that controls for the actual value 
ordered.  
 
– Insert Table 1 around here – 
Table 1 summarizes our results. As shown in Table 1, after controlling for the actual 
value ordered, the PWYW payment for familiar beverages at a table decreased by about 21 
Rupees across both model specifications. In other words, our results provide evidence of 
precommitment weakening reciprocal behaviour (H1) – here in the form of PWYW payment 
in return for non-alcoholic beverages that were expected to be highly familiar to customers. 
We also find that the PWYW payment did not differ significantly according to whether 
reference prices were presented (further analysis shows that there was no significant interaction 
between precommitment and the reference price manipulation, either); that is, H1 is supported 
regardless of whether reference prices were absent or present. At first sight, these findings 
could be partly due to the fact that customers across conditions might have their own internal 
reference prices for these familiar beverages. However, an analysis including all the non-
alcoholic beverages (i.e., the familiar as well as less familiar beverages), as summarized in 
Appendix A, does not reveal an effect of reference prices, while also supporting H1. Overall, 
these findings offer additional evidence on the robustness of the effect of precommitment on 
payments per H1. 
3.4.3. Discussion 
Study 1 provided field evidence for our posited effect (H1). We focus data analysis for 
Study 1 on familiar bottled and pre-packaged branded beverages, for which there could be little 
uncertainty at the point of precommitment (i.e., order) in the “Before” conditions. Note also 
that precommitment and payment were decoupled in the “Before” conditions, so that we 
controlled for payment timing across conditions. In doing so, we could examine the effects of 
precommitment without potential confounds with the act of payment itself. 
Since our findings in Study 1 are consistent with H1, they also offer some preliminary 





are subject to a number of potential confounding factors that could have operated in parallel 
with our proposed mental-accounting process.  
Firstly, the PWYW scheme involved experience goods (non-alcoholic beverages) with 
immediate, experiential consumption benefit. In the “After” conditions, such benefit would be 
much more salient to customers than in the “Before” conditions, and could have driven up 
payments in the “After” conditions relative to the “Before” conditions. To investigate this 
potential confound, we note that customers’ experiential consumption benefit could be 
positively related to their satisfaction, and thus their responses to the satisfaction survey. Had 
the confound made a substantial impact on our main results, we might expect a positive 
relationship in the “After” conditions between the PWYW payment for familiar beverages at a 
table, and the customers’ responses to the satisfaction survey. Note, in addition, that the survey 
was administered shortly following payment in those conditions; moreover, the survey 
response rate was highly representative at 67% (57 out of 85 tables) among the tables in the 
“After” conditions in the final dataset. To proceed, we perform a regression analysis of the 
PWYW payment for familiar beverages in the “After” conditions, with both satisfaction scores 
as well as the actual value of the familiar beverages as covariates. The estimated coefficient for 
satisfaction with drinks was non-significant (p > 0.1), while that for overall satisfaction was 
only marginally significant (ß = 13.29, p = 0.08). Adding the reference price manipulation as 
a binary covariate does not change our qualitative conclusions. These results support the 
possibility that our observed effect was not primarily driven by differences in the salience of 
experiential consumption benefit. A more general mechanism, such as the one we propose, 
might be more appropriate to account for the findings.  
Secondly, established norms of payment might also be a confounding factor. Usually 
at restaurants, the norm is to pay the bill after the meal. It might be conjectured that this norm 
biased payments in the experiments towards higher levels in the “After” conditions. But note 
that, in conventional posted-price transactions at restaurants, customers actually precommit to 
their payment – with reference to the menu – when placing their order of food and beverages. 
Hence it can also be argued that the “Before” conditions in our experiment mirrored the norm 
more than the “After” conditions. To conclude, while norms could be a confounding factor in 
Study 1, the direction of their effect could be ambiguous to hypothesize.  
Lastly, it might be argued that the delivery and consumption of the beverages could 





e.g., Morewedge and Giblin 2015) which contributed towards the higher payments in the 
“After” conditions. Nevertheless, our remaining studies provide evidence that precommitment 
could weaken reciprocal behaviour even when we should expect no or very weak endowment 
effect. 
In our remaining studies, the decision context was designed such that the benefit (an 
Amazon voucher in Study 2, or experimental currency in Study 3 and 4) was not an experience 
good, and in fact a medium of exchange that should prompt no or only a very weak endowment 
effect (Morewedge and Giblin 2015). The decision contexts in those studies were also 
relatively norm-free compared with that in Study 1. In fact, the wording of the decision tasks 
in our remaining studies has been designed to not to explicitly include terms like “reciprocity”, 
so as to avoid invoking the participants’ preconceived norms. The better experimental control 
in the following studies allowed us to test the general existence of our hypothesized weakening 
effect of precommitment. Their results (particularly those of Study 4) also highlight how the 
effect might be mitigated and offer support for our posited mechanism. 
 
3.5. Study 2: Amazon Voucher Laboratory Experiment 
Study 2 was a laboratory experiment with PWYW for an Amazon voucher. The use of 
an Amazon voucher as the benefit to be reciprocated posed very little uncertainty to participants 
in the precommitment condition. In addition, there was no immediate consumption experience 
upon receiving the voucher. Furthermore, being a medium of exchange, an Amazon voucher 
should prompt no or only a very weak endowment effect (Morewedge and Giblin 2015). As 
such, it could offer further confirmatory evidence of the main precommitment effect (H1), over 
and above the results from Study 1. 
3.5.1 Method 
A total of 77 participants, recruited from the participant pool of the behavioural 
laboratory at a major UK business school, took part in the experiment. After excluding four 
participants who refused the experimental PWYW offer or reported complete 
misunderstanding of the instructions (e.g., assuming that paying nothing would mean not being 
able to obtain the voucher), the actual analysed data include 73 participants, in roughly equal 
proportions of males (53.42%) and females (47.58%), and who were mostly between the ages 
of 18 to 35 (90.41%). Informed consent was obtained from all participants on paper at the 





The experiment had a two condition (“Before” [precommitment] vs. “After” [no 
precommitment]) between-subjects design. Procedurally, the experimenter first provided every 
participant with an upfront participation payment of £5 in cash (in practice, a stack of 10 coins 
in £0.5 denomination). Afterwards, the participants were asked to complete a filler 
questionnaire (through an online Qualtrics interface that was used for most of the experimental 
procedures) on lifestyle and consumption preferences, in order to justify and internalize the 
participation payment. The experimenter then showed a physical sample of a £5 Amazon 
voucher (£1 ≈ US$1.3) to the participants. Concurrently, the online interface informed all 
participants that the experimenter was offering one such voucher to each participant on a 
PWYW basis. Participants could pay the experimenter in return any amount they wanted 
(including nothing) for the Amazon voucher, using the £5 cash payment that had just been 
provided to them.  
Immediately following that, in the “Before” (precommitment) condition, the 
participants were asked to pay what they wanted (including nothing) for the voucher, using 
their £5 participation payment. Participants in the “After” (no precommitment) condition 
skipped this step. At this point, all participants received the Amazon voucher, after which they 
were given a second online filler questionnaire that typically took a few minutes to complete. 
Participants in the “After” condition were then asked to pay what they wanted for the voucher 
(which they had already received) from their participation payment. Participants in the 
“Before” condition skipped this step. Finally, all participants completed a third online filler 
questionnaire, after which they were dismissed.  
3.5.2. Results 
 We find that PWYW payment for the Amazon voucher was significantly lower in the 
“Before” (precommitment) condition (M = £0.32, SD = £0.67, 95% CI: [£0.10, £0.55]; N = 37) 
than in the “After” (no precommitment) condition (M = £0.81, SD = £1.23, 95% CI: [£0.39, 
£1.22]; N = 36) with t(71) = -2.09, p = 0.040 from a between-subjects t-test. In fact, the mean 
“Before” payment was less than 40% of the mean “After” payment; this was observed even 
though the only difference between the two conditions was whether the participants were asked 
to pay before or after receiving the Amazon voucher. Hence, as in Study 1, our data provide 
support for H1. 
3.5.3. Discussion 
 Study 2 had a laboratory environment that was better controlled than with the field 





to participants. Yet we still observe the negative effect of precommitment as posited (H1). 
Study 2 thus strongly supports the general applicability of the effect, to scenarios beyond an 
experience good benefit or a benefit that could induce a strong sense of ownership. 
 
3.6. Study 3: Lottery Ticket Online Experiment 
Study 3 was an online experiment with PWYW for a lottery ticket. The study provides 
additional evidence for our hypothesized negative effects of precommitment on reciprocal 
behaviour, but in a very different setup from that in Study 2. First, the participants in this study 
paid an anonymously matched seller (from a separate set of participants) who was offering the 
lottery ticket under a PWYW scheme. This created a directed one-to-one exchange context, 
whereas, in Study 2, the Amazon voucher was offered by the research experimenter to all the 
participants. Second, for the benefit in Study 3, we used an even more direct medium of 
exchange than an Amazon voucher – namely, experimental currency with a preannounced 
conversion rate to real money. Third, in a contingent precommitment manipulation, we 
eliminated risk while controlling for outcomes. In doing so, we could potentially obtain 
evidence for our hypothesized effect again, but in a drastically different context from the 
previous studies. Fourth, by using a lottery as the benefit in Study 3, we could go beyond our 
major focus on benefit without uncertainties, and examine the effects of precommitment in an 
extension scenario with a risky benefit. Lastly, because the benefit in the design of Study 3 is 
variable, we can examine how changes in the benefit may be related to changes in reciprocal 
voluntary payments; as explained below, this leads to a number of hypotheses that allow us to 
gather preliminary process evidence for our theoretical development.  
The lottery in Study 3 was designed to be simple: it generated either one of two 
outcomes (low vs. high) that happened with equal (50%) chance. Our major dependent variable 
was the PWYW amount that a participant paid in return for a ticket for this lottery. The 
precommitment (“Before”) and no-precommitment (“After”) conditions in our experimental 
design were in line with Studies 1 and 2 (in the “After” condition, participants only made their 
payment decision upon being informed about the realized outcome of the lottery). Our design 
also included a “Contingent Before” (contingent precommitment) condition. The “Contingent 
Before” condition was similar to the “Before” condition, except that  participants precommitted 
the respective amount they wanted to pay for each of the two possible outcome scenarios. 
The “Contingent Before” condition effectively eliminated the risk while maintaining a 





apply when we compare the payments in the “Contingent Before” condition with those in the 
“After” condition, while controlling for the outcome. That is (using similar notations as for 
H1):  
H2A: RVPContingent Before, Low Outcome < RVPAfter, Low Outcome. 
H2B: RVPContingent Before, High Outcome < RVPAfter, High Outcome. 
  
In addition, Study 3’s experimental design provides an extension result of our research 
into reciprocal voluntary payment for a risky benefit. Based on H1, we hypothesize that 
payments in the (non-contingent) “Before” condition must be lower than those in the “After” 
condition when the best possible outcome, i.e., the high outcome, was realized: 
H3A: RVPBefore < RVPAfter, High Outcome. 
 
The relationship between RVPBefore and RVPAfter, Low Outcome is, a priori, more 
ambiguous. On one hand, one might suppose that the weakening effect of precommitment will 
pull RVPBefore down to a level that could be lower than RVPAfter, Low Outcome. On the other hand, 
the possibility of a realized high outcome might anchor RVPBefore at a higher level, which 
surpasses RVPAfter, Low Outcome, even though that should not be as high as RVPAfter, High Outcome (as 
per H3A). The net effect depends on the relative impacts of these two factors, so that we cannot 
formulate a clear-cut hypothesis for it. This also means that we cannot formulate a clear-cut 
hypothesis for the relationship between RVPBefore and the overall mean “After” payment that 
is pooled across the “After” payments for the two outcomes. 
3.6.1. Hypotheses for Preliminary Process Evidence 
Study 3 also allows us to gather preliminary process evidence for our theoretical 
development. Because the benefit in the design of this study is variable, we can examine how 
changes in the benefit are related to changes in the reciprocal voluntary payment. This leads to 
three hypotheses, all testable on the data from Study 3, which reflect our basic quid pro quo 
assumption about the positive relationship between perceived benefit and reciprocal behaviour 
(see the Theoretical Development section). We have already obtained some evidence of this in 
the correlation between PWYW payment and actual value of beverages ordered in the field 
experiment in Study 1. Here we offer a more systematic test on the assumption, with the more 
rigorous design of Study 3. First of all, the quid pro quo assumption has the intuitive implication 





low outcome, and likewise, the “After” payments for the high outcome would be greater than 
those for the low outcome. To summarize: 
H3B: RVPContingent Before, Low Outcome < RVPContingent Before, High Outcome. 
   H3C: RVPAfter, Low Outcome < RVPAfter, High Outcome. 
 
Next, consider the payments in the “Contingent Before” condition versus the (non-
contingent) “Before” condition. All are precommitted payments, but in the experiment, the 
“Before” payments were precommitted irrespective of whether the outcome would turn out to 
be low or high, while “Contingent Before” payments were precommitted depending on the 
outcome. The perceived benefit in the “Before” condition (perhaps representable by an 
expected utility) could only lie in between those of the two “Contingent Before” outcome 
scenarios. Correspondingly, we hypothesize that “Before” reciprocal payments should be 
between the “Contingent Before” payments for the low outcome and the “Contingent Before” 
payments for the high outcome. To summarize: 
H3D: RVPContingent Before, Low Outcome ≤ RVPBefore ≤ RVPContingent Before, High Outcome. 
 
3.6.2. Method 
We conducted Study 3 in an Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) environment following 
commonly accepted standards of practice (Paolacci and Chandler 2014). A total of 322 
participants, recruited from the MTurk participant pool in the US, took part in the experiment. 
After excluding 23 participants based on attention, honesty, and previous participation checks, 
and then 38 participants who declined the experimental PWYW offer, the actual analysed data 
include 261 participants, in roughly equal proportions of males (44.44%) and females 
(55.56%), and who were mostly between the ages of 18 to 54 (88.89%). Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants at the beginning of the study using an online form. Each 
participant took approximately seven minutes on average to finish the experiment. The 
payment parameters in the study (to be described below) were determined partly to make sure 
that the total earnings would be on average commensurate with the typical earnings from an 
MTurk task with a similar duration as our experiment (Bohannon 2016); participants in the 
actual analysed data earned US$1.82 in total on average. 






The experiment had three (“Before” [precommitment] vs. “Contingent Before” 
[contingent precommitment] vs. “After” [no precommitment]) between-subjects conditions. 
Figure 1 provides a summary of the major procedures in a flowchart; note that all the 
procedures were conducted using an online Qualtrics interface. Participants were first provided 
$0.25 as an upfront, participation payment. Afterwards, they completed a real-effort task to 
earn an additional 750 tokens, the experimental currency (the participant’s final earnings in 
tokens would be converted to real money at 100 tokens = US$0.1). The real-effort task was a 
variation of the slider task used in Gill and Prowse (2012) and KC, Kunter, and Mak (2018). 
Each participant was presented with 20 sliders on the computer screen; each slider was a row 
of 10 identical star-shaped symbols. To the left of each slider were instructions on how many 
stars the participant needed to highlight (using the mouse) out of the 10 stars in the slider. The 
sequence of number of stars to highlight over the 20 sliders was the same across all participants 
and conditions, and was originally decided using random draws. The participant completed the 
task after highlighting all 20 sliders as instructed. Like the first filler questionnaire in Study 2, 
the slider task served the purpose of justifying and internalizing the additional participation 
payment of 750 tokens.  
Upon completion of the task, the participant was invited to purchase a lottery ticket 
from an anonymously matched seller (from a separate set of participants recruited in an earlier 
pre-study), who was offering the ticket under a PWYW scheme. The participants could pay 
any amount they wanted (including nothing) of the 750 tokens they had earned for the purchase. 
At this point, the participant could decline to proceed with the purchase. As mentioned, 38 
participants declined, for whom the study immediately ended here. For the majority who did 
not decline the offer, each participant was then anonymously matched with a seller. The lottery 
generated either one of two outcomes that happened with equal (50%) chance. With the low 
outcome, the participant won 500 tokens; with the high outcome, the participant won 1,500 
tokens.  
In the “Before” (precommitment) condition, each participant was asked to precommit 
the amount he/she wanted to pay for the lottery ticket regardless of the outcome. After that, the 
participant received the ticket in the form of a unique four-digit number provided by the 
interface. This number, when entered into the Qualtrics platform, generated the lottery 
outcome. After the outcome was generated, the participant earned a net amount in tokens that 
was his/her winning minus the amount he/she had precommitted to pay.  
The “Contingent Before” (contingent precommitment) condition was similar to the 





he/she wanted to pay in each of the two possible outcome scenarios (only one of which would 
occur). If the lottery resulted in a low outcome (a winning of 500 tokens), the participant would 
pay his/her precommitted amount for the low outcome. Likewise, if the lottery resulted in a 
high outcome (a winning of 1,500 tokens), the participant would need to pay his/her 
precommitted amount for the high outcome. The manipulation thus eliminated the risk involved 
in the precommitment decision. It effectively converted the decision scenario to one involving 
reciprocal behaviour towards two distinct levels of benefit without uncertainties. 
In the “After” (no precommitment) condition, participants made the payment decision 
for the lottery ticket only after receiving the lottery tickets and knowing the outcome.  
In all conditions, at the end of the experiment the final earnings were converted to real 
money and paid into the participant’s account. 
 
3.6.3. Results 
– Insert Table 2 around here – 
 
Table 2 summarizes our main results. Our primary focus of analysis is PWYW payment 
differences between the “Contingent Before” and “After” conditions controlling for each 
outcome. As expected, at both low and high outcomes, we find that contingent precommitment 
lowered the PWYW payment (low outcome: t(128) = -2.13, p = 0.035; high outcome: t(131) = 
-2.75, p < 0.01; both according to between-subjects t-tests). We observe a similar significant 
difference between payments pooled across outcomes in the two conditions (t(194) = -2.70, p 
< 0.01). To conclude, our data provide support for H2A and H2B.  
Our analysis also extends to reciprocal voluntary payment for a risky benefit. As it turns 
out, the non-contingent “Before” payment was non-significantly different from the low-
outcome “After” payment (p > 0.1), and significantly less than the high-outcome “After” 
payment (t(129) = -2.99, p < 0.01). The latter finding supports H3A. Note that H3A has been 
derived from H1 as a special case for our setup.  
We next turn our attention to obtaining preliminary process evidence for our theoretical 
development. As might have been intuitively expected, PWYW payments were smaller for the 
low outcome than for the high outcome in the “Contingent Before” conditions (t(66)=-5.33, p 
< 0.01 according to paired t-test), as well as in the “After” conditions (t(127) = -3.86, p < 0.01 
according to between-subjects t-test). These findings support H3B and H3C, and provide support 





of H3D, the non-contingent “Before” payment was non-significantly different from the high-
outcome “Contingent Before” payment (p > 0.1 according to a between-subjects t-test), and 
significantly greater than the low-outcome “Contingent Before” payment (t(130) = 2.52, p = 
0.013). Overall, the participants seemed to anchor their non-contingent precommitted 
reciprocal behaviour towards what they would precommit to in case the best possible outcome 
was realized.  
 
3.6.4. Discussion 
It is clear that the contingent precommitted payments were significantly lower than their 
counterparts in the “After” condition (H2A and H2B) – even though risk had been eliminated by 
the contingent manipulation. Moreover, across conditions the benefit was fully transparent to 
participants at the point of decision making. Study 3 thus complements Study 2 in showing that 
precommitment can weaken reciprocal behaviour in cases where: (1) the beneficiary is allowed 
to specify reciprocal behaviour contingent on the actually received benefit, thus eliminating all 
uncertainties, (2) the benefit did not become especially salient after it was received, and (3) the 
benefit was a medium of exchange with no or very weak endowment effect.  
Study 3 also offered an extension result of our research to risky benefits. Overall, non-
contingent precommitment continued to weaken reciprocal payment compared with when there 
was no precommitment. But this weakening is only valid in the comparison between non-
contingent “Before” and high-outcome “After” (H3A). That is, in Study 3, payment in an 
“After” condition would be higher than in a “Before” condition only when the benefit’s utility 
is sufficiently positive. Meanwhile, the mean non-contingent “Before” payment was not 
significantly different from the mean “After” payment when the low outcome was realized (p 
> 0.4). It was also numerically lower than the pooled mean “After” payment (161.20 vs. 210.03; 
the difference was not statistically significant though, t(192)=1.61, p = 0.12). In sum, the non-
contingent precommitted payment was only around the level of the “After” payment when the 
low outcome was realized, and thus numerically lower than the overall mean “After” payment.  
Lastly, Study 3 allows us to gather preliminary process evidence for our theoretical 
development. In relation to H3B-H3D, the study provides support for our basic quid pro quo 
assumption about the positive relationship between perceived benefit and reciprocal behaviour. 







3.7. Study 4: Online Trust Game Experiment 
Study 1, 2, and 3 together offer a set of consistent results illustrating how 
precommitment can weaken reciprocal behaviour. Recall that, theoretically, we posit that a 
general mechanism based on mental accounting underpinned the findings. That is, before 
receiving a benefit, the recipient has not yet assimilated the benefit into his/her mental account 
for reciprocity. This leads to him/her having a weak appreciation of the prospective benefit. As 
a result, the recipient is reluctant to precommit in a reciprocal decision that would draw down 
his/her currently “low-balance” account. By contrast, after receiving the benefit, the recipient 
has fully assimilated the benefit into his/her mental account. The recipient now has a stronger 
appreciation of the benefit than in the precommitment scenario. He/she is correspondingly 
willing to reciprocate to a larger extent by drawing down a comparatively “high-balance” 
account.  
This key mechanism motivated us to conduct Study 4, an online trust game (Berg et al. 
1995) experiment with manipulations of gain/loss framing of the reciprocal behaviour. Based 
on the mechanism, we hypothesize that, relative to the loss framing, the gain framing can 
mitigate the negative effect of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour. The hypothesized 
mitigation could then provide important process evidence in support of the proposed 
mechanism. Specifically, our reasoning is that, if reciprocating is framed as a decision over 
different levels of loss (greater loss meaning more of the benefit is reciprocated), the decision 
scenario would be similar to our previous experimental settings, and we should observe a 
negative effect of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour. But if the reciprocal decision is 
framed as a decision over different levels of gain out of the original benefit received (greater 
gain meaning less of the benefit is reciprocated), the framing could increase the salience of the 
benefit across conditions. This might then strengthen the assimilation of the benefit into the 
decision maker’s mental account to a ceiling level in both cases, so that the precommitment 
effect would be mitigated. To summarize, we tested the following hypotheses in Study 4: 
H4A: RVPBefore, Loss Framing < RVPAfter, Loss Framing. 
H4B: RVPBefore, Gain Framing = RVPAfter, Gain Framing. 
3.7.1. Method 
We conducted Study 4 in an MTurk environment following commonly accepted 
standards of practice as in Study 3. A total of 245 participants, recruited from the MTurk 
participant pool in the US, took part in the experiment. After excluding 46 participants based 





participants, in roughly equal proportions of males (51.26%) and females (48.74%), and mostly 
between the ages of 18 to 54 (86.43%). Informed consent was obtained from all participants at 
the beginning of the study using an online form. Each participant took approximately five 
minutes on average to finish the experiment. As in Study 3, the payment parameters in the 
study (to be described below) were determined partly to make sure that the total earnings would 
be on average commensurate with the typical earnings from an MTurk task with a similar 
duration as our experiment (Bohannon 2016). Participants in the actual analysed data earned 
US$0.70 in total on average. 
 
– Insert Figure 2 around here – 
 
The study had a 2 (“Before” [precommitment] vs. “After” [no precommitment]) × 2 
(Gain framing vs. Loss framing) between-subjects design. Figure 2 provides a summary of the 
major procedures in a flowchart. Note that all the procedures were conducted using an online 
Qualtrics interface.  
Participants were first provided $0.25 as an upfront, participation payment. Afterwards, 
participants were briefed about the trust game. Specifically, they were informed that they would 
be assigned a role in a task involving two anonymously matched participants – Participant A 
(the Trustor in the Berg et al. 1995 trust game) and Participant B (the Trustee in the Berg et al. 
trust game). Participant A was provided with 400 tokens, the experimental currency (the 
participant’s final earnings in tokens would be converted to real money at 100 tokens = 
US$0.1). Participant B was not provided with any tokens.  
In the first stage of the game, out of the 400 tokens provided, Participant A could choose 
to transfer any amount (in units of 100 tokens, including 0 tokens) to Participant B, and keep 
the remainder to him/herself. The amount Participant A transferred to Participant B would 
triple when Participant B received it.  
The game then proceeded to the second stage, when Participant B could choose how to 
allocate the received tripled amount between the two participants. That is, Participant B could 
freely decide to allocate any number of tokens (including 0 tokens) out of this tripled amount 
to Participant A, and allocate the remainder to him/herself. The decision can be framed in one 
of two ways: (1) Participant B sending an amount to Participant A (and, by implication, keeping 
the remainder to him/herself); or (2) Participant B keeping an amount to him/herself (and, by 





framing manipulation in this study, and as we shall report, the manipulation did create a 
significant impact on Participant B’s decision that was in line with our theorizing. 
In standard interpretations of the trust game, any amount transferred by Participant A 
to Participant B indicates trust towards Participant B. In addition, any amount allocated by 
Participant B to Participant A indicates reciprocity towards Participant A. In line with the rest 
of this research, we focus on reciprocal decisions made by individuals in the role of Participant 
B. Hence, all our main MTurk participants were assigned the role of Participant B. The 
individuals in the role of Participant A were a separate set of participants who were recruited 
in an earlier pre-study; only those Participant As whose decisions were to send out 200 tokens 
were matched with the main MTurk participants. Note that it is typical for trustors in the trust 
game to send out about half of the maximum possible amount (see e.g., Berg et al. 1995). 
Hence, we focused on examining reciprocal behaviour towards this amount in the study, to 
achieve more experimental control.   
Note that the number of main MTurk participants was far higher than the number of 
Participant A individuals. We typically matched several main MTurk subjects to each 
Participant A who sent out 200 tokens, and randomly chose one of them to determine 
Participant A’s payment. This part of the logistics was unbeknownst to the MTurk participants. 
For every Participant A who decided to send out a different amount from 200 tokens, we 
matched him/her with a single MTurk participant (who was not included in the main analysed 
data) to determine payments.  
Upon briefing the MTurk participants about the trust game in the experiment, we first 
matched each participant anonymously with one Participant A. We then informed the 
participant that his/her matched Participant A sent him/her 200 tokens, so that the amount to 
be received was 600 tokens.  
In the “Before” (precommitment) condition, prior to actually receiving the 600 tokens 
into their account, under the Gain framing the participant was then asked to decide “How much 
do you wish to keep? (in tokens)”. In the Loss framing, the participant was instead asked to 
decide “How much do you wish to send to Participant A? (in tokens)” Then the participant 
received the amount during a step in which he/she needed to enter a unique four-digit number.  
In the “After” (no precommitment) conditions, the participant first received the amount 
sent by A during a step in which he/she needed to enter a unique four-digit number. The 600 
tokens then appeared in their account, as stated on the interface. The participant only made 
his/her reciprocal decision at that point upon a prompt that could differ according to the framing 







– Insert Table 3 around here – 
 
Table 3 summarizes our main findings. As expected, in the Loss framing conditions, 
we see a significant decrease in reciprocal payment (payment sent back to A) under the 
“Before” (precommitment) manipulation compared with the “After” (no precommitment) 
manipulation (t(93) = -2.28, p = 0.025 according to a between-subjects t-test). However, there 
is no significant difference between the two precommitment manipulations in the Gain framing 
conditions (p > 0.2). Hence our data provide support for both H4A and H4B.  
Further analysis shows this difference in effects was driven by a significant increase in 
reciprocal payment in the “Before” manipulation when the framing changed from Loss to Gain 
(t(98)=2.49, p=0.014) but no significant change in reciprocal payment in the “After” 
manipulation across the two framing conditions (p > 0.4). This is consistent with our theorizing 
that the Gain framing mainly exerted an effect in strengthening the assimilation of benefit into 
the decision maker’s mental account in the precommitment case. 
3.7.3. Discussion 
Methodologically, Study 4 complemented the previous studies by using a voluntary 
payment context that was not explicitly labelled PWYW. Substantively, it showed that a gain 
framing could mitigate the negative effects of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour. It also 
provided important process evidence for the mental-accounting mechanism behind the findings 
of the previous studies. As predicted, in Study 4, the Loss framing reproduced a similar 
precommitment effect as in the previous experiments (H4A); this is consistent with our prior 
major findings and lends further support to their general applicability. By contrast, the Gain 
framing successfully mitigated the effect of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour (H4B). 
Apparently, this is because the Gain framing strengthened the assimilation of the benefit into 






3.8. Concluding Discussion 
In this research, we examine the effects of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour 
towards a forthcoming benefit. We focus on reciprocal behaviour in the form of voluntary 
payment, which is a sensitive measure of reciprocity as well as a common occurrence in 
practice. We also focus on baseline scenarios in which the individual has little or no uncertainty 
regarding the value and delivery of the forthcoming benefit, so that, intuitively, precommitment 
should make little difference. Through a series of voluntary payment experiments including a 
field experiment in Nepal (Study 1), a laboratory experiment in the United Kingdom (Study 2), 
and two online experiments involving US participants (Study 3 and Study 4), we show that, in 
fact, precommitment can weaken reciprocal behaviour in those cases. Moreover, we show how 
framing the reciprocal payment as incurring less gain from the forthcoming benefit (vs. 
incurring a loss) can mitigate the weakening effect of precommitment. Lastly, we provide 
evidence for an underlying mental-accounting mechanism that is fundamentally applicable 
across many different benefit domains.   
Study 1 to Study 3 provide consistent evidence of the weakening effect of 
precommitment, in a range of experimental conditions that highlighted the generality of our 
findings. Study 1, a field experiment with non-alcoholic beverages at a restaurant, showed a 
weakening effect of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour. Study 1 involved experiential 
consumption, and we tested for robustness of our hypothesized effects with and without 
reference prices. Study 2 – a laboratory experiment with Amazon vouchers – involved cash 
value benefits that were fully transparent to participants at the point of decision making across 
conditions. Consistent with the general applicability of our posited mental-accounting 
mechanism, we still observed the weakening effect of precommitment in Study 2. In Study 3, 
an online experiment with lottery tickets, we adopted a different strategy: the basic setup 
involved a risky benefit in the form of experimental currency, with a contingent 
precommitment manipulation that eliminated risk but controlled for the possible outcomes of 
the benefit. It is strikingly clear that the contingent precommitted payments were significantly 
lower than their counterparts in the “After” condition – even though risk had been eliminated 
by the contingent manipulation. Moreover, across conditions the benefit was fully transparent 
to participants at the point of decision making, with neither consumption salience nor strong 
endowment effect issues because of their nature as a simple medium of exchange (Morewedge 





Study 3 also offered an extension result of our research to risky benefits. Overall, non-
contingent precommitment continued to weaken reciprocal payment compared with when there 
was no precommitment. Nevertheless, this weakening is only valid in the comparison between 
non-contingent “Before” and a high-outcome “After” (H3A). Furthermore, Study 3 allows us to 
gather preliminary process evidence for our theoretical development. In relation to H3B-H3D, 
the study provides support for our basic quid pro quo assumption about the positive relationship 
between perceived benefit and reciprocal behaviour. 
For the effects of precommitment that we have observed, we posit a key general 
mechanism based on mental accounting. This key mechanism motivated us to conduct Study 
4, an online trust game experiment with manipulations of Gain/Loss framing that was expected 
to mitigate or reinforce this mental-accounting process. As predicted, the Gain framing 
successfully mitigated the effect of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour, while the Loss 
framing reproduced a similar precommitment effect as in the previous experiments. The results 
from this final experiment also provide important supporting evidence for our posited 
mechanism. 
Our research highlights a hitherto rarely explored area in behavioural research on 
prosocial decisions as well as precommitment – namely, the study of how precommitment 
could affect reciprocal behaviour. Moreover, by focusing on baseline scenarios without 
uncertainty, so that precommitment should make little difference, we uncover non-intuitive 
findings that lend novel insights into reciprocal behaviour.  
We also make contributions towards research related to voluntary payment decisions, 
such as charitable donations as well as the burgeoning recent research on PWYW. As a result, 
our research offers a wide range of managerial implications. For example, a non-profit should 
offer souvenir gifts to donors before asking for donations; the management of a well-known 
museum should solicit donations at exit; and a business running a pay-what-you-want 
campaign on familiar products should ask for payments after the customers obtain the products. 
As another common example, it is notable that restaurants often request an upfront tip for large 
groups, which in effect asks customers to precommit to a reciprocal payment. Our research 
suggests that, in these cases, it might be more desirable to request a tip only at the end of the 
meal. Our findings that a gain framing could mitigate the observed negative effects of 
precommitment provides additional practical guidance to firms: if it is necessary to ask 
customers to precommit to a reciprocal payment, e.g., because of logistical reasons, the firm 
should design the request in a way that induces customers to focus on what they will be 






3.8.1. Future Research Directions 
A number of future directions are warranted. Firstly, it is of value to investigate if our 
conclusions hold for other forms of reciprocal behaviour, such as time or effort. While our 
theoretical mechanism seems to be in principle adaptable to these other forms of reciprocal 
behaviour, it is important to seek confirmatory evidence from further empirical studies. 
Secondly, we may investigate how established norms of payment timing might interact with 
our findings, as discussed earlier in the context of Study 1. Thirdly, as a continuation of Study 
3, future research could investigate how the effects of precommitment would change with the 
level and nature of uncertainty of the benefit. Our results suggest that the non-contingent 
precommitted payment could be at just around the level of the “After” payment when the low 
outcome was realized. It will be useful to examine if this remains true when the probabilistic 
distribution of the outcomes is more skewed than in Study 3.  
Yet another direction is to examine additional dimensions of endogeneity in the 
decisions. For example, what might happen if the beneficiary were given the choice of whether 
to precommit or not? Or, if, after receiving the benefit, the beneficiary could renege on any 
precommitted reciprocal behaviour? This and other research avenues merit in-depth 
explorations that can uncover more insights into reciprocal behaviour and the effects of 
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3.10. Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1  
STUDY 1 (RESTAURANT FIELD EXPERIMENT):  
RESULTS OF RERESSION ANALYSIS ON PWYW PAYMENT (IN NEPALESE 
RUPEES) FOR BOTTLED OR PRE-PACKAGED BRANDED BEVERAGES 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Precommitment 












Total value in Rupees  


















No. of observations (tables) 161 161 
 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Where the estimate is significantly different from zero, 
the entry is marked by one or more asterisks (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01). The beverages included 
branded soft drinks such as Coca Cola, Fanta, and Sprite, bottled water, pre-packaged fruit 
juices of brands that were familiar to the local population, as well as instant coffee and tea 






STUDY 3 (LOTTERY TICKET ONLINE EXPERIMENT):  
MEAN PAYMENT (IN TOKENS) FOR LOTTERY TICKET BY CONDITION 
 Lottery Outcome Pooled 500 tokens 1500 tokens 
“Before” 
(precommitment) 
N = 65 



























N = 129 
 
Note: SDs in parentheses; 95% CIs in square brackets. The asterisks indicate a significant 
difference between the “After” and “Contingent Before” entries in the same column (* p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01). The superscripts “a” and “b” indicate significant differences across lottery 
outcomes controlling for condition (for both a and b: p < 0.01). The superscripts “+” indicate 
a significant difference relative to the “Before” condition (+ p < 0.05, ++ p < 0.01). All statistical 
significances are based on between-subjects t-tests, except the comparison across lottery 







STUDY 4 (ONLINE TRUST GAME EXPERIMENT):  




















[91.49, 141.29]  
N = 49 
160.65b 
(102.31)  
[130.27, 191.03]  
N = 46 
 
Note. SDs in parentheses; 95% CIs in square brackets. The superscripts “a” and “b” indicate 
statistically significant differences in means across conditions according to between-subjects 



























Low outcome (500 
tokens) 
Precommitment 
decisions made at this 
point in the “Contingent 
Before” condition 
Precommitment decision 
made at this point in the 
“Before” condition 
Actual payment in all 
conditions, including the “After”  

























Trustee (B) is 
matched with a 
Trustor (A)
A transfers 200 
tokens
Transfer becomes 
600 tokens but not 
yet received by B
Gain framing: 
B is asked:
"How much do you 
wish to keep?"
Amount kept 




"How much do you 
wish to send to 
Participant A?"
(600 - sent) tokens 
are received by B as 
B's final earnings
 “Before” (precommitment) conditions 
Trustee (B) is 
matched with a 
Trustor (A)
A transfers 200 
tokens
Transfer becomes 
600 tokens and 
is received by B
Gain framing: 
B is asked:
"How much do you 
wish to keep?"




"How much do you 
wish to send to 
Participant A?"
(600-sent) tokens are 
B's final earnings





3.11. Appendix A: 
Additional Analysis from Study 1 
 
STUDY 1 (RESTAURANT FIELD EXPERIMENT):  
RESULTS OF RERESSION ANALYSIS ON PWYW PAYMENT (IN NEPALESE RUPEES) 
FOR ALL NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Precommitment 






(0 = Withheld; 1 = Presented) 
13.81 
(10.17)  
Actual value in Rupees  





Intercept 50.67** (10.52) 
57.28** 
(9.34) 
R2 0.66 0.65 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.65 
No. of observations (tables) 264 264 
 
Note. The data in this analysis include 655 customers at 264 tables who ordered non-alcoholic 
beverages, comprising 121 tables in the “Before” conditions (of which 70 were presented with 
reference prices) and 143 tables in the “After” conditions (of which 80 were presented with 
reference prices). Standard errors in parentheses. Where the estimate is significantly different 
from zero, the entry is marked by one or more asterisks (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01). The beverages 
included the bottled and pre-packaged branded beverages in Table 1, plus varieties of house-
brewed coffee, house-brewed green tea, hot chocolate, hot lemon with honey, lemon ice tea, 






3.12. Appendix B: 
Instructions for Study 1 
 
STUDY 1 (RESTAURANT FIELD EXPERIMENT):  
1. Order Sheet for Participants in the Precommitment (Before) Condition (in English) 
Respected Customers, 
We have recently started a “Pay As You Wish” program for our drinks (excluding alcoholic 
beverages). You can order any of these drinks from the menu. For each of the drinks, you can choose 
the amount you wish to pay. You have to state, in the box below, the amounts you wish to pay for the 
drinks you order. The stated amounts will then be added to your bill. 
Pay as you wish! 
 
Please list the drinks you would like to order: 












For Restaurant Use Only         Code: B41 
Bill Number:      Date:    Time: 
Table Number:     Note: 
Total number of customers:    Number of children:   





2. Order Sheet for Participants in the Precommitment (Before) Condition (in Nepali) 
आदरणीय 'ाहकबग-, 
हामील ेहाल ैहा2ो िड6 ंकह8मा (मादक पदाथ- बाहेक) "आफुले चाहेको मू? ितनु-होस" काय-Cम संचालन गरेका छौ|ं 
तपाईले मेनुबाट कुन ैपिन िड6 ंक अड-र गन- सIुJKछ र LMके िड6 ंकको आफुले चाहेको रकम ितन- सIुJKछ| Mसको 
लािग आफुल ेअड-र गरेको िड6 ंकको ितन- चाहेको मू? तल िदएको कोठामा उQेख गनु- पनSछ| Mसपिछ उT मू? 
तपाईकंो िबलमा समावेश गWरनेछ| 
आफुल ेचाहेको मू? ितनु-होस|| 
 
कृपया आफुले अड-र गनS िड6 ंक उQेख गनु-होस: 














रे[ुरे\को Lयोगको लािग मा]:        Code: B41 
िबल न^र:     िमित:    समय: 
टेबल न:ं      नोट: 
कुल 'ाहक सं_ा:    बालबािलका सं_ा:   






3. Order Sheet 1 for Participants in the No Precommitment (After) Condition (in 
English) 
Respected Customers, 
We have recently started a “Pay As You Wish” program for our drinks (excluding alcoholic 
beverages). You can order any of these drinks from the menu. For each of the drinks, you can choose 
the amount you wish to pay. After you finish your food (before you receive the bill for the food), you 
will have to state the amounts you wish to pay for the drinks you have ordered. The stated amounts 
will then be added to your bill. 
Pay as you wish! 
 















For Restaurant Use Only         Code: AF1 
Bill Number:      Date:    Time: 
Table Number:     Note: 
Total number of customers:    Number of children:   






4. Order Sheet 1 for Participants in the No Precommitment (After) Condition (in 
Nepali) 
आदरणीय 'ाहकबग-, 
हामील ेहाल ैहा2ो िड6 ंकह8मा (मादक पदाथ- बाहेक) "आफुले चाहेको मू? ितनु-होस" काय-Cम संचालन गरेका छौ|ं 
तपाईले मेनुबाट कुन ैपिन िड6 ंक अड-र गन- सIुJKछ र LMके िड6 ंकको आफुल ेचाहेको रकम ितन- सIुJKछ| तपाईकंो 
खाना समा` भएपछी (खानाको िबल Lा` गनु- अिघ) तपाईलं ेअड-र गनु-भएको िड6 ंकको ितन- चाहेको मू? उQेख 
गनु- पनS JKछ| Mसपिछ उT मू? तपाईकंो िबलमा समावेश गWरनेछ| 
आफुल ेचाहेको मू? ितनु-होस|| 
 















रे[ुरे\को Lयोगको लािग मा]:        Code: B41 
िबल न^र:     िमित:    समय: 
टेबल न:ं      नोट: 
कुल 'ाहक सं_ा:    बालबािलका सं_ा:   






5. Order Sheet 2 for Participants in the No Precommitment (After) Condition (in 
English) 
Respected Customers, 
Please state, in the box below, the amounts you wish to pay for the drinks you have ordered. The 
stated amounts will then be added to your bill. 
Pay as you wish! 
 
















For Restaurant Use Only         Code: AF2 
Bill Number:      Date:    Time: 
Table Number:     Note: 
Total number of customers:    Number of children:   






6. Order Sheet 2 for Participants in the No Precommitment (After) Condition (in 
Nepali) 
आदरणीय 'ाहकबग-, 
कृपया तपाईलंे अड-र गनु-भएको िड6 ंकको ितन- चाहेको मू? तल िदएको कोठामा उQेख गनु-होस|् Mसपिछ उT 
मू? तपाईकंो िबलमा समावेश गWरनेछ| 
आफुल ेचाहेको मू? ितनु-होस|| 
 

















रे[ुरे\को Lयोगको लािग मा]:        Code: AF2 
िबल न^र:     िमित:    समय: 
टेबल न:ं      नोट: 
कुल 'ाहक सं_ा:    बालबािलका सं_ा:   






7. Final questionnaire for all conditions (in English) 
 
Respected Customers, 
We warmly request you to help us by sharing your experience at our restaurant, through answering the 
brief questions below: 
How often do you come to Beijing Garden Restaurant? 
This is my first 
time 
1-5 times a year 6-11 times a year 1-2 times per 
month 
Every week 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 
How often do you order the drinks you ordered today at any restaurant? 
Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Every time 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 












¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 












¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 
 
For Restaurant Use Only         Code: CC 
Date: 
Time: 
Table Number:     Note: 






8. Final questionnaire for all conditions (in Nepali) 
 
आदरणीय 'ाहकबग-, 
हा2ो रे[ुरे\मा आdनो अनुभवबारे तल िदईएको संिe` Lfहgको उhर िदनुभई सहयोग गWरिदनु Jन हािद-क अनुरोध 
गद-छौ: 
 
तपाई ंBeijing Garden रे6ुरे7मा कितको आउनु 9:छ? 
यो मेरो पिहलो  
चोटी हो 
वष-मा १ - ५ पटक वष-मा ६ - ११ पटक मिहनामा १ - २ पटक हरेक ह`ा 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 
आज अड-र गनु-भएको िड# ंक कुनै रे6ुरे7मा कितको अड-र गनु-9:छ? 
किहल ेगिद-न धेरै थोरै मा]ा मा किहलेकाही ं Lाय सधn 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 
आज अड-र गनु-भएको िड# ंक बाट किDको सFुG 9नु9:छ? 
साहo असpुq 
 




¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 
आज रे6ुरे7को समH अनुभव बाट किDको सFुG 9नु9:छ? 
साहo असpुq 
 








रे[ुरे\को Lयोगको लािग मा]:        Code: CC 
िमित: 
समय: 
टेबल न:ं     नोट: 







3.13. Appendix C: 
Instructions for Study 3 
 
STUDY 3 (LOTTERY TICKET ONLINE EXPERIMENT): 
Sample interface for Study 3: Study 3 was conducted over Amazon’s Mechanical Turk using 
the Qualtrics interface. The following is a sample of the interface for the “Contingent Before” 
(Contingent Precommitment) condition in Study 3. The highlighted passages in yellow and the 
text in color are as they appeared in the experimental interface to ensure participants took note 
of key information. On the other hand, any text in square brackets [ ] with a grey text highlight 
are notes on the procedures for the purpose of this document, and is not part of the experimental 
interface. 
Your Earnings 
Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 0 Tokens 





Please read the following very carefully. 
 
Overview 
This study consists of two sections - Section A and Section B. After completing section A, you will be provided 
additional information for Section B. 
  
Fixed Payment: Every participant will receive $0.25 for his/her participation in the two sections. Please note 
that we only compensate participants who choose to complete both Sections A and B. 
 
Bonus Payment: In addition to the fixed payment, completing Section A will earn you 750 tokens. In Section 
B, you will have an opportunity to earn additional tokens. The total tokens you have earned from Sections A and 




Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 0 Tokens 
 Section A 
Please note that you will need to complete the task in its entirety to proceed. 
You will be provided 750 tokens for completing this task. 





The task will consist of a screen with 20 sliders, like the one shown below. 
 
Each slider has ten stars. Your task is to highlight the stars as instructed. The instructions are provided next 
to each slider. You may click or drag the slider from its initial position to reach the number of stars you are 
asked to highlight.   
To proceed, you need to highlight every slider exactly as instructed. You will be awarded 750 tokens for 
completing this task.  
 
Thank you for your participation! 
  
Please click the button below when you are ready to begin. 
[A ‘Continue’ button is shown here] 
[Page Break] 
Your Earnings 
Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 0 Tokens 
  
There are 20 sliders in this section. 
  
Each slider has ten stars. Your task is to highlight the stars as instructed. The instructions are provided next to 
each slider. You may click or drag the slider from its initial position to reach the number of stars you are asked 
to highlight.   
 
There are no time limits.  
 
To proceed, you need to highlight every slider exactly as instructed. You will be awarded 750 tokens for 










Participation Payment: $0.25 






Congratulations on completing Section A. 
750 tokens have been added as bonus payment to your account. 
 




Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 750 Tokens 
Section B 
Please read the following very carefully. 
 
For this section, we will randomly match you with another participant. The other participant is assigned the role 
of a Seller, while you are assigned the role of a Buyer. 
 Participant identifiers are withheld to maintain anonymity 
but each participant is provided a unique ID number. 
 
Please click the button below to proceed  
(the button will appear when you have been matched with another participant) 
[Page Break] 
Your Earnings 
Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 750 Tokens 
Section B 
 
You have been matched with: 
 
[Matched Participant’s ID number is shown here] 
  
Please click the button below to continue 
[Page Break] 
Your Earnings 
Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 750 Tokens 
Section B 
Please read the following very carefully. 
  
[Matched Participant ID] is assigned the role of a Seller, while you are assigned the role of a Buyer. [Matched 





1. The holder of this lottery ticket has a 50% chance to earn 500 tokens and a 50% chance to earn 
1500 tokens. That is, you will earn either 500 tokens or 1500 tokens with equal probability for each 
outcome. 
2. If you wish to purchase the lottery ticket, you will be asked to pay as you wish for it. You can pay any 
amount you wish to [Matched Participant ID], including 0 tokens. 
3. The payment is to be made in tokens; as such, you can use any amount of tokens from your bonus 
payment to pay for the lottery ticket. 
4. There are no transaction costs (i.e. any amount you pay will be provided directly to [Matched 
Participant ID].  
5. The amount you pay has no influence on the probability of earning a higher or a lower amount from the 
lottery. 
6. Purchase of the lottery ticket is optional. If you do not wish to purchase the ticket, the study will 
terminate. Please note that the participation payment is provided only to participants who choose to 
take part in both sections A and B. 
Please indicate your choice by selecting the respective option below. 
Yes, I want to purchase the lottery ticket 
No, I do not want to purchase the lottery ticket 




Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 750 Tokens 
Please read the following very carefully. 
  
You indicated that you wish to purchase the lottery ticket from [Matched Participant ID]. 
The following three steps will happen next:  
 
Step 1: You will be asked to indicate the number of tokens you wish to pay Participant- for the lottery 
ticket depending on the outcome of the lottery. That is, you will be asked to state the amount you wish to pay if 
the lottery outcome is 500 tokens, and the amount you wish to pay if the lottery outcome is 1500 tokens.  At the 
end of the study, after the outcome is revealed, the amount you choose to pay for that outcome will be deducted 
from your bonus payment. The amount you pay has no influence on the outcome of the lottery. 
 
Step 2: Your lottery ticket will be provided as a unique four-digit code. This randomized code will determine 
your outcome in the lottery.  
 
Step 3: The outcome of the lottery will be shown to you. Your earnings from the lottery will be added and the 







Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 750 Tokens 
 
Recall that the lottery gives you a 50% chance to earn 500 tokens and a 50% chance to earn 1500 tokens. That 
is, you will either earn 500 tokens or 1500 tokens with equal probability for each outcome. 
[Page Break] 
Your Earnings 
Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 750 Tokens 
 
How much do you wish to pay [Matched Participant ID] for the lottery ticket? (in tokens) 
Please indicate the amount you wish to pay for the lottery ticket for each possible outcome. At the end of the 
study, after the outcome is revealed, the amount you choose to pay for that outcome will be deducted from your 
bonus payment. The amount you pay has no influence on the outcome of the lottery. 
  Amount you wish to pay 
If you win 500 tokens 
 




Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 750 Tokens 
  
Your unique code for the lottery is: [A unique 4 digit code is provided]  
 





Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: [750 – realized payment] Tokens 
 
Lottery Results 
You have earned: [Lottery outcome, either 500 or 1500, is shown here] tokens. 
 
This amount has been added to your bonus payment.  








Section B is complete.  
  
Bonus Payment Summary 
Earnings from Section A: 750 tokens 
Lottery Winnings: [Lottery outcome] tokens 
Amount you paid for the lottery: [Amount paid for the outcome] tokens 
Total Bonus Payment: [750 – realized payment] tokens 
  
Thank you very much for your participation. The bonus payment tokens will be exchanged at the rate of 500 
tokens = $0.50 and added to your MTurk account as a bonus within a week. 








We would like to hear from you about your experience in the study today. Your responses will be entirely 













I am happy with the 
compensation I 
received for my 
time. 
       
To make sure you 
are paying attention, 
please select 
"Strongly disagree" 
       
I would like to take 
part in more studies 
of this nature in the 
future. 
       
[Page Break] 
How much do you think we expected you to pay for the lottery ticket? (in tokens) 
  Amount we expected you to pay 
If you won 500 tokens 
 
If you won 1500 tokens 
 
[Page Break] 






This study required substantial time and effort to put together. If for whatever reason you feel that you did not 
respond to the questions carefully or accurately, we would greatly appreciate your informing us of this now. 
 












Have you participated in this study before? 
o Yes  
o No  






3.14. Appendix D: 
Instructions for Study 4 
STUDY 4 (LOTTERY TICKET ONLINE EXPERIMENT):  
Sample interface for Study 4: Study 4 was conducted over Amazon’s Mechanical Turk using 
the Qualtrics interface. The following is a sample of the interface for the Send 
framing/“Before” (Precommitment) condition. The highlighted passages in yellow, graphics 
and the text in color are as they appeared in the experimental interface to ensure participants 
took note of key information. On the other hand, any text in square brackets [ ] with a grey text 




Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 0 Tokens 




Please read the following very carefully. 
 
Overview 
This study consists of two sections - Section A and Section B. After completing section A, you will be provided 
additional information for Section B. 
Fixed Payment: Every participant will receive $0.25 for his/her participation in the two sections. You will be 
provided this fee automatically when your HIT is approved. 
 
Bonus Payment: In addition to the fixed payment, you will have an opportunity to earn additional tokens. The 
total tokens you have earned will be exchanged into US Dollars and provided to you as a bonus payment. The 









Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 0 Tokens 
 
Section A 
Please read the following very carefully. 
 
In this section you will be taking part in a task that has two participants - A and B. Participant A is provided 




Out of 400 tokens provided to Participant A, Participant A can choose to send any amount (in units of 100 




The amount Participant A sends to Participant B will triple when Participant B receives it. 
 
 
Out of the amount Participant B receives, Participant B can choose to send any amount back to Participant A 









Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 0 Tokens 
Section A 
Please read the following very carefully. 
 
You have been assigned the role of Participant B. As such, you have not been provided any tokens. Participant 
A has been provided with 400 tokens.  
 
Out of the 400 tokens provided to Participant A, he/she can choose to send to you any amount (in units of 100 
tokens, including 0 tokens).  
The amount Participant A sends to you will be tripled when you receive it. Out of the tripled amount, you can 
then choose to send any amount back to Participant A (including 0 tokens). The remaining amount (i.e. the 
amount you have not sent to Participant A) will be added to your bonus payment. 
 




Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 0 Tokens 
Section A 
Please read the following very carefully. 
You are now being randomly matched with a participant assigned the role of Participant A. 
 Participant identifiers are withheld to maintain anonymity 
but each participant is provided a unique ID number. 
 
Please click the button below to proceed. 




Participation Payment: $0.25 







You have been matched with: 
  
Participant A (ID: [Matched Participant’s ID number is shown here]) 
  




Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 0 Tokens 
Section A 
Please read the following very carefully. 
  
You have been matched with a Participant A, who has decided to send 200 tokens to you. 
 
The amount will be tripled when you receive it. That is, the total amount you will receive is 600 tokens. This 
amount will be added to your bonus payment upon entering a code that will be provided to you later. 
  
Please indicate below how much of this amount you wish to send to Participant A. 
 
How much do you wish to send to Participant A? (in tokens) 





Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 0 Tokens 
Section A 
Please read the following very carefully. 
  
You have decided to send [Amount sent] tokens to Participant A. 
 
This will be deducted from your bonus payment. 
  
Please click the forward button to confirm your choice 








Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: 0 Tokens 
Section A Summary 
Participant A decided to send you: 200 tokens 
You will receive: 600 tokens 
You decided to send to Participant A: [Amount sent] tokens 
Your final bonus payment is: 600 tokens 
  





Participation Payment: $0.25 
Bonus Payment: [600 – Amount sent] Tokens 
 
Section A is complete.  
  
The bonus payment has been added to your earnings.  
The bonus payment will be exchanged at the rate of 500 tokens = $0.50  
and added to your MTurk account as a bonus upon study completion. 
  





We would like to hear from you about your experience in the study today. Your responses will be entirely 

















I am happy with 
the compensation 
I received for my 
time. 
       





       
I would like to 
take part in more 
studies of this 
nature in the 
future. 
       
[Page Break] 











This study required substantial time and effort to put together. If for whatever reason you feel that you did not 
respond to the questions carefully or accurately, we would greatly appreciate your informing us of this now. 
 














Have you participated in this study before? 
o Yes  
o No  










4. Hold-Up Induced by Demand for Fairness:  
Theory and Experimental Evidence 
 
Abstract 
Recent research suggests that fairness concerns could mitigate hold-up problems. In this study, 
we report theoretical analysis and experimental evidence on an opposite possibility: that 
fairness concerns could also induce hold-up. In our setup, hold-up will not occur with purely 
self-interested agents, but theoretically could occur if agents have strong demand for 
distributional fairness without sufficient reciprocating tendencies. Accordingly, we observe 
widespread presence of hold-up in our experiment. Relationship-specific investments occurred 
less than half of the time, resulting in significant inefficiencies. Moreover, whenever a 
relationship-specific investment was made: (a) it was typically not reciprocated by the partner; 
(b) nor did the investor’s offers at the bargaining stage exhibit expectations for reciprocity. 
Consequently, the partners extracted all the additional expected payoff from relationship-
specific investments. Further experimentation suggested that our results were driven by a 
fundamental lack of reciprocal path dependence in fairness concerns, rather than self-serving 
bias. 
 







Relationships often improve in value when the parties involved make relationship-
specific investments. However, a common dilemma for the potential investor is whether the 
partner would take up all or most of the gains resulting from the investment, leaving the 
investor with no benefits in the end. If this is highly likely, the potential investor would be 
reluctant to invest. This, in essence, is the hold-up problem, which could result in significant 
inefficiencies.  
Hold-ups are a prevalent concern when ex ante contracts are incomplete and ex post 
negotiations are not preventable (e.g., Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1983; Grossman & Hart, 1986; 
Hart & Moore, 1990).1 In the traditional setup of these problems, underinvestment and 
inefficiencies occur due to potential self-interested expropriation by the relationship partner at 
ex post negotiation. The embedded assumption of pure self-interest maximization has been 
questioned in a growing stream of recent research (see Köszegi, 2014, for a broad overview of 
related topics), which provides theoretical and experimental evidence that hold-up can be 
mitigated by social preferences over fair dealings. Key issues include how fairness norms that 
have been established ex ante can have a behavioural influence ex post; the establishment of 
such norms can happen through contracting (Hart & Moore, 2008; Fehr et al., 2011, 2015; 
Hoppe & Schmitz, 2011; Bartling & Schmidt, 2015, etc.), communication (Ellingsen & 
Johannesson, 2004a, 2004b; Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006), or sunk cost effects (Carmichael 
& MacLeod, 2003). Complementing these studies, von Siemens (2009) and Dufwenberg et al. 
(2013) highlight how hold-up can be mitigated if agents who behave unfairly ex post are liable 
to be punished effectively, even if the punishment is costly to the punisher.  
In this article, we propose a starkly opposite possibility: that fairness concerns can also 
induce hold-up problems and thus significant inefficiencies. We report theoretical analysis and 
experimental evidence of hold-up in scenarios in which it will not occur if agents are purely 
self-interested, but could occur if they care about fairness at ex post negotiation. We base our 
investigation on the following simple setup. There are two agents in a relationship, whom we 
label the investor and the partner. In an initial first period, the investor decides whether to make 
a relationship-specific investment to increase the efficiency of the relationship. The decision is 
observed by both agents. Afterwards, in the second period, the investor makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to split the value of the relationship between the two agents. Suppose the other 
                                               
1 See also introductory texts in Tirole (1988, p. 24-27), Hart (1995), Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), and Che 





agent, the partner, is purely self-interested in own payoff, and thus prefers any positive value 
to walking away with nothing. Then the second period allows the investor to appropriate 
virtually all of the value of the relationship by making an offer that leaves a minimal positive 
value to the partner. Thus, from a standard economic point of view, the investor would make a 
relationship-specific investment, because he would be able to claim all the subsequent increase 
in efficiency in the relationship. There would not be any hold-up problem.  
Now consider the case when the partner has a strong social preference for fairness in 
the second period, so that she is willing to sacrifice her own payoff to punish the investor, if 
the investor’s take-it-or-leave-it offer leaves too little for the partner.2 The investor can then 
foresee that there is a limit to which he can appropriate the value of the relationship in the 
second period, when he will stand the risk of the partner breaking the deal in a mutually 
destructive fashion. As such, the investor might refrain from investing at the outset, as 
explicated in our more formal analysis in the next section. Therefore, the partner’s social 
preference, in terms of (expected) demand for fairness, potentially creates a hold-up problem 
for the investor. The problem would not have existed had the partner been known to be purely 
self-interested. 
In the spirit of this line of reasoning, an employer might refrain from investing in 
production technology, because of the fear that employees might then demand a “fair” share of 
the increased value of the business (with the threat of mutually damaging industrial actions) 
that renders the original investment unprofitable. A manufacturer might also refrain from 
investing in customized service efficiency for a business customer, if there is fear that the latter 
would demand a high share of the increased value of the business for fairness sake, to the extent 
of allowing bargaining to break down in mutually damaging fashion. A similar conundrum 
could be faced by a nation deciding whether to invest in an international trade agreement. The 
nation might decide not to invest, fearing that partnering nations would disregard its investment 
in their demand for fair deals in future negotiations. 
Such decision contexts also imply a potential conflict between demand for 
distributional fairness and positive reciprocity that has been rarely, if at all, explored. The 
                                               
2 The self-payoff-sacrificing punishment in this context can be understood in terms of a preference for 
distributional fairness, or inequity aversion. Alternatively, it can be understood as negative reciprocity against 
being harshly treated, which is a different type of fairness concerns; see the related references cited later on in this 
section. Empirically, the rejection of positive offers in ultimatum games, like the bargaining in the second period 
described here, has been observed in decades of ultimatum game experiments (see the survey in Güth & Kocher, 





partner’s demand for distributional fairness (inequity aversion) would increase the minimum 
acceptable amount that is offered to her. But the partner might also harbour positive reciprocity 
towards the investor’s earlier decision to invest in the relationship, which might then decrease 
her minimum acceptable amount.  
If inequity aversion dominates and undermines positive reciprocity, that is, when the 
partner’s social preference undervalues the past, then a hold-up problem could be induced by 
demand for fairness. Previous studies of social preference have not fully addressed these 
situations. The literature on inequity aversion either focuses solely on the distribution of value 
as a utility component (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), or studies trust and reciprocity as an indirect 
outcome of concerns for distributional fairness (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 
2002). Meanwhile, another literature that focuses more specifically on trust and reciprocity 
typically leaves distributional fairness issues aside (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg & 
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Cox et al., 2007).  
Research on different fairness ideals, such as Cappelen et al. (2007), provides a different 
perspective. In the framework of Cappelen et al., libertarianism would be highly conscious of 
the relationship between investment and fairness; by contrast, strict egalitarianism would 
consider distributional fairness without regard to previous investments; liberal egalitarianism 
would have a more intermediate position. However, that line of research has so far not 
considered the strategic concerns in ex post negotiation, which is central to hold-up problems 
and this study.  
In the next section, we present and analyse a theoretical model on which our experiment 
is based. In the model, hold-up will not occur with self-interested agents, but theoretically could 
occur under inequity aversion. We then report a laboratory experiment that provided empirical 
evidence for hold-up induced by demand for fairness. As it appears, inequity aversion 
dominated over any positive reciprocity in the partners’ decisions in our experiment. 
Accordingly, we observe widespread presence of hold-up in our experiment. Relationship-
specific investments occurred less than half of the time, resulting in significant inefficiencies. 
Moreover, whenever a relationship-specific investment was made: (a) it was typically not 
reciprocated by the partner; (b) nor did the investor’s offers at the bargaining stage exhibit 
expectations for reciprocity. Consequently, the partners extracted all the additional expected 





results were driven by a fundamental lack of reciprocal path dependence in fairness concerns, 
rather than self-serving bias. 
 
4.2. Model and analysis 
4.2.1. Basic setup 
Our experimental framework is based on a theoretical model with two periods and 
involving two agents, Player P and Player R (the players correspond to the investor and the 
partner respectively in the previous discussion). In period 1, Player P selects one out of a set 
of two ultimatum bargaining games, Game NI and Game I (“NI” stands for “not invest” and 
“I” stands for “invest,” as will be explained further). After Player P makes this decision, period 
2 begins, in which the two players play the game chosen by Player P in period 1, with Player 
P in the role of proposer and Player R in the role of responder. Game j (j {NI, I}) in period 2 
can be described by the ordered pair (Mj, Cj), where Mj > 0 is the total amount to be allocated 
(the pie size) and Cj ≥ 0 is the outside option of the proposer should the responder reject the 
proposer’s offer. For simplicity, the responder’s outside option is zero in both games.  
Hence period 2 itself has two stages such that, if Game j is played:  
(i) In the first stage, Player P offers to Player R an allocation such that Player R receives yj 
 [0,Mj] and Player P keeps Mj-yj for him/herself;  
(ii) In the second stage, Player R makes a binary decision to accept or reject Player P’s offer. 
If Player R accepts, the game ends with Player P earning a pecuniary payoff of Mj-yj and Player 
R earning a pecuniary payoff of yj. If Player R rejects, the game ends with Player P earning a 
pecuniary payoff of Cj and Player R earning a pecuniary payoff of zero. It is important to 
emphasize that these payoffs are pecuniary, which can be different from utilities after 
incorporating social preference.  
The four parameters of the two games are common knowledge to both players. We 
further assume that MI > MNI > CNI > CI ≥ 0. That is, Game I has a larger pie size than Game 
NI, but Player P has a larger outside option in Game NI than in Game I; moreover, the outside 
option in Game NI is less than the pie size in both games. Therefore, Player P’s choice in period 
1 between Game NI and Game I is equivalent to a relationship-specific investment, through 
which Player P sacrifices part of his/her outside option in return for an increase in the total 







We next present two levels of analysis on possible decisions of players in the model, 
one under standard assumptions of self-interest, the other incorporating fairness concerns. As 
we can see, the two sets of analysis could result in completely opposite conclusions in payoffs 
and efficiencies.  
 
4.2.2. Decisions under pure self-interest 
If it is common knowledge that both players are purely self-interested in pecuniary 
payoffs, Player R will accept any minimal positive offer in period 2, so that Player P can keep 
virtually all of the value of the pie Mj to him/herself. This implies that Player P will choose 
Game I in period 1 which does enhance the value of the relationship. This subgame perfect 
equilibrium does not incur a hold-up problem: Player P always invests in the relationship in 
equilibrium, thus guaranteeing full efficiency. Player P, moreover, is able to extract all the 
surplus from the investment. 
 
4.2.3. Decisions with fairness concerns 
If Player R has social preference in the form of inequity aversion, so that he/she could 
reject positive offers that are too low and deemed too unfair relative to what Player P would 
gain, the picture could be very different. Player P might then make a significantly positive offer 
to Player R in either game, in order to secure acceptance of offer.  
We employ Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s model of inequity aversion to obtain further 
results. Suppose Player P believes Player R’s preferences to be such that, if the payoffs to 
Player P and Player R are xP and xR respectively, then Player R’s utility vR is: 
vR = xR-αR max{xP-xR ,0}-βR max{xR-xP ,0}, 
where the two parameters αR and βR are such that αR≥βR and 1>βR≥0. The parameter αR 
characterizes Player R’s aversion to having less payoff than Player P (disadvantageous 
inequality), while the parameter βR characterizes Player R’s aversion to having more payoff 
than Player P (advantageous inequality). 
Assume that Player P does not consider offers that would result in Player R earning 
more than Player P (this would be in line with empirical observations, and is also valid when 
Player P him/herself has a Fehr-Schmidt utility function). If Player R accepts an offer yj in 





vR = yj-αR(Mj-2yj); 
if Player R rejects that offer, so that the payoffs to the two players are Cj and 0, then: 
vR = -αRCj. 
Hence Player R accepts an offer only if yj-αR(Mj-2yj)≥ -αRCj, or: 
yj ≥ αR(Mj-Cj)/(1+2αR). 
That is, at the end of period 2, Player R accepts the offer only if yj/(Mj-Cj)≥ αR/(1+2αR) 
irrespective of the other parameters of the game. Moreover, αR/(1+2αR) is not more than 1/2 by 
definition of the parameter αR, so that Player R’s minimum acceptable offer αR(Mj-Cj)/(1+2αR) 
would not be more than half of the pie size in surplus of the outside option. 
Inducing backwards, a pecuniary payoff-maximizing Player P should offer αR(Mj-
Cj)/(1+2αR) to Player R and keep the remainder of the pie, which is: 
Mj-[αR(Mj-Cj)/(1+2αR)] = [(1+αR)Mj + αRCj]/(1+2αR). 
This is Player P’s subgame perfect equilibrium payoff in the subgame beginning in period 2, 
conditioned on having chosen Game j in period 1. 
Finally, inducing to the beginning of period 1, Player P will choose Game NI if: 
(1+αR)MNI +αR CNI > (1+αR)MI + αR CI , or 
αR/(1+αR) > (MI-MNI)/(CNI-CI). 
In other words, Player P will choose not to invest in increasing the value of the 
relationship, if he/she believes that Player R’s demand for fairness is sufficiently high with 
respect to the efficiency-outside option trade-off between Game NI and Game I captured by 
(MI-MNI)/(CNI-CI). The intuition is that, compared with Game I, the higher outside option in 
Game NI provides a stronger “bargaining chip” for Player P that could lower Player R’s 
minimum acceptable offer, namely αR(Mj-Cj)/(1+2αR). This appeal of Game NI needs to be 
overturned by the appeal of Game I having a larger pie to split, in order for Player P to invest; 
otherwise, Player R’s demand for fairness (which would lead to rejection of perceived unfair 






4.2.3.1. Incorporating uncertainty about the other player’s inequity aversion 
The above analysis suffices in conveying our major insight that demand for fairness 
could create a hold-up problem. In order to tie in our analysis with experimental decisions, we 
now introduce an extension in which Player P is uncertain about Player R’s level of inequity 
aversion. Such uncertainty is manifested in a probabilistic belief about αR. To proceed, we first 
define σj  = yj/(Mj-Cj), so that Player R accepts an offer only if σj ≥ αR/(1+2αR), which is 
equivalent to αR ≤ σj /(1-2σj). Next, define p(σj)=Pr[αR≤σj/(1-2σj)], a function of σj that is Player 
P’s subjective estimate of the probability that the offer will be accepted. Note that p(·) is non-
decreasing with p(0) = 0 and p(1/2) = 1. At the beginning of period 2, when Game j has been 
chosen to be played, an expected payoff maximizing Player P should make an offer that 
maximizes: 
p(σj)[Cj+(1-σj)(Mj-Cj)]+(1- p(σj))Cj = p(σj)(1- σj)(Mj-Cj)+Cj, 
which is equivalent to choosing σj such that: 
σj = σ* = arg  [p(σ)(1-σ)] = arg {Pr[αR ≤ σ/(1-2σ)] · (1-σ)}, 
where the effective range of σ in the maximization problem is over 0≤σ≤1/2 because of the 
definition and properties of p(·). As is also explicit in the above formulation, the maximization 
problem should yield the same optimal σj irrespective of the game, as p(·) is a function of Player 
P’s belief over the distribution of αR only. In other words, we have σNI =σI =σ* upon Player P’s 
expected payoff maximization, and the inequality for hold-up becomes: 
p(σ*)(1-σ*)(MNI-CNI)+CNI > p(σ*)(1-σ*)(MI-CI)+ CI, or 
{1/[p(σ*)(1- σ*)]}-1 > (MI-MNI)/(CNI-CI), 
after simplification.  
The intuition behind this hold-up condition is similar to that in the case without 
uncertainty, but in a more general context. First, the left-hand side only depends on Player P’s 
belief over Player R’s Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion coefficient αR, and is independent of the 
right-hand side. Meanwhile, as in the case without uncertainty, we have a right-hand side that 
is a measure of the efficiency-outside option trade-off between Game NI and Game I. If Player 
P believes that Player R has a sufficiently strong demand for fairness (i.e., p(σ*)(1- σ*) is 
sufficiently low) with respect to the efficiency-outside option trade-off, then Player P would 









Our experimental parameters involve a special case in which MI -MNI = CNI-CI, so that 
the decrease in outside option is equal to the increase in the pie size. The right-hand side is then 
equal to one, and hold-up occurs if p(σ*)(1-σ*)<1/2. Without uncertainty, so that Player P’s 
belief for αR is a single mass point distribution, σ*=αR/(1+2αR), p(σ*)=1, p(σ*)(1-
σ*)=(1+αR)/(1+2αR)>1/2, and there would be no hold-up problem. However, with uncertainty, 
when Player P’s belief could be more diffuse, it is possible that p(σ*)(1-σ*)<1/2, when hold-
up would occur. For example, ultimatum game experiments (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003, Ch. 2.1) 
suggest that proposer offers are predominantly in the range of 30% to 50% of the pie size. If 
σ* = 40% for a Player P, then hold-up occurs when the player believes that his/her offer will 
be accepted with a probability that is less than 5/6 = 83%.  
This special case highlights the more general implication that, when Player P is 
uncertain about Player R’s demand for fairness, so that Player P may entertain a more diffuse 
belief distribution for αR than the single mass point distribution in the case without uncertainty, 
hold-up is correspondingly feasible over a larger range of (MI-MNI)/(CNI-CI). The intuition is 
that, under uncertainty, Player P typically cannot be sure whether an offer will be accepted or 
rejected. Thus a higher outside option would serve the advantage of a better guaranteed payoff 
in the event that the offer is rejected (in addition to providing a stronger “bargaining chip” that 
could lower Player R’s minimum acceptable offer with or without uncertainty). This then gives 
Player P more cause to choose lower investment in return for a higher outside option. 
 
4.2.3.2. Reciprocity towards investment 
In the preceding analysis, we have implicitly assumed that αR is constant across Game 
NI and Game I. That is, as Player P believes it, Player R does not harbour a reciprocal path 
dependence that traces back to Player P’s investment decision. Had such extent of reciprocity 
existed, it might have led to the effective value of αR being lower in Game I than in Game NI. 
Player R will then be willing to accept lower offers than in the preceding analysis, and, if this 
is common knowledge, Player P will make lower offers as well in expectation of Player R’s 
reciprocity, which might then mitigate the hold-up problem for Player P. We shall seek 
evidence for the existence of such tendencies in our experimental data; as will be reported, our 






4.2.4. Summary and discussion 
To sum up our results in this section, investment in relationship will always take place 
in our model if both agents are commonly known to be self-interested in pecuniary payoffs, 
and the investing agent will capture all the additional welfare from the investment. However, 
if agents have social preference in the form of inequity aversion – to be more precise, if the 
investing agent believes that the other agent has inequity aversion – then a hold-up problem 
might occur. That is, the investing agent might shy away from investing to enhance the value 
of the relationship, because a higher outside option could provide a stronger “bargaining chip” 
that could lower the other agent’s minimum acceptable offer. Moreover, hold-up could be more 
widespread when the investing agent is uncertain about the other agent’s fairness demand, since 
a higher outside option would then serve the additional advantage as a better guaranteed payoff 
in the event that the offer is rejected.  
Our analysis assumes that Player P believes that Player R is a Fehr-Schmidt decision 
maker. Moreover, we make the simplifying assumption that Player P is (expected) pecuniary 
payoff maximizing, which, in the present context, is consistent with Player P being a Fehr-
Schmidt decision maker with negligible inequity aversion to earning a higher payoff than 
Player R. More relaxed assumptions, as well as other models of fairness concerns, could have 
been used. These other approaches would have yielded different parameter conditions for the 
occurrence of a hold-up problem induced by demand for fairness; but the present analysis 
suffices for our main objectives.  
4.3. Experiment 1: Hold-up induced by demand for fairness 
We next report an experiment designed to demonstrate the existence of the hold-up 
problem discussed in the previous section. Our experiment follows our model setup and is in 
essence a modification of the ultimatum bargaining game, in which the proposer may make a 
relationship-specific investment by foregoing an outside option in return for an increase in the 
total amount to be allocated. The investment decision therefore involves a trade-off between 
reduced protection (i.e., outside option) against prospective bargaining breakdown, and an 
increase in the value of the relationship. 
4.3.1. Procedures 
Ninety-six subjects, recruited from the experimental and behavioural economics subject 
pool of a UK university, participated in the experiment. The experiment was conducted via an 





interfaces for both roles in the experiment (proposer and responder) can be found in the 
Appendix (Section 4.8). Subjects’ earnings were contingent on their own decisions and the 
decisions of the subjects they were matched with to play the experimental games. Earnings 
were first calculated in the experimental currency, tokens, which were converted to real 
currency at the rate of £1 = 30 tokens at the end of the experiment. There was also a £2 show-
up fee. Each experimental session lasted approximately half an hour, and the average payment 
per subject was £7.32 including the show-up fee. 
Upon entering the laboratory, the subjects were first introduced to a version of the 
control game in the experiment (see below) for practice. Afterwards, they were informed about 
the role they had been assigned, upon which the main part of the experiment commenced. 
Half of the subjects were randomly assigned to the role of proposer (labelled as 
Participant P), the other half to the role of responder (labelled as Participant R). For each role, 
the experiment had the same five conditions (called “tasks” in the experiment), including four 
control games and one focal game. Every subject was paid for his/her decision in the focal 
game plus one randomly selected control game. For each of these two games, payment was 
determined by independent random matching between proposers and responders. The random 
matching, and determination of payments, were carried out only after the experiment was over. 
Complete information was provided to participants about the matching procedure at the 
beginning of the study. 
Each control game was an ultimatum game, and the four control games together formed 
a 2(total amount to be allocated: 200 tokens vs. 240 tokens) × 2(proposer’s outside option: 0 
tokens vs. 40 tokens) within-subjects design; note that the responder’s outside option was 
always zero tokens. Specifically, each proposer subject was asked, for each control game, to 
indicate his/her proposed allocation of a number of tokens that was the bargained pie size, 
between him/her and the responder subject who would be randomly matched with him/her, had 
that game been randomly selected for payment. The possible allocations were constrained in 
our setup, so that offers to the responder were in multiples of 20 tokens, from zero tokens to 
the whole pie.  
Meanwhile, for every allowed proposed allocation of tokens in every control game, 
each responder subject was asked whether he/she would accept or reject the allocation, had the 
proposer randomly matched with him/her made that offer. This is the strategy method for 





experimenter to collect very comprehensive decision data. The method has been employed by, 
among others, Bellemare et al. (2008), who also offered a discussion (see footnote 4 of their 
article) on the empirical evidence regarding how the approach compared with collecting the 
responder’s decision only after revealing the proposer’s offer. 
Whichever the role, the decision tasks for the four control games were all listed within 
the same Qualtrics page, and subjects could scroll back and forth between the games as they 
made decisions. This design feature could thus minimize the order effect of decisions in the 
four games.  
Upon completing the four control games, subjects moved on to the focal game in a new 
webpage. The focal game was essentially the model developed in the previous section with 
Game NI being (200 tokens, 40 tokens) and Game I being (240 tokens, 0 tokens). Specifically, 
in the focal game, the proposer was first required to choose between two alternatives, 
Alternative A (corresponding to Game NI) and Alternative B (corresponding to Game I). If 
Alternative A was chosen, an ultimatum game would be played between the proposer and a 
matched responder with a pie size of 200 tokens and proposer’s outside option of 40 tokens. If 
Alternative B was chosen, an ultimatum game would be played between the proposer and the 
matched responder with a pie size of 240 tokens and proposer’s outside option of 0 tokens. 
While the proposer subjects made the choice of alternative and then an offer in conjunction 
with that choice, each responder subject was asked to indicate his/her accept or reject decision 
contingent on each possible alternative and offer that could be chosen by the matched proposer. 
In addition, every subject was provided an on-screen text box at the end of the experiment, 
which prompted them to write down the rationale behind their decisions in the focal game. 
The design of the experiment allowed us to compare, for every subject, his/her decisions 
in the focal game with corresponding decisions in the control games. We also deliberately 
required subjects to play the control games first, in order for them to familiarize themselves 
with the more basic ultimatum bargaining of the control games, before moving on to the more 
complex focal game. The within-subjects design was moreover aimed to elicit any possible 
reciprocal tendency: since the control games and their corresponding focal game alternatives 
were presented in close sequence, the proposers’ endogenous choice in the focal game should 
be further highlighted for the responders to adjust their decisions accordingly.3 
                                               
3 About two months after Experiment 1, we invited the subjects in the experiment to short (approximately 15 






As discussed, the focal game involved a trade-off for the proposer between giving up 
an outside option to increase the value of the relationship. We shall refer to a proposer who 
chose to not give up the outside option (i.e., Alternative A in the experiment, corresponding to 
Game NI in the model in Section 4.2) as a non-investor, while a proposer who chose to give 
that up (i.e., Alternative B in the experiment, corresponding to Game I in the model in Section 
4.2) as an investor. We shall also refer to a proposer’s decision to choose Alternative B as 
investing.  
A standard subgame perfect equilibrium argument, based on common knowledge of 
pure self-interest-maximization, would suggest that the proposer should always be an investor 
in the focal game. Upon that choice, the proposer should offer the responder 20 tokens (the 
minimum positive amount that was allowed to be offered). The responder subject would accept 
the offer, since it was higher than the payoff of 0 tokens in the case of rejection. The proposer 
would earn 220 tokens as a result, which would be strictly preferable to any outcome when the 
proposer did no invest.  
Instead, we observed that, of the 48 proposer subjects in Experiment 1, only slightly 
less than half of them (22 subjects, 45.83%) invested, while the remaining 26 subjects (54.17%) 
were non-investors. Thus, the total welfare of subjects in the experiment was strikingly lower 
than the maximum possible – which could be achieved only if all proposers invested. Seen in 
the context of our experiment being a simulation of a hold-up model, we conclude that: 
 
Result 1. There is a significant existence of hold-up and inefficiencies in Experiment 1, as 
investments occurred less than half of the time.  
 
Informal verbal comments collected at the end of the experiment shed light on the 
proposer subjects’ decisions. Firstly, they suggest that those subjects deliberated carefully 
between the two alternatives in the focal game. Moreover, subjects who did not invest (i.e., 
                                               
role as they were previously assigned. Subject payment in the follow-up sessions included a show-up fee of £1 
plus the payment from randomly matching proposers’ and responders’ decisions in the sessions to play the focal 
game. Eventually, 41 proposer subjects and 40 responder subjects (out of 48 in each case) returned for the follow-
up sessions; the average payment per subject was £2.86 including the show-up fee. The follow-up sessions were 
designed to serve as a robustness check for the results from Experiment 1. Indeed, our major conclusions from 
Experiment 1 regarding proposers’ decisions and responders’ MAOs remained unchanged in the follow-up 
sessions. For example, less than half (19 subjects, 46.34%) of the proposer subjects invested in the follow-up 





chose Alternative A in the focal game) largely saw it as a safer option with a higher guaranteed 
payoff (40 tokens) than if they invested (i.e., chose Alternative B, when the outside option 
would be 0 tokens) – even though, if those proposers modelled responder subjects as self-
interested maximisers of pecuniary payoffs, there should not be such a consideration. This 
suggests that the proposers were concerned with responders rejecting positive offers that were 
not deemed high enough. Meanwhile, proposers who invested showed high awareness of the 
responder’s demand for fairness. Their reasoning was that, even though they would have to 
make an offer that would be sufficiently fair – in order to make the offer likely to be accepted 
– investing would still yield them higher payoffs than otherwise. This is consistent with the 
strategic considerations analysed theoretically in Section 4.2. 
 
4.3.2.1. Proposers’ offers 
 
– Insert Table 1 around here – 
 
Table 1 summarizes the observed proposer decisions in Experiment 1, expressed as 
offers to the responders and with a distinction between non-investors and investors. 
Specifically, we display the means and standard deviations, for every control game and each 
choice of alternative in the focal game, the proposer’s offer in number of tokens, as percentage 
of the total amount to be allocated (the pie size, Mj, using the notations in the theory section), 
and as percentage of (Mj-Cj), the pie size in surplus of the outside option.   
A major observation is that there were no significant differences in offers between the 
control game (200,40) and its counterpart among the focal game alternatives, and similarly 
between the control game (240,0) and its focal alternative counterpart: paired t-test 
comparisons in both cases yielded p>0.4. Among the non-investors, 15 subjects (57.69%) made 
the same offer in the control and focal (200,40) games; among the investors, 17 subjects 
(77.27%) made the same offer in the control and focal (240,0) games. Correspondingly, in the 
scatter plot in Fig. 1, the data points cluster about the 45-degree line but with small fluctuations 
above and below it for both investors and non-investors. The correlations between focal and 
corresponding control offer were 0.86 for non-investors and 0.90 for investors, respectively (p 






Result 2. In Experiment 1, the proposers’ offers in their chosen focal game alternative were 
similar to those in the corresponding control game. 
 
– Insert Figure 1 around here – 
 
This result in particular means that the offers of investing proposers did not exhibit 
expectations of reciprocity (which would have made the offers more stringent than in the 
comparable control condition). Furthermore, among the control games, as indicated in Table 
1, the proposer offered significantly less when there was an outside option of 40 tokens, 
compared with when there was not, controlling for the pie size. The proposer was obviously 
aware of the outside option’s influence on the responder’s demand for fairness (see below). 
The variations could be understood when the offers are expressed as percentages of Mj-Cj, the 
pie size in surplus of the outside option; as shown in Table 1 and supported by statistical 
analysis, when expressed in this way, the effects of the outside option on the offers went away 
(p > 0.1 in all relevant paired t-tests).  
The observation carries over to the focal game as well. For example, as percentages of 
the surplus, the offers were on average 43.27% for non-investors playing (200,40) and 41.67% 
for investors playing (240,0) in the focal game. Between-subjects t-test yielded a non-
significant difference (p > 0.7). Note that such a test potentially violates independence of data 
points, as the proposer subjects self-selected into non-investors and investors. Thus, we re-
analysed the focal game offer data using a sample selection model (see, e.g., Nakosteen & 
Zimmer, 1980). Specifically, we first modelled the proposer’s investment decision as a probit 
binary choice. We then modelled the subsequent offer decision, given either of the two 
investment decisions, as two linear regression models with normally distributed random errors 
that might correlate with the error term of the probit binary choice model. Our aim was 
primarily to check endogeneity, so all three models had only intercept terms. Our analysis 
showed that the correlation between each linear regression model error term and the probit 
model error term was non-significantly different from zero (p > 0.9). Hence we conclude that 







4.3.2.2. Responders’ minimum acceptable offers (MAOs) 
Of the 48 responder subjects, 45 (93.75%) exhibited normal monotonic preference in 
the sense that, in every game in the experiment, they accepted an offer as long as the offer was 
sufficiently high. That is, they were consistently threshold players in the terminology of 
Bellemare et al. (2008). The remaining three subjects (6.25%) rejected offers that were either 
too low or too high in every one of the five games (the second threshold being always higher 
than half of the total pie size); those subjects were consistently plateau players in the 
terminology of Bellemare et al. In all observations, it was always possible to define an 
unambiguous minimum acceptable offer (MAO). We shall focus our analysis on the MAOs in 
the data and report calculations based only on the MAOs; incorporating the more atypical 
decision strategies of the three plateau players in our analysis does not alter our major 
conclusions. 
 
– Insert Table 2 around here – 
 
Table 2 and Fig. 2 summarize our findings for the responders. There were no significant 
differences in mean MAOs (in number of tokens) between the control game (200,40) and its 
counterpart among the focal game alternatives, and similarly with the control game (240,0) and 
its focal alternative counterpart; paired t-test comparisons in both cases yielded p>0.5. A 
consistent picture emerges from the very similar distributions of MAOs within each panel in 
the histograms in Fig. 2. In fact, 38 subjects (79.17%) prescribed the same MAO over the two 
(200,40) games, and 35 subjects (72.92%) prescribed the same MAO over the two (240,0) 
games. Correspondingly, the correlations between focal and corresponding control game 
MAOs were 0.90 for (200,40) and 0.88 for (240,0), respectively (p < 0.01 in both cases). That 
is: 
 
Result 3. In Experiment 1, the responders’ minimum acceptable offers in each focal game 
alternative were similar to those in the corresponding control game. 
 






Informal verbal comments from the responder subjects rarely considered the proposer’s 
endogenous choice between the two alternatives in the focal game. One subject explicitly 
mentioned that he/she ignored that choice and made decisions only in response to the amount 
of the offer. It seems that responder subjects were aware of the proposer’s choice of alternatives 
in the focal game, but considered each alternative, once chosen, in the same standalone context 
as the control games. Approximately half of the subjects mentioned their willingness to accept 
any positive offer, with acknowledgement of the proposer’s bargaining position. This is 
reflected in the modes in the histograms in Fig. 2 being consistently at 20 tokens (with 30%-
35% subjects choosing 20 tokens as MAO across the games represented). However, a 
considerable number of subjects also mentioned fairness of split as a criterion, as well as the 
intention to punish the proposer who offered too little. For Alternative A, the focal game 
alternative that would be played if the proposer decided not to give up the outside option, some 
subjects used that outside option (40 tokens) as a reference point for their MAOs.  
Another major observation is that the responders had significantly lower MAOs as 
percentages of the pie size, when the proposer had the outside option of 40 tokens. As displayed 
in Table 2, these were typically 25-28% when the proposer had the outside option, and 21-22% 
otherwise, with statistical evidence as indicated in the table (paired t-test between the control 
games of (200,40) and (240,0) yielded p < 0.05 as well). The variations could be understood 
when the MAOs are expressed as percentages of the amount allocated in surplus of the outside 
option, as indicated in Table 2 and supported by statistical analysis (p > 0.8 in relevant paired 
t-tests for the effects of the outside option). That is, across different games, responders’ MAOs 
were consistently a similar percentage of the surplus. Such an interpretation is in line with 
Section 4.2. 
 
4.3.2.3. Expected payoffs 
With data points of proposer offers and responders’ MAOs, we can work out statistics 
of the results of subject interactions, when subjects in the two roles were randomly matched to 
play the games. Relevant dependent variables include acceptance probability (the probability 
that proposers’ offers were accepted by responders), the expected payoffs of the two roles, and 
the sum of those two expected payoffs. Table 3 summarizes the results of such calculations 
with the following proposer-based approach: for the offer of every proposer subject in every 





randomly matched responder subject from the experiment, using the responder subjects’ 
submitted decisions. That became a data point for acceptance probability. From that 
probability, we could work out the expected payoff of the proposer subject, the expected payoff 
of a randomly matched responder subject, and the total expected payoff of the two. These 
became data points of the expected payoff variables. Means and standard deviations of these 
variables across proposer subjects could then be readily obtained.   
 
– Insert Table 3 around here – 
 
Consistent with previous analysis, we have not found significant differences in any of 
the dependent variables in Table 3 between the control game (200,40) and its counterpart 
among the focal game alternatives, and similarly between the control game (240,0) and its focal 
alternative counterpart. All related paired t-test comparisons yielded p>0.4. 
We next focus on comparing expected payoffs under the two alternatives in the focal 
game. Between-subjects t-tests yielded p > 0.3 for proposer’s expected payoff between non-
investors and investors (106.6 tokens vs. 109.7 tokens), but p < 0.05 for responder’s expected 
payoff (61.86 tokens vs. 86.23 tokens) and total expected payoff (168.5 tokens vs. 195.9 
tokens). Sample selection model analysis, with the same approach as that for the proposer 
offers, showed that the correlations in error terms between the probit model for the investment 
choice and each of the linear regression models for the expected payoffs was non-significant 
(p> 0.9). We conclude that our between-subjects t-test results are valid. Therefore: 
 
Result 4. In Experiment 1, among the proposers, the expected payoffs of investors and non-
investors were not significantly different. In contrast, responders benefitted on average from 
being matched with an investor than with a non-investor. Correspondingly, investors brought 
higher total expected payoff to the relationship than non-investors.  
 
In other words, investing in the relationship did not benefit the proposers in Experiment 
1; instead, the responders extracted all the additional expected payoff brought about by the 
investment. This is in sharp contrast to standard economic predictions based on common 
knowledge of pure self-interest-maximization, which would suggest that the investing proposer 





investing proposers in our experiment could foresee the responder’s demand for fairness, and 
made sufficient concessions in their offers to responders. The concessions resulted in a similar 
acceptance probability as under no investment, but also a similar expected payoff. Non-
investing proposers, meanwhile, benefitted from their outside option, which served as: (a) a 
“bargaining chip” that could lower the responder’s MAO, and (b) a guaranteed payoff when 
the offer was rejected (which could happen with a substantial probability on average).  
Our analysis therefore suggests that, in Experiment 1, similar strategic considerations 
were played out as in our earlier theoretical analysis, leading to the significant existence of 
hold-up. In fact, we can try to apply the results of the experiment to evaluate the inequality 
criterion of hold-up put forward at the end of Section 4.2. To proceed, we first assume a 
representative offer (as percentage of surplus value) of σ*=0.4 (Table 1), and a representative 
acceptance probability of p(σ*)=0.8 (Table 3), as the optimized values of these quantities for 
an expected payoff maximizing proposer. Meanwhile, the parameters of the focal game are 
such that MNI = 200, MI = 240, and CNI = 40. Substituting these into the inequality at the end 
of Section 4.2, we obtain 0.48 on the left-hand side vs. 0.5 on the right-hand side. That is, the 
proposer would be almost indifferent between investing and not investing. Tie breakers for the 
investment decision could be due to a heterogeneous spread of proposer beliefs over the 
responders’ inequity aversion, which corresponds to a spread of σ*and p(σ*) around the above 
representative values. Or, tie breakers could be due to other relatively minor factors in utilities, 
such as the proposer’s aversion to advantageous inequality (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), or 
the proposer’s model of the responder having non-linear terms in payoff differences beyond 
the Fehr-Schmidt model (see, e.g., Loewenstein et al., 1989, and an application in Bellemare 
et al., 2008). These effects might have manifested like a random noise among our proposer 
subjects, which would then correspond with our observation of approximately half of the 
proposer subjects choosing each of these decisions.     
 
4.4. Experiment 2: Self-serving bias, or  
insufficient reciprocal path dependence in fairness concerns? 
In the data from Experiment 1, we have not detected significant reciprocal behaviour 
of responder subjects towards the proposer subjects’ investment decisions. That is, the 
responder subjects exhibited demand for fairness that traced insufficiently backwards to the 





forget the past” because otherwise they would have felt obliged to lower their demand for 
fairness. In other words, responder subjects might have been influenced by a self-serving bias. 
Self-serving bias has indeed been observed in previous bargaining studies (e.g., Knez & 
Camerer, 1995; Babcock et al., 1995; Babcock et al., 1996; Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; 
Charness & Haruvy, 2000; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2013). Such possibility prompted us to 
investigate whether responder behaviour in Experiment 1 was driven by self-serving bias in 
any significant sense. Alternatively, our observations might have been driven by a more 
fundamental lack of reciprocal path dependence in fairness concerns among humans – so that 
even a neutral third party would not see reciprocity towards the proposer’s investment as an 
important normative factor in the responder’s decisions.   
Hence, in Experiment 2, we asked subjects to indicate, as third-party, neutral observers, 
their ideas of “fair” allocation of value in the focal game alternatives in Experiment 1, and their 
corresponding control games. If the subjects in Experiment 2 exhibited significant awareness 
of reciprocity to proposer investment as part of their notion of fairness, then the responder 
subjects in Experiment 1 might well have been affected by self-serving bias. Otherwise, the 
idea of a fundamental lack of reciprocal path dependence in fairness concerns might be a better 
approach to organizing our observations. 
4.4.1. Procedures 
Forty-two subjects from the same subject pool as Experiment 1 participated in 
Experiment 2; none of them participated in Experiment 1. Each subject was first given a brief 
outline of the ultimatum games in Experiment 1, described as an “earlier experiment,” followed 
by a practice task that was also similar to that in Experiment 1. Afterwards, the experiment 
moved on to its main section, with a Qualtrics interface that was very similar to the responder’s 
in Experiment 1, but including only the (200,40) and (240,0) control games, followed by the 
two focal game alternatives. Moreover, the subject was asked to “please indicate what a fair 
decision (Accept or Reject) by Participant R should be” for each presented offer in each 
game (the bold text is as appeared in the experiment). In addition, every subject was provided 
an on-screen text box at the end of the experiment, which prompted them to write down any 
comments regarding how they evaluated "fair decisions" in the games. As compensation, 
subjects were informed that three £50 Amazon gift voucher would be given out via a prize 






Of the 42 subjects, 31 (73.81%) exhibited normal monotonic preference in the sense 
that, in every one of the four games in the experiment, they (as third-party observers) accepted 
an offer for the responder as long as the offer was sufficiently high. That is, they were 
consistently threshold players in the terminology of Bellemare et al. (2008). Of the remaining 
subjects, nine (21.43%) rejected offers that were either too low or too high in every game (the 
second threshold being always higher than half of the total pie size); those subjects were 
consistently plateau players as per Bellemare et al. The remaining two subjects accepted low 
offers but rejected high offers in at least some of the games, and none of them switched more 
than twice between accept and reject as the offer increased in any given game. In all 
observations, it was always possible to define an unambiguous MAO. We shall focus our 
analysis on the MAOs in the data. 
 
– Insert Table 4 around here – 
 
Table 4 and Fig. 3 summarize our main findings. As it appears, even as third-party 
observers judging what fair decisions should be, subjects were consistently non-reciprocal 
towards the investor. There were no significant differences in mean MAOs (in number of 
tokens) between the control game (200,40) and its counterpart among the focal game 
alternatives, and similarly between the control game (240,0) and its focal alternative 
counterpart: paired t-test comparisons in both cases yielded p>0.8. A consistent picture 
emerges from the very similar distributions of MAOs within each panel in the histograms in 
Fig. 3. In fact, 30 subjects (71.43%) prescribed the same MAO over the two (200,40) games, 
and 27 subjects (64.29%) prescribed the same MAO over the two (240,0) games. 
Correspondingly, the correlations between focal and corresponding control game MAOs were 
0.82 for (200,40) and 0.88 for (240,0), respectively (p < 0.01 in both cases). To conclude: 
 
Result 5. In Experiment 2, the “fair” minimum acceptable offers in each focal game alternative 
were similar to those in the corresponding control game. 
 






Informal verbal comments collected at the end of the experiment suggest that subjects 
had deliberated carefully with their decisions. In fact, there were some elaborately spelt out 
views of fairness regarding the games. Those views were highly heterogeneous: some subjects 
considered any positive offer to be fair, while some saw fair offers as only offers resulting in 
equal split of the pie. Only one subject raised a comment regarding reciprocity towards the 
proposer’s choice in the focal game, and that comment was framed in the spirit of negative 
reciprocity, that is, the proposer should be punished for not choosing the (240,0) alternative. 
The concern for distributional fairness among subjects was reflected in the histograms in Fig. 
3 being much more centered around higher offers than the corresponding ones for Experiment 
1 in Fig. 2. 
We also observe that the MAO as a percentage of the pie size was on average not 
significantly different across games (p > 0.4 in all paired t-test comparisons), and was 
consistently around 30% to 32%. This implies that, as a percentage of the surplus over the 
outside option, the mean MAO was significantly higher in the (200,40) games than in the 
(240,0) games, as is also indicated in Table 4 with statistical evidence. These results are 
markedly opposite from the corresponding ones in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, with real 
payoff at stake, the responders were often more concerned with pecuniary self-interest than 
with fairness, and were more sensitive to the outside option (if any) as a bargaining advantage 
of the proposer. As a result, in contrast with the subjects in Experiment 2, the responders in 
Experiment 1 exhibited lower MAO as percentage of the pie size in games in which the 
proposer had the outside option of 40, but similar MAOs across games as percentage of the 
value in surplus of the outside option.  
An important upshot is that, if the allocation of values in the focal game was left to the 
jurisdiction of the third-party subjects in Experiment 2, the proposers would benefit from 
investing, as their payoffs would be significantly higher (see the last row in Table 4) when the 
value of the relationship was enhanced under investment. This was due to: (a) Experiment 2 
subjects’ consistent application of proportional split of the pie across games, and (b) if 
allocation was really left to third-party jurisdiction, there would be no issue of bargaining 
breakdown. Meanwhile, in Experiment 1, with the acceptance rate being considerably less than 
certain, and the responder indicating lower MAO when the proposer had an outside option of 
40, the expected payoffs for the proposer were not significantly different across the different 






4.5. Concluding remarks 
In identifying a novel causal link between fairness concerns and hold-up problems, we 
contribute to the studies of both social preferences and incomplete contracts. Our contributions 
have been supported by theoretical analysis as well as experimental evidence. It is important 
to re-emphasize that the hold-up problems we study are driven, as opposed to mitigated (as 
studied in previous literature), by social preference. In our setup, the existence of demand for 
fairness could be strong enough to induce a hold-up where there would have been none, had 
there been no social preference at all.  
We also contribute to the study of social preferences in highlighting a scenario in which 
demand for distributional fairness potentially conflicts with reciprocating tendencies; our 
experimental evidence suggests an overwhelming dominance of the former over the latter. It is 
true that humans have a general capacity to reciprocate positively, as demonstrated by trust 
game experiments from Berg et al. (1995) onwards. Further results such as Cox (2004) 
established the independence of reciprocal tendency from social preferences for distributional 
fairness; studies such as Gneezy and List (2006) established the impact of reciprocity on 
economic activities in the field. While acknowledging these facts, what we have demonstrated 
is that reciprocity might trace insufficiently backwards over a path of actions, so that it cannot 
remedy hold-up induced by current distributional fairness demand. 
In fact, in our data for Experiment 1, we have not detected any significant positive 
reciprocal behaviour of the responders towards the welfare-enhancing actions of investing 
proposers. Moreover, only responders benefitted significantly from an investment, in terms of 
their expected payoffs in the experiment. Accordingly, in Experiment 1, only 46% of the 
proposers invested in the relationship; the widespread underinvestment empirically presented 
a hold-up problem. 
In Experiment 2, subjects as third-party observers largely considered any control game 
and its corresponding focal game alternative in the same manner, as far as “fair” minimum 
acceptable offers were concerned. Thus, there is no evidence that insufficient reciprocity 
towards the investing party in Experiment 1 was due to self-serving bias. The phenomenon 
seemed to be the result of a fundamental lack of reciprocal path dependence in fairness 
concerns. Previous studies such as Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) and Bartling and Schmidt (2015) 





of mitigating hold-up. Our observations do not contest these findings. Rather, our objectives 
pertain to historical actions that contributed to current welfare, rather than historical reference 
points per se, and we find that the historical actions in our settings had non-significant influence 
on the current fairness norm. It thus appears that subject decisions across both experiments fit 
Cappelen et al. (2007)’s description of strict egalitarianism better than the other types of 
fairness ideals that they proposed. 
Our research can be extended in multiple directions. One possible direction is to 
develop a deeper understanding of our hold-up context by studying more complex forms of 
bargaining, including alternating-offer and free-form bargaining. For example, in alternating-
offer bargaining experiments, players could strategically manipulate their demand for fairness 
in intriguing ways (see discussion in Zwick & Mak, 2012). Another direction pertains to 
communication: if the investor can voice and defend his/her own contribution during 
bargaining, would that mitigate the insufficient reciprocal path dependence in the non-
investor’s fairness concerns? Further, if the two parties could conduct pre-play communication, 
as has been researched in another stream of experimental studies on standard hold-up problems 
(see the introductory section), would that mitigate hold-up in our context too? And how would 
the impact of all these factors change in an ongoing, long-term relationship? The crux is that 
fairness concerns are highly and dynamically susceptible to contextual influences, so that it 
would be an important next step to identify more of those influences that can mitigate the hold-
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4.7. Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
Major results of Experiment 1: Mean proposer offers to responders.  
 
 Control games  Focal game alternatives 
 (200,0) (200,40) (240,0) (240,40)  (200,40) (240,0) 
 Non-investors (26 subjects) 
In tokens 92.31a 66.92a 104.6b 80.00b  69.23 – 
 (26.58) (30.95) (30.62) (43.82)  (31.61) – 
As % of Mj 46.15a 33.46a 43.59b 33.33b  34.62 – 
As % of (Mj - Cj) 46.15 41.83 43.59 40.00  43.27 – 
 Investors (22  subjects) 
In tokens 79.09c 69.09c 101.8b 81.82b  – 100.0 
 (20.91) (23.69) (26.84) (30.18)  – (28.28) 
As % of Mj 39.55c 34.55c 42.42b 34.09b  – 41.67 
As % of (Mj - Cj) 39.55 43.18 42.42 40.91  – 41.67 
 Pooled (48 subjects) 
In tokens 86.25a 67.92a 103.3b 80.83b  83.33 
 (24.81) (27.60) (28.68) (37.80)  (33.60) 
As % of Mj 43.13a 33.96a 43.06b 33.68b  37.85 
As % of (Mj - Cj) 43.13 42.45 43.06 40.42  42.53 
Note: For an entry under Game j, Mj is the pie size of the game, Cj is the outside option of the 
proposer. Standard deviations of offer to responder (in tokens) are included in parentheses. The 
standard deviations of the other dependent variables are all directly proportional to that of the 
corresponding one in tokens. a, b Significant at 1% according to paired t-test comparing the 
same type of dependent variable. c Significant at 5% according to paired t-test comparing the 







Major results of Experiment 1: Mean responders’ minimum acceptable offers 
(MAOs).  
 
 Control Games  Focal game alternatives 
 (200,0) (200,40) (240,0) (240,40)  (200,40) (240,0) 
In tokens 56.25a 44.58 a 61.67b 50.83b  43.33c 62.92c 
 (43.60) (29.82) (45.73) (35.96)  (28.68) (47.93) 
As % of Mj 28.13 a 22.29 a 25.69 b 21.18b  21.67c 26.22c 
As % of (Mj-Cj) 28.13 27.86 25.69 25.42  27.08 26.22 
 
Note: No. of subjects = 48. For an entry under Game j, Mj is the pie size of the game, Cj is the 
outside option of the proposer. Standard deviations of MAOs in tokens are included in 
parentheses. The standard deviations of the other dependent variables are all directly 
proportional to the corresponding one in tokens. a, b, c Significant at 5% according to paired t-







Major results of Experiment 1: Means of proposer-based interactions statistics.  
 Control games  Focal game alternatives 
 (200,0) (200,40) (240,0) (240,40)  (200,40) (240,0) 
 Non-investors (26 subjects) 
Acceptance probability 0.86 0.78 0.85c 0.76c  0.80 – 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.23)  (0.21) – 
Expected payoff (tokens):       – 
Proposer 88.25a 106.7a 109.8b 122.5b  106.6 – 
 (9.48) (9.18) (9.08) (15.62)  (10.76) – 
Responder 83.06a 58.69a 94.25c 70.24c  61.86 – 
 (32.20) (36.19) (37.92) (49.76)  (37.19) – 
Total 171.3 165.4 204.0 192.7  168.5 – 
 (34.41) (34.22) (45.23) (45.58)  (34.27) – 
 Investors (22 subjects) 
Acceptance probability 0.75 0.82 0.83 0.81  – 0.82 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)  – (0.18) 
Expected payoff (tokens):      –  
Proposer 87.50a 110.3a 109.8b 130.0b  – 109.7 
 (7.13) (6.74) (8.01) (7.86)  – (11.11) 
Responder 63.07 60.30 88.81c 71.57c  – 86.23 
 (29.62) (28.47) (37.34) (37.36)  – (38.27) 
Total 150.6a 170.6a 198.6 201.6  – 195.9 
 (36.56) (28.01) (44.03) (38.70)  – (43.66) 
 Pooled (48 subjects) 
Acceptance probability 0.81 0.80 0.84 0.78  0.81 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21)  (0.20) 
Expected payoff (tokens):       
Proposer 87.91a 108.4a 109.8b 125.9b  108.0 
 (8.40) (8.27) (8.52) (13.10)  (10.91) 
Responder 73.90a 59.43a 91.75b 70.85b  73.01 
 (32.33) (32.55) (37.35) (44.06)  (39.25) 
Total 161.8 167.8 201.6 196.8  181.0 
 (36.55) (31.31) (44.29) (42.36)  (40.83) 
Note: See the main text for an explanation of our proposer-based approach to calculating 
expected payoffs. a, b Significant at 1% according to paired t-test comparing the same type of 







Major results of Experiment 2.  
 
 Control games  Focal game alternatives 
 (200,40) (240,0)  (200,40) (240,0) 
Mean fair MAO for Responder:      
In tokens 61.90a 76.19a  62.38b 77.62b 
 (36.11) (50.41)  (34.84) (50.40) 
As % of Mj 30.95 31.75  31.19 32.34 
As % of (Mj - Cj) 38.69a 31.75a  38.99b 32.34b 
      
Mean Proposer payoff with MAO in tokens 
(= Mj - MAO) 
138.1a 163.8a  137.6b 162.4b 
      
Note: For an entry under Game j, Mj is the pie size of the game, Cj is the outside option of the 
proposer. Standard deviations of fair MAOs in tokens are included in parentheses. The standard 
deviations of the other dependent variables are all directly proportional to the corresponding 
one in tokens. a, b, c Significant at 1% according to paired t-test, when the same type of 







Figure 1: Scatter plot of proposers’ percentage offers to responders in focal game vs. 
corresponding control game in Experiment 1. 
 
Note: Pie size is the total number of experimental tokens allocated in the ultimatum game. For 
Alternative A (the choice of non-investors) in the focal game, it is 200 tokens; for Alternative 
B (the choice of investors), it is 240 tokens. The corresponding control game is the control 
game with the same parameters as the alternative chosen by the proposer subject in the focal 
game. Thus, the corresponding control game is (200,40) for non-investors and (240,0) for 
investors. Note also that there are many identical pairs of offers across proposer subjects for 






































Figure 2: Histograms of minimum acceptable offers of responder 
subjects in Experiment 1 
 
 
Note: One subject indicated a high MAO of 220 in the focal game alternative (240,0) based on 
the view (expressed in informal verbal comments at the end of the experiment) that he/she 
would not accept any allocation that did not leave him/her anything less than the “best possible 
situation” (here presumably the pie size minus the minimal positive amount that the proposer 
might keep). Another subject indicated a high MAO of 140 in the control game (240,0); the 
subject expressed a trade-off between profit maximization and demand for fairness, but 
otherwise it is not clear why he/she indicated such a high MAO. All other MAOs were not 
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Figure 3: Histograms of fair minimum acceptable offers for responders 







Note: One subject prescribed very high MAOs (140 in the (200,40) games and 220 in the 
(240,0) games) based on the view (expressed in informal verbal comments at the end of the 
experiment) that the responder “had the bargaining power in this situation” so that the proposer 
should only be able to earn an amount that was just higher than his/her outside option. All other 
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Instructions for Experiment 1  
The experiment was conducted using an adaptation of the Qualtrics survey interface. The 
following presents the main decision tasks as seen by subjects on their computer screens. 
Further details such as consent form and practice task are omitted and are available from the 
authors upon request. 
In what follows, the highlighting in yellow is as appeared in the experimental interface. 
However, any text in square brackets [ ] are notes on the procedures for the purpose of this 
document, and is not part of the experimental interface. 
 
4.8.1 Instructions for the Proposer  
Welcome! 
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this decision making study.   
Please read these instructions carefully.   
From now on, until the end of the study, please do not communicate with the other participants 
in any way. If one or more participants do communicate with one another, then your session 
may have to be terminated.   
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the study coordinator will come to assist 
you. 
Procedures 
This study consists of three parts.   
Part 1 explains the tasks to you using an example, and provides you an opportunity to practice.   
Part 2 is the main part of the study. It consists of five independent tasks. You will be paid for 
one randomly selected task out of the first four tasks, plus the fifth task.   







Consider the following example. 
There are two participants: Participant P and Participant R.   
There is a fixed amount of tokens to be allocated between the two participants. In this example 
the amount is 200 tokens.   
Participant P makes an offer to Participant R about how to allocate the 200 tokens between 
him/herself and Participant R.   
Any allocation that is a multiple of 20 tokens is allowed, including that in which Participant P 
















Participant R accepts, Participant P and Participant R receive the amounts as specified in 





If Participant R rejects, Participant R receives 0 tokens (nothing) while Participant P receives 
a pre-determined number of tokens, which in this example is 40 tokens.          
 
You now have the opportunity to practice as both Participant P and Participant R: 
 







This part of the study consists of five independent tasks. Half of the participants will be 
randomly assigned the role of Participant P, while the remaining half will be assigned the role 
of Participant R. Every participant will be assigned the same role throughout all five tasks. 
You can earn some tokens (experimental currency) from the tasks, which will be converted to 
pound sterling when you will be paid. The conversion rate is 30 tokens = £1. 
We will randomly select one out of the first four tasks, and you will be paid your earnings in 
the selected task. In addition, you will be paid your earnings in the fifth task. To sum up, you 
will be paid for one randomly selected task out of the first four tasks, plus the fifth task. 
For each of these tasks, you will be randomly and anonymously matched with a participant in 
a different role from yours. The matching for the tasks will be independent, so that you could 
be matched with a different participant from one task to another. Your earnings from the tasks 
will depend on your decisions and the decisions of the participants you are matched with. 







[Task 1 to Task 4 are on the same webpage and subjects could scroll back and forth between 
the tasks when completing them. Task 5 was on a separate set of webpages and subjects could 
not return to previous tasks once they started Task 5.] 
Please Read Carefully 
Task 1 to Task 4 
Instructions 
In each of Task 1 to Task 4, you, as Participant P, will make an offer about how to allocate a 
fixed number of tokens between yourself and Participant R. Any allocation that is a multiple 
of 20 tokens is allowed, including that in which you offer to allocate all the tokens to yourself 
and 0 tokens (nothing) to Participant R. 
Participant R will need to decide whether to accept or reject the allocation. If Participant R 
accepts, you and Participant R receive the amounts as specified in your offer. If Participant R 
rejects, Participant R receives 0 tokens (nothing) while you receive a pre-determined number 








Total number of tokens: 200 
If Participant R rejects your offer, you receive 40 tokens and Participant R receives 0 
tokens (nothing). 
Please choose the allocation you offer Participant R by ticking the corresponding button: 
o Participant R receives 0 tokens, you receive 200 tokens 
o Participant R receives 20 tokens, you receive 180 tokens 
o Participant R receives 40 tokens, you receive 160 tokens 
o Participant R receives 60 tokens, you receive 140 tokens 
o Participant R receives 80 tokens, you receive 120 tokens 
o Participant R receives 100 tokens, you receive 100 tokens 
o Participant R receives 120 tokens, you receive 80 tokens 
o Participant R receives 140 tokens, you receive 60 tokens 
o Participant R receives 160 tokens, you receive 40 tokens 
o Participant R receives 180 tokens, you receive 20 tokens 







Total number of tokens: 200 
If Participant R rejects your offer, you receive 0 tokens (nothing) and Participant R 
receives 0 tokens (nothing). 
Please choose the allocation you offer Participant R by ticking the corresponding button: 
o Participant R receives 0 tokens, you receive 200 tokens 
o Participant R receives 20 tokens, you receive 180 tokens 
o Participant R receives 40 tokens, you receive 160 tokens 
o Participant R receives 60 tokens, you receive 140 tokens 
o Participant R receives 80 tokens, you receive 120 tokens 
o Participant R receives 100 tokens, you receive 100 tokens 
o Participant R receives 120 tokens, you receive 80 tokens 
o Participant R receives 140 tokens, you receive 60 tokens 
o Participant R receives 160 tokens, you receive 40 tokens 
o Participant R receives 180 tokens, you receive 20 tokens 







Total number of tokens: 240 
If Participant R rejects your offer, you receive 40 tokens and Participant R receives 0 
tokens (nothing). 
Please choose the allocation you offer Participant R by ticking the corresponding button: 
o Participant R receives 0 tokens, you receive 240 tokens 
o Participant R receives 20 tokens, you receive 220 tokens 
o Participant R receives 40 tokens, you receive 200 tokens 
o Participant R receives 60 tokens, you receive 180 tokens 
o Participant R receives 80 tokens, you receive 160 tokens 
o Participant R receives 100 tokens, you receive 140 tokens 
o Participant R receives 120 tokens, you receive 120 tokens 
o Participant R receives 140 tokens, you receive 100 tokens 
o Participant R receives 160 tokens, you receive 80 tokens 
o Participant R receives 180 tokens, you receive 60 tokens 
o Participant R receives 200 tokens, you receive 40 tokens 
o Participant R receives 220 tokens, you receive 20 tokens 







Total number of tokens: 240 
If Participant R rejects your offer, you receive 0 tokens (nothing) and Participant R 
receives 0 tokens (nothing). 
Please choose the allocation you offer Participant R by ticking the corresponding button: 
o Participant R receives 0 tokens, you receive 240 tokens 
o Participant R receives 20 tokens, you receive 220 tokens 
o Participant R receives 40 tokens, you receive 200 tokens 
o Participant R receives 60 tokens, you receive 180 tokens 
o Participant R receives 80 tokens, you receive 160 tokens 
o Participant R receives 100 tokens, you receive 140 tokens 
o Participant R receives 120 tokens, you receive 120 tokens 
o Participant R receives 140 tokens, you receive 100 tokens 
o Participant R receives 160 tokens, you receive 80 tokens 
o Participant R receives 180 tokens, you receive 60 tokens 
o Participant R receives 200 tokens, you receive 40 tokens 
o Participant R receives 220 tokens, you receive 20 tokens 







Please note that you will be paid your earnings in this task (Task 5). 
Task 5 
Instructions 
In this task, you, as Participant P, will make a decision first, by choosing one out of two 
alternatives: 
Alternative A: 
If you choose this alternative, your next decision will be to make an offer about how to allocate 
200 tokens between yourself and Participant R. Any allocation that is a multiple of 20 tokens 
is allowed, including that in which you offer to allocate all the tokens to yourself and 0 tokens 
(nothing) to Participant R. 
Participant R will need to decide whether to accept or reject the allocation. If Participant R 
accepts, the two participants receive the amounts as specified in your offer. If Participant R 
rejects, you receive 40 tokens while Participant R receives 0 tokens (nothing).  
Alternative B: 
If you choose this alternative, your next decision will be to make an offer about how to allocate 
240 tokens between yourself and Participant R. Any allocation that is a multiple of 20 tokens 
is allowed, including that in which you offer to allocate all the tokens to yourself and 0 tokens 
(nothing) to Participant R. 
Participant R will need to decide whether to accept or reject the allocation. If Participant R 
accepts, the two participants receive the amounts as specified in your offer. If Participant R 
rejects, both participants receive 0 tokens (nothing). 
To summarise:                                     
  If Participant R rejects your offer... 




Participant R receives 
(tokens) 
A 200 40 0 








To summarise:                                     
  If Participant R rejects your offer... 
Alternative Total number of tokens 
to be allocated 
You receive 
(tokens) 
Participant R receives 
(tokens) 
A 200 40 0 
B 240 0 0 
 
Please choose between Alternative A and Alternative B: 
o Alternative A 







[Based on what the proposer chooses, the following piped text appeared.] 
Alternative A: 
Total number of tokens: 200 
If Participant R rejects your offer, you receive 40 tokens and Participant R receives 0 
tokens (nothing).  
Please choose the allocation you offer Participant R by ticking the corresponding button: 
o Participant R receives 0 tokens, you receive 200 tokens 
o Participant R receives 20 tokens, you receive 180 tokens 
o Participant R receives 40 tokens, you receive 160 tokens 
o Participant R receives 60 tokens, you receive 140 tokens 
o Participant R receives 80 tokens, you receive 120 tokens 
o Participant R receives 100 tokens, you receive 100 tokens 
o Participant R receives 120 tokens, you receive 80 tokens 
o Participant R receives 140 tokens, you receive 60 tokens 
o Participant R receives 160 tokens, you receive 40 tokens 
o Participant R receives 180 tokens, you receive 20 tokens 







Total number of tokens: 240 
If Participant R rejects your offer, you receive 0 tokens (nothing) and Participant R 
receives 0 tokens (nothing).  
Please choose the allocation you offer Participant R by ticking the corresponding button: 
o Participant R receives 0 tokens, you receive 240 tokens 
o Participant R receives 20 tokens, you receive 220 tokens 
o Participant R receives 40 tokens, you receive 200 tokens 
o Participant R receives 60 tokens, you receive 180 tokens 
o Participant R receives 80 tokens, you receive 160 tokens 
o Participant R receives 100 tokens, you receive 140 tokens 
o Participant R receives 120 tokens, you receive 120 tokens 
o Participant R receives 140 tokens, you receive 100 tokens 
o Participant R receives 160 tokens, you receive 80 tokens 
o Participant R receives 180 tokens, you receive 60 tokens 
o Participant R receives 200 tokens, you receive 40 tokens 
o Participant R receives 220 tokens, you receive 20 tokens 
o Participant R receives 240 tokens, you receive 0 tokens 
 
You have entered your decisions for all five tasks. Feel free to use the back button to review 
your decisions.   








4.8.2. Instructions for the Responder 
[The interface up to and including the practice task is identical to the Proposer’s. The following 
is the main decision task.] 
Please Read Carefully 
Task 1 to Task 4 
Instructions 
In each of Task 1 to Task 4, Participant P makes an offer about how to allocate a fixed number 
of tokens between him/herself and Participant R (you). Any allocation that is a multiple of 20 
tokens is allowed, including that in which Participant P offers to allocate all the tokens to 
him/herself and 0 tokens (nothing) to you. 
You, as Participant R, will need to decide whether to accept or reject the allocation. If you 
accept, you and Participant P will receive the amounts as specified in Participant P’s offer. If 
you reject, you receive 0 tokens (nothing) while Participant P receives a pre-determined 








Total number of tokens: 200 
If you reject Participant P's offer, Participant P receives 40 tokens and you receive 0 
tokens (nothing). 
For each of the following allocations, please indicate whether you would accept or reject (by 
ticking the corresponding button) if Participant P offers that allocation to you: 
 Accept Reject 
You receive 0 tokens, Participant P receives 200 tokens o  o  
You receive 20 tokens, Participant P receives 180 tokens o  o  
You receive 40 tokens, Participant P receives 160 tokens o  o  
You receive 60 tokens, Participant P receives 140 tokens o  o  
You receive 80 tokens, Participant P receives 120 tokens o  o  
You receive 100 tokens, Participant P receives 100 tokens o  o  
You receive 120 tokens, Participant P receives 80 tokens o  o  
You receive 140 tokens, Participant P receives 60 tokens o  o  
You receive 160 tokens, Participant P receives 40 tokens o  o  
You receive 180 tokens, Participant P receives 20 tokens o  o  









Total number of tokens: 200 
If you reject Participant P's offer, Participant P receives 0 tokens (nothing) and 
you receive 0 tokens (nothing). 
For each of the following allocations, please indicate whether you would accept or reject (by 
ticking the corresponding button) if Participant P offers that allocation to you: 
 Accept Reject 
You receive 0 tokens, Participant P receives 200 tokens o  o  
You receive 20 tokens, Participant P receives 180 tokens o  o  
You receive 40 tokens, Participant P receives 160 tokens o  o  
You receive 60 tokens, Participant P receives 140 tokens o  o  
You receive 80 tokens, Participant P receives 120 tokens o  o  
You receive 100 tokens, Participant P receives 100 tokens o  o  
You receive 120 tokens, Participant P receives 80 tokens o  o  
You receive 140 tokens, Participant P receives 60 tokens o  o  
You receive 160 tokens, Participant P receives 40 tokens o  o  
You receive 180 tokens, Participant P receives 20 tokens o  o  







Total number of tokens: 240 
If you reject Participant P's offer, Participant P receives 40 tokens and you receive 0 
tokens (nothing). 
For each of the following allocations, please indicate whether you would accept or reject (by 
ticking the corresponding button) if Participant P offers that allocation to you: 
 Accept Reject 
You receive 0 tokens, Participant P receives 240 tokens o  o  
You receive 20 tokens, Participant P receives 220 tokens o  o  
You receive 40 tokens, Participant P receives 200 tokens o  o  
You receive 60 tokens, Participant P receives 180 tokens o  o  
You receive 80 tokens, Participant P receives 160 tokens o  o  
You receive 100 tokens, Participant P receives 140 tokens o  o  
You receive 120 tokens, Participant P receives 120 tokens o  o  
You receive 140 tokens, Participant P receives 100 tokens o  o  
You receive 160 tokens, Participant P receives 80 tokens o  o  
You receive 180 tokens, Participant P receives 60 tokens o  o  
You receive 200 tokens, Participant P receives 40 tokens o  o  
You receive 220 tokens, Participant P receives 20 tokens o  o  
You receive 240 tokens, Participant P receives 0 tokens o  o  
Task 4: 





If you reject Participant P's offer, Participant P receives 0 tokens (nothing) and 
you receive 0 tokens (nothing). 
For each of the following allocations, please indicate whether you would accept or reject (by 
ticking the corresponding button) if Participant P offers that allocation to you: 
 Accept Reject 
You receive 0 tokens, Participant P receives 240 tokens o  o  
You receive 20 tokens, Participant P receives 220 tokens o  o  
You receive 40 tokens, Participant P receives 200 tokens o  o  
You receive 60 tokens, Participant P receives 180 tokens o  o  
You receive 80 tokens, Participant P receives 160 tokens o  o  
You receive 100 tokens, Participant P receives 140 tokens o  o  
You receive 120 tokens, Participant P receives 120 tokens o  o  
You receive 140 tokens, Participant P receives 100 tokens o  o  
You receive 160 tokens, Participant P receives 80 tokens o  o  
You receive 180 tokens, Participant P receives 60 tokens o  o  
You receive 200 tokens, Participant P receives 40 tokens o  o  
You receive 220 tokens, Participant P receives 20 tokens o  o  
You receive 240 tokens, Participant P receives 0 tokens o  o  
Please note that you will be paid your earnings in this task (Task 5). 
Task 5 
Instructions 






If Participant P chooses this alternative, his/her next decision is to make an offer about how to 
allocate 200 tokens between him/herself and Participant R (you). Any allocation that is a 
multiple of 20 tokens is allowed, including that in which Participant P offers to allocate all the 
tokens to him/herself and 0 tokens (nothing) to you. 
You, as Participant R, will need to decide whether to accept or reject the allocation. If you 
accept, you and Participant P will receive the amounts as specified in Participant P’s offer. If 
you reject, Participant P receives 40 tokens while you receive 0 tokens (nothing). 
Alternative B: 
If Participant P chooses this alternative, his/her next decision is to make an offer about how to 
allocate 240 tokens between him/herself and Participant R (you).   Any allocation that is a 
multiple of 20 tokens is allowed, including that in which Participant P offers to allocate all the 
tokens to him/herself and 0 tokens (nothing) to you. 
You, as Participant R, will need to decide whether to accept or reject the allocation. If you 
accept, you and Participant P will receive the amounts as specified in Participant P’s offer. If 
you reject, both, you and Participant P, will receive 0 tokens (nothing).    
 To summarise:                                     
  If you reject Participant P’s offer 
Alternative Total number of tokens 
to be allocated 




A 200 40 0 







Suppose Participant P chooses Alternative A... 
Total number of tokens: 200 
If you reject Participant P's offer, Participant P receives 40 tokens and you receive 0 
tokens (nothing). For each of the following allocations, please indicate whether you would 
accept or reject (by ticking the corresponding button) if Participant P offers that allocation to 
you: 
 Accept Reject 
You receive 0 tokens, Participant P receives 200 tokens o  o  
You receive 20 tokens, Participant P receives 180 tokens o  o  
You receive 40 tokens, Participant P receives 160 tokens o  o  
You receive 60 tokens, Participant P receives 140 tokens o  o  
You receive 80 tokens, Participant P receives 120 tokens o  o  
You receive 100 tokens, Participant P receives 100 tokens o  o  
You receive 120 tokens, Participant P receives 80 tokens o  o  
You receive 140 tokens, Participant P receives 60 tokens o  o  
You receive 160 tokens, Participant P receives 40 tokens o  o  
You receive 180 tokens, Participant P receives 20 tokens o  o  







Suppose Participant P chooses Alternative B... 
Total number of tokens: 240 
If you reject Participant P's offer, Participant P receives 0 tokens (nothing) and 
you receive 0 tokens (nothing).  
For each of the following allocations, please indicate whether you would accept or reject (by 
ticking the corresponding button) if Participant P offers that allocation to you: 
 Accept Reject 
You receive 0 tokens, Participant P receives 240 tokens o  o  
You receive 20 tokens, Participant P receives 220 tokens o  o  
You receive 40 tokens, Participant P receives 200 tokens o  o  
You receive 60 tokens, Participant P receives 180 tokens o  o  
You receive 80 tokens, Participant P receives 160 tokens o  o  
You receive 100 tokens, Participant P receives 140 tokens o  o  
You receive 120 tokens, Participant P receives 120 tokens o  o  
You receive 140 tokens, Participant P receives 100 tokens o  o  
You receive 160 tokens, Participant P receives 80 tokens o  o  
You receive 180 tokens, Participant P receives 60 tokens o  o  
You receive 200 tokens, Participant P receives 40 tokens o  o  
You receive 220 tokens, Participant P receives 20 tokens o  o  
You receive 240 tokens, Participant P receives 0 tokens o  o  
You have entered your decisions for all five tasks. Feel free to use the back button to review 





5. Concluding Remarks 
This thesis furthers the exploration of social influences in decision making. Central to 
the three studies is a motivation to provide evidence-based actionable insights to marketers and 
policy makers. In addition, these investigations into the fields of competition, reciprocal 
behaviour and hold-up raise opportunities for further extension of the work. In this section, we 
summarise the principal findings of the individual papers, highlight their limitations and 
explore future research opportunities.  
In Chapter 2, “Contagion of the Competitive Spirit: The Influence of a Competition on 
Non-Competitors”, we show that competitions, alongside impacting competitors, can also 
influence a potentially much large number of non-competing individuals who are aware of the 
competition. Furthermore, we find that this effect is moderated by reward levels. Our findings 
suggest that higher rewards might motivate competitors more, but it can also be demotivating 
to non-competitors. For practitioners and researchers alike, the contagion effect we investigate 
has relevance in many real world domains. These non-competitors could be important to a 
campaign, its productivity and eventual success. It is therefore important to consider these non-
competitors when designing competition and implementing gamification strategies. Just 
because an individual does not take part in a competition does not mean they are unaffected by 
the social comparison dynamics created by it. Chapter 2 provides evidence that there could 
indeed be an influence, and moreover, the influence could change in an intriguing way 
according to the characteristics of the competition. 
 In Chapter 3, “The Negative Effects of Precommitment on Reciprocal Behaviour: 
Evidence from a Series of Voluntary Payment Experiments”, we examined how 
precommitment could affect reciprocal behaviour. The study focused on baseline scenarios 
without uncertainty, where intuitively precommitment should make little difference. However, 
counter to the intuition, we were show that precommitment can weaken reciprocal behaviour. 
Our research suggests that, for example, a non-profit should offer souvenir gifts to donors 
before asking for donations; the management of a well-known museum or regular charity event 
should solicit donations at exit; and a business running a pay-what-you-want campaign on 
familiar products should ask customers for payments after the customers obtain the products. 
Lastly, although the study focused on voluntary payments, the underlying mental-accounting 





 In Chapter 4, “Hold-Up Induced by Demand for Fairness: Theory and Experimental 
Evidence”, we show that that fairness concerns can also induce hold-up problems and thus 
significant inefficiencies. In particular, the study highlights a scenario in which demand for 
distributional fairness potentially conflicts with reciprocating tendencies. Our theoretical 
analysis and experimental evidence demonstrate that reciprocity might trace insufficiently 
backwards over a path of actions, so that it cannot remedy hold-up induced by perceived 
distributional fairness demand. The study is a work in progress and its shortcomings deserves 
to be recognised. Next, we discuss the limitations and possibilities of extension for all three 
studies. 
 
5.1. Limitations and Future Opportunities 
To our knowledge, there has been little, if any, research on how competitions influence 
non-competitors’ performance in similar tasks. In exploring this new domain, Chapter 2 
pioneers the investigation into an important area of human behaviour. We find consistent 
evidence for the presence of the contagion effect and provide process evidence that the 
observed effect, among non-competitors, is due to heightened social comparison motivation 
created by the awareness of competition. We further conjecture a two-stage detailed 
psychological mechanism behind this phenomenon (see General Discussion section for 
Chapter 2). However, these possible intermediate processes, have not been tested, and could 
provide an excellent extension of the study. In addition, the idea of the ‘contagion effect of 
competition’ could be extended to group settings. For example, a possible research objective 
could be to explore how competition between members of a group, with a common objective, 
could affect group members who are not-competing. Extensions of the contagion effect of 
competitive spirit merit in-depth explorations that could provide more insights to a fundamental 
and ever-present human behaviour. 
Additionally, it is pertinent to recognise the boundary conditions for this research. 
Although we find competitors and non-competitors in many instances, they may not be 
involved in the same type of task. Cases like these, are beyond the scope of the contagion effect. 
In fact, small differences in task undertaken could mean that  non-competitors could be beyond 
the ‘influence’ of competition. Similarly, here we observe the contagion effect in one 
dimensional attributes like effort, time and money. Although easy to compare, participants do 





additional dimensions or the possibility of differentiating arises, non-competitors may want to 
distinguish themselves to assert the differences. This too is a boundary condition. 
Similar to the second chapter, Chapter 3 is not without its limitations. Chapter 3 focused 
on reciprocal behaviour in form of voluntary payments with a rationale that voluntary payments 
are a sensitive measure of reciprocity and a common occurrence in practice. A possible research 
extension would be to see if our conclusions hold for other domains of reciprocal behaviour 
such as time and effort. Furthermore, it would be of value to investigate how the effects of 
precommitment would change with a change in the level and nature of uncertainty of benefits 
(see Concluding Discussion section for Chapter 3 for more). Lastly, a third extension of the 
research could be to examine the effect of endogeneity of the precommitment decision. For 
example, what could be the effect of a beneficiary choosing whether or not to precommit? Or, 
how would an individual’s reciprocal behaviour change if there is a possibility of reneging on 
the precommitted behaviour? Answering these questions could uncover more actionable 
insights into reciprocal behaviour, and relevant real-life decisions. 
Chapter 4 is a work in progress and has a few key areas where it can be improved. 
Following the insights from our model, the focus on Experiment 1 was to examine the 
dynamics of a potential hold-up. As such, the experiment used strategy method over Qualtrics 
platform to be able to accurately pinpoint the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) for each 
responder. As a consequence of this set up, responders and proposers were randomly matched 
only after the data was collected. It is of value to see if our conclusions hold in cases where 
participant decisions are sequential in an interactive laboratory setting. Further, in our 
experiments, the investment cost is equal to the increase in total amount to be allocated. 
Although this provides a baseline condition for testing, the choice in parameters is limiting. A 
possible extension here could be to add the rate of return for the investment as a manipulation 
itself. In addition to improvements to the current design, Chapter 4 also provides a variety of 
future research opportunities. Some possible directions for extensions include exploring the 
same hold-up context using alternating-offer, free-form bargaining, pre-play communication 
and interaction between the two parties (see Concluding Remarks section in Chapter 4 for 
more). It would also be of value to explore additional cases with varying investment roles. For 
example, how would the dynamics of bargaining change when investment decisions are made 
by a responder? Or, how would this dynamic vary if both proposer and the responder have the 
option to invest. Lastly, as mentioned earlier, it would be interesting to see how the above 





To conclude, this dissertation provides consistent evidence that competitions influence 
non-competitors in intriguing ways, precommitment can weaken reciprocity, and fairness 
concerns can induce hold-up. In doing so, the thesis advances the exploration into, and extends 
boundaries of, research on social influences in decision making. In addition, the evidence-
based, counter-intuitive nature of the findings provide novel and actionable insights to 
practitioners. It is anticipated that evidence from the three studies prove useful for decision-
makers and furthers academic conversations and investigations. 
